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ABSTRACT
TEM PERING THE RESOURCE CURSE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
AN EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS OF THE VARIANCE OF THE RESOURCE 
CURSE IN NIGERIA AND BOTSW ANA
Jody-Ann Suzette Jones 
Old Dominion University, 2014 
Director: Dr. Francis J. Adams
The issue o f the resource curse has been central to the academic debate since the 
1990s. In recent years, we have witnessed a resurgence o f  the importance o f  this topic 
because o f  the discoveries o f oil, natural gas, and other point source resources in several 
developing countries such as Ghana, M ozambique and Tanzania. It is important to note 
that while the resource curse is not solely limited to developing states, the main 
observation is that the majority of negative effects associated with the resource curse 
primarily afflicts poorer countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is reported 
that sub-Saharan Africa possesses the majority o f the world's natural resources; therefore, 
it is puzzling that most o f these resource-rich countries continue to struggle both 
economically and politically despite the abundance o f  mineral and/or oil wealth. Using a 
three-level typology, this study presents a comparative examination o f  the leadership, 
government and civil society in Botswana and Nigeria. It explains how the contrast in 
these critical aspects has an effect on the degree o f  the resource curse. The study finds 
that, overall, Botswana has depicted a lower degree o f the resource curse than N igeria 
because o f  three predominant reasons: 1) its leadership has been more cohesive in terms 
o f attaining its developmental goals because o f  the similarity in socioeconomic 
backgrounds among its immediate post-independent leaders, 2) the country adheres to a
developmental state model, which has engendered a highly meritocratic civil service that 
is relatively free of corruption and 3) its civil society has depicted a greater level o f 
cooperation and collaboration with the government, which could possibly be because o f 
the relatively higher degree o f ethnic homogeneity and consequently lower level o f  ethnic 
strife.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
The issue o f the resource curse has been central to the academic debate since the 
1980s. However, recently we have witnessed a resurgence o f  this topic due to the recent 
discoveries o f oil, natural gas, and other point source resources in several developing 
countries. It is important to note that while natural resources are not limited solely to 
developing nations; it is observed that the problems with natural resources seem to affect 
developing countries primarily. In particular, African countries seem to bear the brunt o f 
the negative aspects associated with the resource curse. In a continent that possesses the 
majority o f the world's natural resource is it is puzzling that most o f  these resource rich 
countries continue to struggle both economically and politically despite the abundance o f  
mineral and/or oil wealth. It is estimated that the African continent holds 60%  o f  the 
world’s natural resources yet despite this resource abundance it is one o f  the poorest 
regions in the w orld.1
Overcoming these hurdles is critical to developm ent. Regardless o f  how much 
resource wealth a country has, if it is not effectively m anaged and invested, the country 
will forever remain poor and underdeveloped. Joseph Stiglitz argues that resource-rich 
African countries will not reap the benefits from their oil and mineral reserves unless
'Hazel McFerson, "Extractive Industries and African Democracy: Can the Resource Curse Be Exorcised?," 
International Studies Perspectives II (2010).
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proper institutions and laws are implemented in order to guard against the squandering 
and misuse o f resource revenues.2
The concept o f the resource curse was originally proffered by Richard Auty who 
used this term to identify the paradoxical relationship between a large am ount o f resource 
revenues and poor economic growth.3Auty posited that “not only may resource-rich 
countries fail to benefit from a favorable endowment; they m ay actually perform worse 
than less well-endowed countries.”4Auty wrote this text in the early 1990s in the context 
o f  recently independent developing states that have discovered new forms o f  wealth 
creation. However, almost two decades later, Auty's thesis is still strikingly relevant. The 
majority o f resource rich African states are still struggling w ith developmental challenges 
and unquestionably, these struggles are associated with the resource curse.
A prime example o f  such a state is Nigeria. Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer 
and exporter. It has the largest source o f  human capital being Africa's most populous 
country and is often described as the mammoth o f  West Africa. Revenue W atch Institute 
reports that “Oil revenues totaled $50.3 billion in 2011 and generated 70 percent o f  
government revenues."5Despite the impressive am ount o f revenue that the governm ent 
collects from oil exports a significant portion o f the country's population rem ains mired 
in poverty. The World Bank consistently ranks Nigeria as a lower middle income country 
in its annual World Development Indicators. In 2010, the index estimated that 
approximately 46 percent o f the population was living below the poverty line.6And
:Joseph Stiglitz, "Resource Rich, Cash Poor," 5 /ateAugust 12, 2012.
’Richard Auty. Sustaining D evelopm ent in M inera l E conom ies: The Resource C urse Thesis (London: 
Routledge. 1993).
"Ibid.
5 Revenue Watch Institute, http://www.revenuewatch.org/countries/africaynigeria/overview
6 World Bank Development Indicators
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similarly, the 2013 United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human 
Development Index (HDI) ranks Nigeria 153 out o f  186 countries which places it in the 
low human development category. In addition to this, the country has also struggled with 
political stability and governance. After independence in 1960 the country was 
predominantly under military rule. It was only since 1999 that the country returned to a 
democratic regime. It is evidence such as this that led several scholars to identify the 
negative correlation between resource abundance and economic growth and developm ent 
as a curse.
However, not every resource abundant African country has encountered the same 
experience as Nigeria. Take for example Botswana which is the continent's largest 
diamond producer and exporter. In contrast to Nigeria, Botswana has a thriving economy 
and a strong stable democratic political system. The UNDP's HDI ranks Botswana 119 
out o f 186 countries and is placed in the medium human development category. In 
addition to this, Botswana has been an uninterrupted democracy since independence in 
1966. While Botswana has its issues with poverty and inequality, it is nevertheless one o f 
the few developing countries that have m anaged to am eliorate the degree o f  the resource 
curse. It is important to note that it is impossible to escape the resource curse entirely; 
however, as seen in the case o f  Botswana it is definitely possible to mitigate the most 
negative and harmful aspects o f  the curse.
The contrast in these two countries presents an interesting puzzle. If we found that 
every resource rich African country experienced a high degree of the resource curse then 
the resource curse thesis would prove to be more tenable. However, the problem  is that 
countries such as Botswana have disproved or discredited this thesis. It stands to reason
4
therefore that there are factors that determine the level o f  the resource curse that a 
country experiences. Several studies have discussed how Botswana has escaped the 
resource curse. Most o f these countries have attributed Botswana’s success to sound 
institutions and economic policies and lack o f  corruption; however no study to the best o f 
my knowledge has looked at why that is. What sets a country such as Botswana apart 
from Nigeria? Furthermore, no study has taken a look at other factors besides those on 
the state level o f analysis. This is where this study contributes to the literature. 1 posit that 
the variation o f the resource curse is contingent upon certain conditions found within 
three basic levels o f analysis within a country. These factors are: 1) leadership attributes 
2) governance attributes and 3) the degree o f influence that the civil society has in 
affecting critical developmental policies
This study is based upon the assum ption that the resource curse is not a 
dichotomous phenomenon as the literature would suggest but is more o f  a continuum 
with varying degrees o f the curse. Consequently, this study poses the following research 
questions based on case studies o f Nigeria and Botswana: I) what are the differences in 
leadership between Nigeria and Botswana that account for divergent experiences in the 
level o f the resource curse? 2) What are the differences in the type o f governance that 
account for varying levels o f the resource curse? And 3) what differences can be 
observed in the civil societies within these countries that could account for differences in 
the level o f the resource curse?
This study finds that Nigeria has had a greater degree o f the resource curse than 
Botswana because o f three major reasons. First, it lacked a post-independent 
transformational leadership; instead the country’s leadership has been characterized by
5
personal rule for the majority o f  its post-independent period. Second, its governm ent has 
been weak and divided because o f factional conflict thus this engendered weak 
democratic institutions and rampant corruption. Because o f  these attributes and its 
overdependence on oil resources it has depicted characteristics of a Rentier state. And 
three, civil society for the most part has had relatively little influence in improving 
transparency and accountability in the extractive sector because o f  these non­
democratizing forces.
On the contrary, Botswana’s leaders adopted developm entally-oriented policies 
that precluded the resource curse. The united and cohesive leadership setup favorable 
agreements with foreign mining companies that benefitted Botswana’s econom y and also 
implemented specific policies that contributed to the long-term developm ent o f  the 
country. Second, from the governmental level, Botswana modeled its political behavior to 
that o f a developmental state, that is, it fostered an autonomous bureaucracy and 
meritocratic civil service that was relatively non-corrupt. Furthermore, the state invested 
substantially on public goods such as health and education instead o f  spending on 
outlandish public investment projects. Third, from the civil society level, dom estic NGOs 
have been relatively more effective in influencing policy, particularly in the 
developmental sector. This has in turn resulted in a relatively lower rate o f  corruption and 
conflict and thus facilitating a more conducive environm ent for economic growth and 
development in. Furthermore, because o f  the willingness o f  the governm ent to heed 
suggestions from the civil society, multistakeholder initiatives such as the Kimberley 
Process have been able to be relatively more effective as well.
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Research Design and Justification of Method
The overarching research question of this study is What accounts fo r  the 
differences in the level o f  the resource curse between Botswana and Nigeria?  A 
comparative case study method is chosen in order to capture the subtle nuances and 
variations of the resource curse dilemma. Many quantitative case studies have presented 
evidence o f the causes o f  the resource curse;7but very few to my knowledge have 
explained why there is variation in the degree o f  the resource curse across countries. 
Thus, in this circumstance a small-A7analysis is m ore suitable because it will sufficiently 
distinguish the differences between a country with a low degree o f  the resource curse 
from one with a higher degree o f the resource curse. These intricate details would 
otherwise be overlooked in a large-A7 design.
As such, this study uses a process tracing m ethod in order to identify and explain 
the differences in the extent o f  the resource curse between these two countries. George 
and Bennett explain that process tracing "attempts to trace the links between possible 
causes and observed outcom es."8 The major puzzle that we aim to decipher is what 
makes Botswana stand out as the anomaly in terms o f the resource curse. The research 
problem is that not every sub-Saharan African resource rich country has experienced a 
high degree o f the resource curse. I f  it is possible for at least one country to have a low 
extent o f  the resource curse then it is important to find out what underlying factors or 
conditions contribute to this exceptionality.
7 One o f  the first quantitative studies that addressed this challenge was Sachs and W arner 's  1995 stud>, 
which will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.
sAlexander George and Andrew* Bennett, Case Studies a n d  Theory D evelopm ent in the S oc ia l Sciences  
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
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Justification of Case Selection
The particular cases were selected for several reasons. First, it was important to 
select two cases that represented examples on opposite ends of the resource curse 
continuum. Botswana was selected primarily because it is one of the few resource-rich 
sub-Saharan African countries that have depicted a low degree o f the resource curse. It is 
the region's largest diamond exporter yet it has maintained sustained economic growth 
and a stable democratic polity in spite o f  its resource wealth. In contrast, Nigeria, the 
region's largest oil exporter has continually struggled with critical aspects o f the resource 
curse: it has a high level o f corruption, vulnerable to commodity price shocks, its non­
resource sectors have been crowded out by the oil industry, and it carries a high debt 
burden. Because o f all these factors and others, the economy has been suffering despite 
its oil wealth. Combined with an ailing economy, Nigeria has also experience several 
bouts o f political instability. It struggled with military coups and authoritarian regimes 
until 1999.
The second reason I selected these two particular countries to examine is because 
o f their similarity in colonial origins. Several studies have discussed the effects that 
colonialism has had on economic development in former colonies.9 Both countries were 
colonized by the British administration and thus this controls for rival argum ents 
concerning the role o f colonial institutions on economic development. If  these countries 
had different colonial origins yet different economic outcomes then the possibility exists 
that the type o f  colonization would play a significant role. However, since the British 
colonized both countries yet Botswana has experienced a substantially lower degree o f
9Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Rosinson. "The Colonial Origins o f  Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation," A m erican Econom ic Review  91, no. 5 (2001).
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the resource curse and consequently a higher level o f  economic developm ent than 
Nigeria, this excludes the divergent colonial adm inistration argument as a possible 
explanation for the differences in resource curse degree.
I acknowledge that there are distinctive differences between these tw o countries. 
The first significant difference is the fact that Nigeria is an oil-rich country; whereas 
Botswana is a diamond producer. Second, the countries also have distinctive differences 
in terms o f size, population, ethnic composition, religion, and governmental structure. 
One cannot ignore the fact that these two differences might play a role in the variation o f 
the resource curse in these countries. Nevertheless, the countries are different enough to 
allow for an interesting study but similar enough in order to make controlled 
comparisons. If the cases were too similar, then there would hardly be any variation in 
which we could control for and thus test for explanations.
The Distinctiveness of Oil
It is important to note that the oil industry is very different from the diamond 
industry. W hereas, the structure o f the oil industry is oligopolistic in nature, one major 
company, for the most part, has controlled the diam ond industry for decades, DeBeers. 
The oil market is significantly larger than the diamond market and represents the largest 
sector in global trade.10 Consequently, the price o f  oil has been highly more volatile than 
diamonds over the years."T here  are a num ber o f reasons that make oil a unique 
commodity and could possibly account for the higher degree o f  the resource curse in oil- 
rich nations.
l0Steve Yetiv. The Petroleum  Triangle: Oil, G lobalization an d  Terror (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2 0 1 1 ),
11 Inkpen and Moffett (2011) report that the prices o f  crude oil and natural gas are more closely watched 
than any other commodity in the global economy.
9
For one, oil prices are more subject to international events, for exam ple, the Arab 
Oil Crisis o f 1973 and 1979 had a dramatic influence on the power that oil producing 
states had. The Arab Oil Embargo was the greatest transfer of wealth from the rich 
developed countries to the developing world. Furthermore, Yetiv shows that every major 
global recession since the 1950s can be attributed to oil shocks; these include the 
aforementioned 1973 and 1979 crises, the 1990 oil spike when Iraq invaded K uw ait12 and 
most recently the 2008 global recession.13
Two, more actors are involved in the extraction, production and distribution o f 
oil. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, prior to the first Arab Oil Crisis, the 
majority o f oil wealth was entrusted in the hands o f  seven m ajor oil companies, all from 
the U.S. and Europe.14 Colloquially, these companies were named The Seven Sisters and 
controlled approximately 85 percent o f  the w orld’s petroleum reserves.15 Since the 
formation o f OPEC in 1960 however and the subsequent Arab Oil Crises, the influence o f 
the Seven Sisters have markedly decreased. What has supplanted this structure however is 
the rise o f a myriad o f players in the oil industry. These include the successors to the 
Seven Sisters cartel, also known as international oil com panies (IOCs). Although, IOCs 
still play a significant role in the oil industry, in 2009, it was reported that they only 
controlled 6 percent o f the oil trade.16 In lieu o f  the wrested power from the IOCs, the 
players that gained prominence starting in the 1960s have been national oil com panies
'"Steve Yetiv, Economic an d  Strategic Interdependence, Lecture, Graduate Seminar in International 
Relations o f  the Middle East (Norfolk, VA: Old Dominion University, January 25. 2012).
11 Granted, the 2008 recession was primarily because o f  the U.S. housing crisis; however, Jam es Hamilton
shows how oil played a role in this recession as well. See James Hamilton, "Causes and Consequences o f
the Oil Shock o f  2007-08," Brookings Papers on E conom ic A ctiv ity  (2009).
14 Standard Oil Company o f N e w  York, Standard Oil o f  New Jersey , Standard Oil o f  California, G u lf  Oil, 
Texaco, Royal Dutch Shell and Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
15Joseph Hilyard, The O il a n d  Gas Industry: A N ontechnica l G uide (Tulsa, OK; PennW ell Corporation,
2 0 1 2 ).
I6lbid.
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(NOCs). OPEC members thought that nationalizing their oil industries would shift the 
balance o f power from rich industrialized nations into the hands o f the developing oil- 
producing states. As such, many oil-rich developing countries nationalized their oil and 
gas industries during the 1970s, thereby reducing the influence that IOCs had in the oil 
m arket.l7In addition to IOCs and NOCs, there are other subsidiary players in the 
petroleum industry, including Independents, are smaller oil and gas producers that are not 
as vertically integrated as IOCs or NOCs, as such they are involved in either the upstream 
or downstream process; and Juniors, which are basically small Independent firm s.18
Three, the global oil demand is much greater than the demand for diam onds or 
any other commodity for that matter. Oil comprises 80 percent of global trade. This is 
reflected in the central role that oil plays in every major daily activity and process 
including transportation and electricity. Also, oil has been the primary driver o f  industrial 
growth in the developed world during early 20th century, especially with the invention o f 
the automobile and the airplane. The transition from coal to oil in m anufacturing and 
industry provided more efficient methods o f  production and thus aided in the process o f  
rapid industrialization in countries such as the U.S. and Britain. Since the 21st century, 
certain developing countries such as China, Brazil, Russia and India, have been 
aggressively expanding their industry and manufacturing sectors as well and therefore, 
the role of oil has been playing an even greater role in the global economy. Oil is no
17 In 2011, it was reported that Saudi Arabia's national oil company, Saudi Aramco, held 12 percent o f  the
oil market share. Contrast this to the top three IOCs share o f  oil production: Exxon Mobil (3 percent),  BP 
(3 percent) and Royal Dutch Shell (2 percent). Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
http:/7w ww.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/world_oil_market.cfm
lsAndrew Inkpen and Michael Moffett, The G lobal Oil a n d  G as In d u s try  M anagem ent. S tra tegy  and  
Finance (Tulsa. Oklahoma: PennWell Books, 2011).
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longer only a demand o f the rich, industrialized nations; emerging growth are also 
demanding greater quantities o f oil as their economies expand.19
Why Choose Oil and Diamonds
With that being said, I selected cases with different resources because I am 
investigating the phenomenon o f  the resource curse itself and not solely the oil curse or 
the diamond curse. 1 could have just as easily selected two diamond-rich countries such 
as Botswana and Angola, but then, we run into other issues such as the differences in 
colonial heritage, and also by not selecting cases with different resources, we run into the 
potential for bias o f one particular resource.
Several studies have investigated the resource curse problem are related to a 
specific type o f  resource, namely, point-source resources, as opposed to diffused-source 
resources such as agriculture and forestry. The problems evident in countries with point- 
source resources are what authors refer to in the resource curse literature. M avrotas and 
colleagues argue that countries with point-source resources such as oil and hard minerals 
as opposed to diffused source resources such as agriculture are more prone to slow 
economic growth because o f institutional failures.20 Using an econometric model they 
show that point-source resources retard economic growth because o f  the negative 
correlation between these type o f natural resources and governance and dem ocracy.21 
Therefore, since oil and diamonds are classified as both point source resources, we can 
analyze the impacts that they have using the same empirical model. Despite the
19 The International Energy Administration predicts that C hina will surpass the U.S. as the largest global oil 
consumer by 2035. http://w ww.bloomberg .com /news/2014-01-21/china-seen-retaking-Iead-from-u-s-in-oil- 
demand-growth.html.
20George Mavrotas,  Syed Mansoob Murshed, and Sebastian Torres, "Natural Resource Dependence and 
Economic Performance in the 1970-2000 Period," Review o f  D evelopm ent Economics 15, no. 1 (2011).
2lIbid.
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differences in natural resources in the two cases, both countries bear some similarities in 
the effects that point-source resources have on the countries' institutional capacity, which 
is at the crux o f the resource curse thesis.
Explaining the Degree of the Resource Curse
In order to explain the respective levels o f  the resource curse, I utilize a three 
level typology that is based on each country's leadership, government, and civil society. 
Because no existing study has attempted to explain the resource curse from several levels, 
this study draws from a combination o f  sources. As such, three sets o f theoretical 
frameworks underpin this study's typology: 1) the individual level theories o f
transformational leadership and personal rule, 2) the governmental level theories o f  the 
developmental state and the Rentier state, and 3) the influence o f  civil 
society/multistakeholder initiatives in m itigating the resource curse. Table 1 illustrates 
this typology and 1 will also discuss the details o f this theoretical model below.
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Table 1.1: Explaining the Variation o f the Resource Curse in Nigeria and Botswana
N ig e r ia B o t s w a n a
D e g r e e  o f  
T h e  
R e s o u r c e  
C u r s e
Low
L e a d e r s h ip
Fragmented leadership with  
com peting personal interests 
and goals
C ohesive, charism atic 
leadership with a clear focus  
and vision and hom ogenous  
background.










d Hoc Responses to 
Corruption
• Bureaucracy relatively
autonomous and ; 
insulated from 
competing interests
• Syncretic blending of 
pre-colonial and 
postcolonial institutions 
because the type o f  
colonial rule.




S o c ie t y
Less Influential More Influential
The Individual Level
The first set o f theories corresponds to the individual level o f  analysis. The study 
o f leadership is uncharacteristic in International Relations because o f the dom inant role o f 
the state level o f  analysis in the realist and liberal paradigms. However, in looking at such 
a complex phenomenon as the resource curse it is important to consider levels o f  analysis 
beyond the state in order to provide a more comprehensive perspective on the issue. In 
terms o f development, leadership matters even m ore than a country’s colonial experience. 
Rotberg accounts that controlling for leadership, the type o f colonial authority plays a
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less significant role. According to Rotberg, “ idiosyncratic behavior o f  individual leaders 
have arguably mattered more than whatever were those countries’ perceived colonial 
legacies.”22
There are three key points to keep in mind when studying leadership theory as it 
pertains to the personality o f political figures. First o f  all it is important to note that there 
is not a unanimous definition o f  personality because it is such a complex and multifaceted 
term. This results in a hybrid or eclectic approach in terms o f  defining and 
operationalizing personality traits. Second, there are many different theories o f 
personality but since our study focuses specifically on political leadership this drastically 
narrows the number o f theories on which we will focus. A third important point is that 
personality in a vacuum is hardly influential. Cottam et al highlight that the context or the 
situation in which a particular leader is placed matters far more than specific personality 
traits.23 In other words, different situations may evoke different personality traits.
Transformational and Transactional Leadership
With that said, one o f the more influential theories on leadership as it pertains to 
political figures is Burns’ dichotomy o f  transformational and transactional leadership. 
Burns first espoused these theories in 1978 in his seminal text Leadership: Power and  
Purpose. He described transformational leadership as one in which “ leadership ultimately 
becomes moral in that it raises the level o f  human conduct and ethical aspiration o f  both 
leader and led, and thus it has a transforming effect on both.”24 Transformational leaders 
are usually characterized as charismatic, motivational, visionary and capable o f  leading
"R o b e r t  Rotberg, Transform ative P olitical Leadership  (Chicago: The University o f  Chicago. 2012).
21Martha Cottam et al.. Introduction to P olitical Psychology  (New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2010).
2i|J Bums. Leadership  (New York: Harper and Row . 1978). 20.
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their population to a single, clearly delineated goal or vision. The second aspect o f  Burns 
typology is transactional leadership, which Burns described as one in which the leader 
and followers engage in a reciprocal exchange relationship of valuable econom ic or 
political goods.25
It would appear that Burns classified leaders into either one o f  these categories. 
The limitation to this approach however is that a num ber o f leaders possess a 
combination o f  these traits. No leader is solely transformational or transactional. As 
depicted in Table 1. I show that Botswana’s leaders have leaned closer towards the 
transformational side o f the spectrum. Certainly, some leaders have depicted more 
transformational than transactional traits and vice versa. For example the first president 
Sir Seretse Khama was seen as more dynamic and charismatic hence his leadership style 
was more transformational rather than transactional. However, his successor Quett 
Masire was perceived more as an adept administrator and technocrat rather than a 
visionary and thus was more transactional than transform ational in his leadership style. 
Overall however, Botswana’s leadership was more transformational in scope because o f  
the unity o f  their presidents. Samatar expresses that Botswana m aintained a united, 
dominant elite leadership class that cooperatively established local institutions according 
to the country’s developmental needs.26 The building o f strong institutions from the onset 
of independence was buttressed B otsw ana's potential for resource-led developm ent and 
prosperity . This would not have been possible without the long-term vision o f its leaders.
25Ibid.
26Abdi Samatar, "National Institutions for Development: The Case o f  Botswana," in Tow ards a New M ap  
o f  Africa, ed. Ben Wisner, Camilla Toulmin. and Rutendo Chitiga (London: Earthscan, 2005).
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Personal Rule
Another limitation to Burns’ leadership dichotomy is that some leaders do not 
neatly fit into these categories, especially leaders who are primarily concerned with just 
acquiring power for pow er’s sake. Burns response to this was that it is possible for one to 
wield power without being either transformational or transactional. However, he regarded 
this wielding o f naked power as non-leadership. He argued that in order for leadership to 
take place there needs to be a relationship between leaders and followers. He posited that 
“ leadership, unlike naked power wielding is inseparable from follower’s needs and goals. 
The essence o f  the leader follower relation is the interaction of persons with different 
levels of motivations and o f power potential, including skill, in pursuit o f  comm on or at 
least joint purpose.”27
Nevertheless, there are leaders who do not fit into B urns’ dichotomy. W hether or 
not they wield naked power, they are legitimate leaders nevertheless. During the 
postcolonial period in sub-Saharan Africa one o f  the theories that emerged to describe 
this unique system o f  leadership where unchecked power was wielded is personal rule to 
which we will now turn in the following section.
In Personal Rule in Black Africa, Jackson and Rosberg contend that the transition 
from colonial rule to independence presented a specific set o f  obstacles for Sub-Saharan 
African countries. Whereas, the colonial system was highly institutionalized and 
bureaucratic, the governments o f  the newly independent countries lacked the capacity to 
wield such institutional power. In addition to this, because the majority o f  the African 
countries were multiethnic in composition, leadership became a com petition over 
resources and power-wielding. They posited that:
‘ H u m s .  Leadership.
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"African politics is most often a personal or factiona l struggle to control the 
national government or to influence it: a struggle that is restrained by private and  
tacit agreements, prudential concerns, and personal ties and dependencies rather 
than by public rules and  institutions. The consequences o f  such politics have 
usually been increased political instability and occasionally the deterioration o f  
the game o f  politics into a fig h t among personal and  factional contenders fo r
.•2Xpower.
Furthermore, Jackson and Rosberg noted that “the new African statesman was a 
personal ruler more than a constitutional and institutional one; he ruled by his ability and 
skill (as well as the abilities and skills o f those he could convince to be his supporters), by 
his personal power and legitimacy, and not solely by the title granted to him by the office 
he occupied and the constitution that defined it.”29This motivated them to describe the 
majority o f  sub-Saharan Africa as being led by personal rule. This distinctive type o f rule 
can be described as “a system o f relations linking rulers not with the public or even the 
ruled but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and rivals, who constitute the 
system.”30
This type o f rule directly contrasts to Burns’ typology of transform ational and 
transactional leadership and this is illustrated in the cases. Whereas Botsw ana’s leaders 
operated within the constraints o f its constitution, N igeria’s leaders for the m ost part 
ruled the country according to personal whims. This is demonstrated by the numerous 
military coups and regime interruptions. These individual level theories are important in
28Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in B lack Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant




order to understand the difference in degree o f  the resource curse within these two 
countries because as demonstrated in these cases, type o f leadership affects not just the 
political stability o f the country but it also shapes the long-term developmental trajectory. 
Thus, based on this level o f  analysis we can generate the following hypothesis:
Hi Leadership When a resource-rich country's leadership is characterized by a 
succession o f  leaders that are strictly driven by personal gains; this increases the 
degree o f  the resource curse. In contrast, when a  resource-rich country's 
leadership cohesive and  exhibits greater transformational attributes, it is more 
likely that they will work towards a common goal thus decreasing the extent o f  the 
resource curse.
The Governmental Level
The second set o f  theories corresponds to the governmental level o f  analysis. 
While separate from the individual level o f analysis it cannot be stressed enough that a 
ruler’s leadership style has a direct influence on the country’s type o f  government. The 
central theories that underlie this aspect o f  the m odel are theories o f the developmental 
and Rentier state. The contrast between these state theories is strikingly relevant to the 
type o f governance in the two cases. W hereas, N igeria has exhibited effects o f  the Rentier 
state which is reflected in its weak democratic institutions, high level o f  corruption, less 
skilled civil service and political instability, Botswana in contrast has pursued the path o f 
a developmental state. It has strong democratic institutions, a highly skilled civil service 
based on meritocracy, low level o f corruption and long-term political stability. We will 
begin our discussion with the theoretical framework o f  the Rentier state.
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The Rentier State Theory
The study o f the Rentier state was first embarked upon by Hossein M ahdavy in 
1970 in his analysis o f the Iranian economy. Mahdavy describes Rentier states as “those 
countries that receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external rent. External 
rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns or governm ents 
to individuals, concerns or governments o f  a given country.”31 It is important to note that 
most Rentier states have nationalized their resource sectors. Nigeria nationalized its oil 
sector in 1970.32 Nationalization allows the government to take full control o f  the 
country’s natural resources.
Yates discusses that Mahdavy does not precisely define the param eters in which a 
state may be classified as a Rentier state. It depends on the extent to which a state is 
dependent on its natural resource sector for economic revenues. Yates cites extreme 
examples o f states in which their natural resource sectors have completely overshadowed 
their secondary sectors; critical examples o f  such states are Kuwait and Q atar.33
Building upon M ahdavy’s study, Beblawi describes four characteristics that 
describe a Rentier state: “ first, the Rentier economy must be one where rent situations 
predominate. Second, the origin o f this rent must be external to the econom y. Third, in a 
Rentier state only few are engaged in the generation o f rent, while the majority is 
involved in its distribution and consumption. And fourth, the government m ust be the 
principal recipient o f  the external rent in the econom y.”34 Furthermore, Yates citing
"H osse in  Mahdavy, "The Pattern and Problems o f  Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case o f
Iran," in Econom ic H istory o f  the M iddle East, ed. Michael Cook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). 
"D oug las  Yates. The Rentier State in Africa: O il Rent D ependency and  N eocolonialism  in the Republic o f  
G abon  (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1996).
” lbid.
"Ib id ..  14.
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Luciani describes a Rentier state as that in which “external rent liberates the state from 
the need to extract income from the domestic econom y,”35 This unaccounted revenue 
creates problems. Yates argues that unlike the other primary factor incomes rent does not 
require any input or sacrifice. Furthermore, he posits that the other prim ary factors 
incomes all require substantial effort in order for their benefits to be received: “wages are 
paid for labor, interests for capital employed, and profits for the successful m anagement 
o f risk.”36 On the other hand, rent does not require any o f  the aforementioned inputs, 
instead, rent is perceived more as a gift or a fringe benefit from the extraction o f 
environmental resources.37
In the case o f Nigeria the Rentier state is especially applicable because despite the 
fact that agriculture is its primary sector, oil revenues account for “95 per cent o f foreign 
exchange earnings and 65 per cent o f budgetary revenues.”38 Furthermore, the state has 
utilized fuel subsidies as a means to placate the domestic population. In 2010, when the 
government stopped providing fuel subsidies, widespread riots and upheaval occurred. 
President Jonathan had to concede by partially restoring the fuel subsidies in order to 
pacify the violent demonstrations.39
The Rentier state mentality presents crucial problems for a resource-rich country. 
In fact, this mentality lies at the heart o f the resource curse thesis. Countries such as 
Nigeria, which have enjoyed an unusually high volume o f  resource revenues, are usually 




38 Organization o f  the Petroleum Exporting Countries, "Nigeria Facts and Figures," 
http://vvww.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/l67.htm.
39ADAM NOSSITER, "Under Pressure, Nigerian Leader Relents on Gas Price," New York Times January 
16. 2012.
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government does not need to tax or seek out other sources o f domestic revenue, 
unaccountability and authoritarianism tendencies seem to creep into the country’s 
political institutions. The Rentier state not only adversely affects political institutions but 
it also jeopardizes economic growth and development.
The Developmental State Theory
On the other hand, countries that adopt a developmental state approach to 
governing their resources tend to depict not only a stronger economy but also stronger 
democratic institutions and political stability. Botswana exemplifies a resource-rich 
country that has followed such an approach.
Adrian Leftwich defines development as “the organization, m obilization, 
combination, use and distribution o f resources in new ways, whether these resources take 
the form o f capital, land, human beings or their com bination.”40 He adds that “because 
resources are to be distributed in new ways this autom atically creates winners and losers 
because o f  the varying configurations in distribution.”41 Because of these differences and 
disputes, Leftwich argues that politics plays a critical role in the developmental process. 
He describes politics as “the activities o f conflict, cooperation and negotiation involved 
in the use, production and distribution o f resources, whether material or ideal, whether at 
local, national or international levels, or whether in the private or public dom ains.”42 
Furthermore, the state is the only vehicle capable o f  m anaging or steering these processes 
when private actors fall short.43




43i u : ^
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In Leftwich’s theorization o f the developmental state, he identifies developmental 
states as "those whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonom y, capacity 
and legitimacy at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement o f  explicit 
developmental objectives.”44 Furthermore, Leftwich creates a typology which entail 
seven critical components of the developmental state: “ 1) a determined developm ental 
elite, 2) relative state autonomy, 3) a powerful, com petent and insulated economic 
bureaucracy, 4) a weak and subordinated civil society, 5) the capacity for effective 
management o f  private economic interests, 6) an uneasy m ix of repression and poor 
human rights, and 7) legitimacy and performance.”45
Unquestionably, some elements o f  Leftw ich’s typology no longer apply to 
Botswana or is no longer as relevant. For example, the role of the civil society has 
substantially increased since independence. Carroll and Carroll discuss that the influence 
o f civil society organizations in Botswana has significantly broadened in scope since the 
late 1980s.46 In addition to this, Botswana’s human rights record has also improved. The 
Ibrahim Index o f African Governance ranks Botswana no. 4 out of 54 countries on the 
Participation and Human Rights sub-category. Granted, since the Ibrahim Index was first 
launched in 2007, we cannot measure the trends in Botswana’s human rights record since 
independence. However, what this score does tell us is that comparatively speaking, 
Botswana is among the top performers in Sub-Saharan A frica in terms o f respect for 
human and civil rights.
44lbid.
45Ibid„ 160.
46 Terrance Carroll and Barbara Carroll. "The Rapid Emergence o f  Civil Society in Botswana," 
C om m onw ealth A  C om parative Politics 42. no. 3 (2004).
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Although the weak civil society and repressed human rights elem ents o f 
Leftwich’s typology does not apply to the Botswana state, the remaining com ponents o f 
the typology is largely relevant to the role o f the state in economic developm ent. Other 
scholars seem to concur with Leftwich that Botswana was able to achieve high economic 
growth because it modeled its behavior to that o f  a developm ental state.
According to Samatar, Botswana pursued “entrepreneurial interests with the close 
backing o f the state.”47 This stood in contrast to the continent’s overall anti-statist 
agenda. After the failure o f  many IS1 policies, many African countries (at the behest o f 
international financial institutions) turned away from statist agendas because o f  the 
abysmal economic developmental outcomes. On the contrary, Botswana attained 
substantial economic development with the aid o f  the state without the state being heavy- 
handed or predatory. This developmental role that the state played greatly benefitted the 
country’s economic development.
Furthermore, Samatar argues that Botswana implemented several policies that 
helped to shape its developmental agenda. Central to these policies is the establishm ent o f  
the Ministry o f  Finance and Development Planning (MFDP). This institution was pivotal 
in building and shaping Botswana’s institutional capacity. Samatar expresses that the 
MFDP was instrumental in planning, budgeting, and implementing developm ental 
programs 48 It prevented corruption with a two-step process: “ 1) it ensured the economic 
viability o f a project proposal before granting approval, and 2) it ensured that these 
projects did not surpass the expenditure ceilings.”49 In other words, it was significantly 
difficult for bureaucrats to siphon public funds into their pockets by proposing
47Samatar, "National Institutions for Development: The Case o f  Botswana."
48Ibid.
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outlandishly expensive development projects. Therefore, Samatar concludes that 
Botswana was able to maintain a high level o f  economic development because it 
substantially improved its institutional capacity. Therefore, based on the above theories, 
we can derive the following hypothesis:
H2  State/Government Resource-rich states that succumb to a Rentier state model 
o f  development are more likely to have a higher degree o f  the resource curse. In 
contrast, states that have adopted a developmental state fram ew ork w ill tend to 
have a lower degree o f  the resource curse.
The Civil Society Level
The third level o f analysis looks at the effectiveness o f  civil society organizations 
including international multistakeholder initiatives such as the EIT1 and KPCS in curbing 
the extent o f  the resource curse. Admittedly, this level o f analysis m ight not have as an 
extensive an impact on the level o f the resource curse as the leadership and governm ent 
levels. Carbonnier and others explained that it m ay be too soon to tell if  these m ulti­
stakeholder initiatives are useful in mitigating the resource because o f  the relatively new 
ideas that have been implemented.50 Nevertheless, outside o f  effective leadership and 
sound governmental policies, civil society is the next major source in finding strategies to 
reduce negative aspects o f the resource curse. M any o f these m ultistakeholder initiatives 
include several external actors such as multinational companies, IFIs and international 
non-governmental organizations. Arguably however in term s of curbing the resource 
curse CSOs play the greatest role in these initiatives. Scholte describes the concept o f  
civil society as “a political space, or arena, where self-generated associations o f  citizens
,0Gilles Carbonnier. Fritz Brugger, and Jana Krause. "Global and Local Policy Responses to the Resource
Trap,’’ G lobal G overnance  17, no. 2 (2011).
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seek, from outside political parties, to shape the rules that govern social life. Civil society 
groups bring citizens together non-coercively in deliberate attempts to mould the formal 
laws and informal norms that regulate social relations.'01
This is primarily because o f their potential to respond to issues where 
governments have fallen short or have failed to provide sufficient services or programs to 
the population. Edwards adds to this concept by explaining that people form civil society 
associations in order to “ find inspiration in their struggles for a better w orld.”52 However, 
Carbonnier cautions the limits o f CSOs; he posits that they are two fundamental factors 
that inhibit the capabilities o f CSOs. For one, CSOs usually struggle with their own 
transparency and accountability problem s.53 In fact, several CSOs have been formed by 
public sector actors in order to distract the population from the matters at hand.54 Second, 
CSOs while formed in order to intervene where governm ent fails in fact have no actual 
power in transforming governmental policies.55Carbonnier convincingly argues that "the 
expectations o f  CSOs often stand in contradiction to their actual leverage ."56 
Furthermore, if the CSOs are already politically weak then the probability that 
multistakeholder initiatives (such as the EIT1) have in improving transparency and 
accountability is drastically lowered. Consequently, Carbonnier expresses that 
"experience in several EIT1 implementing countries shows that local civil society remains
51 Jan Aart Scholte, G lobalization: A C ritical Introduction  (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
218.
' 2Michael Edwards. C ivil Society  (Cambridge. UK: Polity Press, 2009).




too weak to fulfill its watchdog function. It is often either co-opted or marginalized by the
57government, or simply lacks the capacity to hold governm ents and business to account."
Weinthai and Luong add that in looking at the effectiveness o f  the civil society, 
the role o f external actors is drastically limited if the domestic institutions in the
58particularly country does not allow for freedom o f  speech, freedom o f the press etc. 
Furthermore, they also posit that the possibility o f  CSOs having a positive impact is 
determined by the ability o f external and local actors to hold governments accountable.59 
And finally, all actors involved including the domestic government m ust have a mutual 
interest in weeding out the corrupt and rent-seeking behavior.60
In order for m ulti-stakeholder initiatives to be influential in reducing the degree o f 
the resource curse in a country two factors need to be present; one, the country needs to 
have strong democratic institutions, two, civil society needs to be active and influential. 
In the cases we study in this project we see a significant difference between these two 
countries in terms o f the ability that m ulti-stakeholder initiatives have in changing 
policies related to natural resources. In Nigeria, multi-stakeholders have had very little 
effect in mitigating critical aspects o f the resource curse namely corruption and rent 
seeking. Although Nigeria is a democracy, it does not have very strong democratic 
institutions. Furthermore, while its civil society is active it is relatively weak and less 
influential because o f  the lack o f democratic institutions. Botswana on the other hand, 
while its civil society is not highly active and influential either, it is relatively more 
influential than Nigeria for one, and more importantly, Botswana has stronger democratic
S7lbid.
58Erika Weinthai and Pauline Luong, "Combating the Resource Curse: An Alternative Solution to 




institutions that allow for multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Kim berley process to 
have a positive effect on the country’s resource policy. Based on this, we can hypothesize 
the following:
H3 Civil Society In resource-rich countries with strong  democratic institutions 
where governments have fa iled  to provide sufficient public  goods and  services to 
the population, one would expect an active civil society with the capacity to shape 
and influence policies that mitigate the resource curse.
Overview o f the Nigeria Case
The first case presented in this study is Nigeria. This country was selected 
primarily because of the ongoing struggle it is has endured with the resource curse. As 
mentioned previously, despite its abundant oil wealth, the country continually ranks low 
on major socioeconomic and development indicators. The historical experience o f  
Nigeria undoubtedly affects its present issues with economic development and political 
stability. Located on the W est coast o f Africa the country is the most populous state on 
the continent. It is also one o f the most diverse countries in the region with over 250 
ethno-linguistic groups. The Northern region primarily consists o f  the Hausa-Fulani 
people that predominantly practice Islam. The Southeast and Southwestern regions are 
predominantly Christian and consist o f the Igbo and Yoruba groups respectively.
Prior to colonization, the area now known as Nigeria consisted o f  several diverse 
groups o f people that were primarily connected through trade. From the 14ih to the 17!h 
century, the economy o f  this region was dependent on the trade of slaves, gold and other 
commodities. Many o f these groups engaged in barter as a means o f  com pensation for
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traded goods. However, by the 19lh century, upon British colonization, the structure o f 
Nigeria's economic activities was transformed. Because the British passed the abolition 
o f the slave trade act in 1807, it compelled the Nigerian territories to seek other forms o f 
‘legitimate com m erce’ instead, such as palm oil production.
The encroachment o f the British onto Nigerian society dramatically transform ed 
critical aspects o f this economy, politics, and culture. The British transform ed Nigeria 
into a Crown Colony and introduced a cash-based economy, a top-dow n political 
hierarchy, and Christianity. The most important effect o f  colonialism how ever was that it 
created an artificial statehood that forced previously autonom ous ethnic groups together 
under a common national identity. This created the environm ent for a m ultitude o f  ethnic 
disputes and factionalism within Nigeria. The discovery o f oil in 1956 further 
complicated this ethnic strife.
Increased ethnic tension is just one o f the ramifications o f the discovery and 
dependence o f oil. Evidence shows that Nigeria has experienced a high degree o f  critical 
aspects o f the resource curse such as Dutch disease, Commodity Price Volatility, Debt 
Burden and Corruption. Among these variables however, corruption seems to be the most 
salient impediment to economic development and it is reflected in N igeria’s poor 
performance on several indicators o f corruption and governance such as Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the World Bank’s W orld Governance 
Indicators and the Ibrahim Index o f African Governance. All these elem ents combined 
together have left Nigeria vulnerable to a high degree o f  the resource curse.
Nigeria's high degree o f the resource curse may be explained from three levels: 
leadership, government and civil society. First, the evidence shows that Nigeria's
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leadership has been characterized by personal rule. Since independence in 1960, the 
country has had 14 leadership transitions, most o f  which were military rulers. During this 
scramble for power, very few developmental goals were set, let alone obtained. Instead, 
the country was fraught with personal competition over oil resources and power.
Second, from the state/governmental level, N igeria can be characterized as a 
Rentier state. This is so not only because o f its overdependence on oil to drive the 
economy but also because of the negative ramifications o f  such dependence. Corruption 
has taken center stage in the public sector because various ethnic groups see the 
competition over oil resources as a zero-sum game instead o f seeing it as a possible 
cooperation game.
The third and final explanation looks at the resource curse from the civil society 
level. Nigeria became a fully compliant m em ber o f the EIT1 in 2010. Despite its 
membership and several audits since then, there has been no improvement in 
accountability. Arguably, because o f Nigeria's weak democratic institutions, civil society 
is unable to wield significant influence as it relates to resource revenues. Even if 
transparency is improved by the publication o f audit reports, there are very few channels 
in which the public can hold the government accountable because o f  these weak 
democratic institutions.
Overview of the Botswana Case
In contrast to Nigeria, Botswana is a sparsely populated, landlocked country 
located in Southern Africa. Despite being relatively ethnically homogenous, its main 
group, the Tswana (which accounts for 80 percent o f the population) consists o f several
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sub-groups that maintain distinct identities. The predom inant religion is Christianity 
accounting for 72 percent o f the population and English is its official language. However, 
because o f the predominance o f  the Tswana ethnic group, the majority (approximately 80 
percent o f the population) all speak the Setswana language.
Botswana was also colonized by the British but instead of being a Crown Colony, 
it was a Protectorate. The central geographical feature in Botswana is the Kalahari desert. 
Because o f  this Botswana's climate is predominantly arid with frequent periods o f  
droughts. As a result o f  this harsh environment, the British found it very difficult to settle 
there. Furthermore, they also found it difficult to exploit agricultural crops such as sugar 
as it did in the West Indies. Consequently, Botswana was established as a Protectorate 
and not a Crown Colony for all these aforementioned reasons. Therefore, many o f  
Botswana’s chiefs were left to rule in lieu o f perm anent British settlers.
The role o f  the Tswana Chiefs during colonial rule was instrumental because they 
took it upon themselves to implement critical developmental projects in order to improve 
Botswana's living conditions. Again, because Botswana w as a Protectorate and not a 
Crown Colony the British did not substantially invest in infrastructure and other public 
goods. Not only did the Tswana chiefs have a strong commitment to developm ent, but 
they also had a high regard for constitutionalism. In fact, by use o f  the comm unal 
advisory group, the kgotla, chiefs could be prosecuted in circumstances where laws or 
customary rules were violated. This goes to show that no one was above the law, not even 
the leaders in the community.
This steadfastness to democratic principles is evident in present-day Botswana. 
The country has had several decades o f uninterrupted democratic rule since independence
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in 1966. It is the only sub-Saharan African country that has not encountered any military 
coups since independence. Furthermore, the country ranks high on m easures o f 
democracy and political authority such as the Freedom House Rankings and the POLITY 
IV data set.
Botswana's exceptionality is also demonstrated in its relatively low level o f  the 
resource curse. It was one o f the few African countries that have mitigated critical aspects 
o f the resource curse. Similar to Nigeria, 1 analyzed patterns in Botswana's leadership, 
government and civil society that have contributed to an overall lower degree o f the 
resource curse. First, the evidence shows that in contrast to Nigeria, Botswana's 
leadership was characterized by transformational leaders who not only inspired their 
population to attain long-term development goals for Botswana but also shared a 
cohesive vision for the country. A plausible explanation for this unity and cohesiveness 
may be attributed to the similar ethnic, socioeconomic upbringing and educational 
backgrounds o f Botswana's leaders. All came from middle-class, cattle-rearing families. 
Furthermore, all the leaders were from the same Tswana ethnic group, thus there is a high 
rate o f  homogeneity within the leadership.
Second, from the governmental level, another striking contrast presented is that 
Botswana adopted a developmental state framework instead o f succumbing to Rentier 
state dynamics despite being a resource wealthy country. The critical characteristics o f 
such types o f state are: an efficient, meritocratic civil service, an autonom ous 
bureaucracy and a relatively low level o f public sector corruption. One o f  the reasons 
Botswana has been able to adopt such an effective fram ework is because it was able to 
syncretically blend its pre-colonial and postcolonial institutions; an example o f this is the
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15 member House of Chiefs which continues the traditional kgotla customs o f advising 
on tribal matters.
Third, admittedly, Botswana’s civil society also suffers drawbacks ju st as Nigeria, 
however, in terms o f  the resource curse; CSOs have had relatively greater success in 
mitigating certain aspects o f the resource curse in Botswana than they had in Nigeria. 
Arguably, civil society was very weak in Botswana upon independence. However, since 
the government enacted key legislations during the 1980s, the country witnessed a 
burgeoning o f  NGO activity. Because o f  this w illingness of the governm ent to 
incorporate NGOs into the political economy o f  the country, and also the overall 
relatively higher level o f democracy, NGOs in Botswana have depicted a relatively 
higher rate o f  effectiveness in terms o f influencing governm ental policies, especially as it 
applies to development. Therefore, one could expect that these institutions have 
contributed to mitigating corruption, conflict and other associated negative aspects o f  the 
resource curse.
Roadmap o f the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 2 surveys the literature 
on the resource curse. This chapter serves two purposes: 1) to trace the history o f  the 
study o f the resource curse and 2) to present the challenges, causes and consequences o f  
mismanagement o f  natural resources.
Chapters 3 and 4 present the Nigeria case. Starting with Chapter 3, which 
discusses the history, geography, demographics, and the structure o f the country’s 
government and economy. The purpose o f  this chapter is to present a
33
framework/background from which we will launch into the dynamics o f  its relationship 
with the resource curse. Chapter 4 begins by showing the extent of the resource curse in 
Nigeria. It analyzes N igeria’s experience with four critical aspects o f  the resource curse: 
1) the Dutch disease, 2) commodity price volatility, 3) debt burden and 4) corruption and 
finds that Nigeria has had a high degree o f the resource curse because o f its failure to 
mitigate or limit the occurrence o f these factors. The second half o f the chapter explains 
why Nigeria has had such a high degree o f the resource curse using the three-level 
framework previously described in this introductory chapter.
Chapters 5 and 6 present the Botswana case. Set up in an identical fram ework as 
the Nigeria case, chapter 5 discusses the country’s history, economy and government. 
Chapter 6 first shows that Botswana has encountered a low extent o f  the resource curse 
not because the four critical aspects are absent from the country but because the 
government has employed measures in order to mitigate the presence o f  these factors. 
The second half o f Chapter 6 explains why Botswana has experienced a low degree o f 
this resource curse. In other words, why has it been successful in im plem enting these 
measures while other countries such as N igeria have not. Chapter 7 concludes our 
discussion o f the resource curse in these two countries and provides implications and 
directions for future research.
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Chapter 2 
A Critical Survey of the Causes o f the Resource Curse 
Introduction
A central problem in resource-rich African countries is how best to manage the 
abundance o f  resources. One would think that the greater resource abundance a country 
has, the more likely it is that sustained economic developm ent can be achieved. However, 
for many sub-Saharan African countries that is not the case. Despite, the abundance o f 
natural resources the sub-continent has, the m ajority o f  countries continue to face 
sustainable economic development challenges. Arguably, several resource-poor African 
countries encounter a myriad o f  other developmental challenges as well. However, what 
is unique about several resource-rich African countries is that despite the high influx o f  
revenues from the extraction o f  oil and/or mineral resources, economic growth tends to 
be slow or worse yet, inversely correlated with resource revenues.
McFerson adds that international companies and other external actors (most 
recently, China) benefit the most from A frica’s mineral reserves.1 Furthermore, because 
o f  the secrecy and the lack o f  accountability on the part o f  local governm ent and local 
leaders, the real value o f  extraction is unknown to the public and unaccounted for.2This 
paradoxical, negative relationship between resource abundance and econom ic growth is 
referred to as the resource curse thesis,3
'McFerson, "Extractive Industries and African Democracy: Can the Resource Curse Be Exorcised?."
*1 bid.
JAut>. Sustain ing D evelopm ent in M inera l Economies: The Resource C urse Thesis.
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Despite the name, it is not the actual resources that causes the curse, or rather the 
poor economic performance. Instead, the curse is created by a combination o f several 
economic and/or political factors that altogether m anifest into an adverse environm ent for 
sustainable economic development. The literature discusses three major causal economic 
explanations for the resource curse: 1) Dutch Disease, 2) Volatility o f  Com m odity Prices 
and 3) Declining Terms of Trade. W hile these factors may explain the economic 
processes that occur during a resource boom, they do not explain how policymakers 
address the high influx o f  resource revenues. Therefore, political explanations seek to 
understand the dynamic o f  the resource curse from the governm ents’ perspective. The 
literature points out that the fundamental reason for the resource curse is based on the 
failure o f  governments to act in the best interest o f their population. Instead, they are 
generally guided out o f self-interest and short-sighted goals. Political explanations may 
be categorized into one o f the following categories: 1) Resources tend to create weak 
institutions and poor governance, 2) Resources tend to breed rent-Seeking and corrupt 
behavior, and 3) As a consequence o f the aforementioned explanations, resources tend to 
erode democratic institutions, thus engendering authoritarianism  and instability.
The major criticism o f the resource curse literature is that authors tend to focus on 
the economic explanations at the expense o f the political factors that could possibly 
account for the resource curse. In fact, the curse itself is nothing more than the 
m ismanagement o f resource revenues, which leads to slow economic growth and low 
levels o f  development. Arguably, governments can mismanage any high influx o f
36
revenue regardless o f  the source.4 If the influx o f other type o f  revenues (such as foreign 
aid, and remittances) has the same negative effect on economic growth, then the 
economic explanations for the resource curse are not as persuasive, thus giving greater 
credence to the political explanations. For the scope o f  this project however, I will limit 
the discussion to the causal explanations for negative economic growth in countries that 
experience resource booms and omit economic crises associated with other revenue 
streams.
The following sections will provide an in-depth, critical discussion and analysis o f 
the seminal texts that address these explanations for the resource curse. The rest o f  this 
paper is organized as follows: 1) Economic Explanations for the Resource Curse, 2) 
Political Explanations for the Resource Curse and 3) Concluding Remarks and 
Criticisms.
Economic Causes
There is consensus in the literature that natural resource abundance is inversely 
correlated with economic growth, however, the economic reasons for this negative 
relationship vary considerably among scholars.
In 1995 and 2001, using a m ultiple regression m odel controlling for several 
external variables such as geography and climate features, Sachs and W arner found 
empirical evidence that natural resource abundance was inversely correlated with
4 Some authors have made comparisons o f  the resource curse to foreign aid. See Kevin Morrison, What 
C an We Learn About the “Resource C urse" fr o m  F oreign A id? , The  World Bank Research Observer 
(Oxford University Press on behalf o f  the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,  2010).
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economic growth from 1970 to 1990.5 Their research was motivated prim arily by the 
slow economic growth experienced by several Latin American countries during the 
postwar era, despite the abundance o f natural resources. Furthermore, their research also 
indicated that controlling for geography and climate variables, and also growth from 
previous non-boom periods, the relationship between natural resources and economic 
growth still depicted a negative relationship. This pressed Sachs and W arner to conclude 
that resource abundance has a deteriorating effect on a country’s economy.
For social scientists (in particular economists) this posed a dilem m a because 
historically nations built their economy based on their natural resources. M ost advanced 
industrialized states such as the U.S., Canada and Norway capitalized on their resources 
and were able to grow their economies at a relatively fast pace. Harold Innis wrote in the 
1950s that countries such as Canada should specialize in exporting those products are 
commodities that are in abundance in order to promotes economic growth. Innis labeled 
this as the staple theory o f growth.6
This pattern o f  development was expected to spread to the developing world, 
especially after decolonization when several form er European colonies gained their 
independence. However, in the 1990s scholars such as Sachs and Warner, Auty, and Ross 
found that this was far from the case. Instead o f  following in the path o f  developed 
countries such as Canada, resource rich developing countries were actually performing 
worse than resource poor developing countries. Thus, resource curse studies were 
primarily motivated by what causes the curse or what factors can explain the curse. The
'Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, "The Curse o f  Natural Resources," European E conom ic Review  45 
( 2 0 0 1 )’
6 As cited in Alan Gelb and Associates. OH Windfalls: B lessing or C urse?  (W ashington DA'.: World 
Bank/Oxford University Press. 1988).
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majority o f the scholars that were initially fascinated by the resource curse were 
economists. Consequently, in the early 90s most o f the explanations for the resource 
curse were economic. Thus, this section will explore the economic explanations for the 
resource curse. The major economic causes can be subdivided into three main categories: 
1) Dutch Disease, 2) Commodity Price Volatility and 3) Declining Terms o f  Trade.
Dutch Disease
Resource booms or an increase in the price o f a particular resource tends to 
appreciate a country’s exchange rate because o f  the dramatic increase in the resource 
sector exports.7 Since the country’s currency appreciates, the price o f goods also 
increases. Unfortunately, this makes a country’s other exports less attractive and thus 
jeopardizes the non-resource sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing. Sachs and 
W arner’s studies found that a high influx o f natural resource revenues tend to crowd out 
manufacturing exports and consequently, non-mining sectors decline as a result o f  
resource booms.8
For a sub-Saharan African country in particular, this can pose a grave problem for 
the population. For one, agriculture provides em ployment for the majority o f  the rural 
populations in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, when the price of agricultural products 
increases because o f the currency appreciation, the international demand for these goods 
decreases. Importing countries would simply find cheaper, alternative countries from 
which to import the respective agricultural goods. Thus, the non-resource sector would 
suffer the most and unfortunately in many developing countries, in particular sub-Saharan
7Michael Ross, "The Political Economy o f  the Resource Curse," W orld Politics 51, no. January (1999).
“Sachs and Warner, "The Curse o f  Natural Resources."
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Africa, the non-resource sectors are usually the mainstay o f a significant portion o f the 
population.
Two, if the manufacturing sector declines, the country loses out on the possibility 
o f export diversification. This was one o f  the hallmark economic developm ent strategies 
o f the East Asian Tigers such as M alaysia and South Korea. Moreover, the lack o f export 
diversification can create a Rentier state dynamic where the country is solely dependent 
on its natural resource. In general, Rentier states do not need to tax their population 
because o f the steady stream o f  revenues from natural resources. This can have negative 
political effects such as the lack o f  political participation and government accountability. 
This will be covered more in-depth under the political explanations section.
Third, as the county’s resource sector booms, it is able to purchase goods at the 
international level. This creates yet another problem for the domestic sector because as 
the country imports more cheap foreign goods, domestic produced goods become less 
attractive to the consumer. Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz explain that when this occurs, 
the domestic costs o f producing a good increase and thus creates economic difficulties for 
domestic producers.9
A fourth consequence o f the disease is related to the obsolescence o f  the non­
resource sectors. This creates long-term growth problems for the country because at some 
point in time the resource boom will eventually end. When this occurs, the industries that 
were adversely affected by the resource boom will face tremendous difficulty in catching 
up with the rest o f the economy. Unfortunately, during the end of a boom period, it is the 
non-resource industries that need to be the primary focus o f  economic developm ent.
’ Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz Macartan Humphreys. E scaping the Resource C urse  (New York: 
Columbia University Press. 2007).
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Therefore, while in the short run the crowding out o f  the manufacturing, agriculture, and 
other non-resource sectors do not seem to be a big problem; in the long run, the 
underperformance o f these sectors may lead to obsolete industries which can cripple the 
economy during a non-boom period.
According to the literature, the predom inant problem with the Dutch disease 
appears to be the appreciation o f the exchange rate o f  country with a resource boom 
sector. Thus, this dilemma can potentially be avoided and/or controlled by implementing 
specific monetary policies such as sterilization. Pugel defines sterilization as “taking an 
action to reverse the effect o f official intervention on the domestic money supply.” '°A 
country may pursue a policy o f  sterilization when it decides that it is necessary to resist 
changes to its money supply." As previously described, a sudden influx in revenue can 
create detrimental imbalance to the domestic sector. Therefore, despite the fact that the 
Dutch Disease is an economic explanation for the resource curse, the consequences 
associated with the disease are as a result o f  specific choices made by policymakers in 
regards to the management o f the exchange rate.
Karl concurs the use o f  sterilization as an effective mechanism to ward o ff  Dutch 
Disease. She adds that “governments need to accum ulate foreign reserves, match these 
with additional savings, and prevent petrodollars from becoming monetized inside their 
economies. This course o f action would protect agriculture and industry from being
l0Thomas Pugel. International Econom ics, Fourteenth Edition ed. (New York, NY: M cGraw-Hill Irwin, 
2009), 579.
" ib id .
41
disadvantaged by an appreciated exchange rate, reduce the problems o f  absorptive 
capacity, and mitigate against petrolization.” 12
Besides this observation, it is unclear in the literature how to avoid the Dutch 
Disease if it is in fact strictly an economic explanation. Based on the David R icardo’s law 
o f  comparative advantage, a country should export goods and services at which it is 
relatively better at producing. Thus, if resource-rich countries were to adhere to this 
principle, and if Dutch Disease is an unavoidable phenomenon, then these countries 
would be caught in a cyclical, deterministic trap.
Based on all the aforementioned reasons Dutch disease is commonly associated as 
a common economic cause o f the resource curse. But the biggest flaw in the literature is 
failing to explain how a country can avoid this without sound policymaking. The 
literature describes Dutch disease as to imply that it is an invisible phenomenon, when in 
fact it can be avoided by effective governance, which leads one to question whether 
Dutch disease is really an economic explanation or a political explanation for the 
resource curse.
Volatility o f Com m odity Prices
Luciani describes “price v° latility as the result o f  rigidity of supply and demand 
in the short term, which prevents mutual adjustm ent with more gradual price 
m ovements.” 13Siegle illustrates that "a standard m easure o f  volatility, the coefficient o f  
variation, shows that resource-rich countries experience 60 percent greater volatility in
lzTerry Karl, The Paradox o f  Plenty: O il Booms a n d  Petro-States  (Los Angeles, California: University o f  
California Press, 1997).
l3Giacomo Luciani, "Price and Revenue Volatility: What Policy Options and Role for the State?," G lobal 
G overnance  17 (2011).
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their growth than the global norm ."14Similar to Dutch disease, volatility o f  world 
commodity prices has adverse effects on the domestic sector in a resource rich country. 
As described above, resource rich countries generally go through cycles o f  booms and 
busts in the resource sector. Whereas, the Dutch disease affects the com petitiveness o f  the 
non-resource boom sectors on the global market, volatility affects the stability  o f  the 
price for the particular resource exports.
Price stability is crucial for developing countries because m ost developing 
countries are primary commodity exporters. This especially applies to resource abundant 
countries, which for the most part rely on exporting oil or a particular mineral such as 
diamonds or copper. The price o f primary commodities is contingent upon the 
international market. Frankel refers to resource-rich countries as price takers, that is, the 
price o f their tradable goods is contingent on the price on the world m arket.15 Because 
most developing countries are price takers as Frankel describes, an unstable or volatile 
global commodity market can create a myriad o f  domestic economic problems.
Furthermore, resources are subject to boom and bust periods. During a boom, that 
is, when the international market value for the resource is significantly higher, a country 
may experience a substantial increase in revenues because o f the high price o f  the 
resource. However, during a bust period, when the international market value for the 
resource drops, countries experience a decline in their revenues because o f the lower 
price o f the resource. This volatility poses problems for countries that are reliant on the
l4Joseph Siegle, "Governance Strategies to Remedy the Natural Resource Curse," In terna tional Socia l 
Science Journal 57, no. si (2005).
15Jeffrey Frankel, The N atural Resource Curse: A Survey o f  D iagnoses and Som e P rescrip tions , Hks 
Faculty Research Working Paper Series R w pl2 -01 4  (John F. Kennedy School o f  Government: Harvard 
University, 2012).
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revenues from their resources. It especially poses a challenge for countries that consumed 
their windfall gains during a boom period instead o f  investing the capital.
Because o f the aforementioned factors: price instability, developing countries’ 
reliance on the exports o f primary products, and the boom-bust cycles o f  natural 
resources, it is critical that resource-rich countries invest the windfall gains from their 
resources during the boom periods. Failure to invest capital during a boom period can 
jeopardize long-term economic growth.
Collier and Venables propose that the successful venture o f  converting natural 
resources into sustained economic development should be thought of as a four link chain. 
“The first link is discovery and development o f the natural resource. The second link is 
the appropriate taxation o f these resources. Third, taxation o f  these resources should be 
able to provide sufficient asset formation so as to offset the extraction and depletion o f  
the resources. And fourth, this asset formation should be in the form o f  investments with 
a high rate o f return.” 16 Thus, based on Collier and Venables framework, one o f the ways 
in which resource rich countries can avoid price volatility is by sound investment and 
asset formation o f  the extracted resources.
A valid question to the investment argument would be, do resource rich countries 
remain vulnerable to stagnant economic growth even if they pursue sound investment 
policies. Gauthier and Zeufack provide evidence o f  Cam eroon’s growth trajectory, an oil- 
rich African country which experienced steady economic growth during an oil boom in 
the 1970s. The authors illustrate that Cam eroon’s GDP skyrocketed from “5.7%  between 
1972 and 1979, this was driven largely by the production o f  cocoa. In 1977, Cam eroon
l6Paul Collier and Anthony Venables, eds.. P lundered Sa tions; Successes a n d  F ailures in N atural 
Resource Extraction  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 201 1).
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discovered oil and GDP growth suddenly increased to 9.4% between 1977 and 
1986.” 17however, the authors argue that GDP quickly plummeted after a combination o f 
“a drop in oil prices coupled with poor m anagement o f oil revenues.” 18
What the authors also demonstrate however is that in the case o f  Cameroon 
mismanagement o f  natural resources appear to be a greater contributing factor to the 
resource curse than volatility in oil prices.19 Therefore, this gives credence to Collier and 
Venables argument. It is possible that Cameroon failed to implement effective investment 
strategies and this resulted in a failure to maintain a high economic growth rate despite its 
oil reserves.
The evidence from Gauthier and Zeufack’s case study poses a very important 
question in the resource curse literature, and that is to what extent does price volatility 
play a part in the economic performance o f resource rich countries. Based on the 
evidence analyzed it appears to be a mixed explanations. W hile international commodity 
prices certainly affect the domestic economy o f  primary exporters, countries that have 
sound governance policies appear to weather the vagaries o f  the market much better than 
countries with weak and ineffective governance.
Declining Terms o f Trade
The decline in terms o f  trade argument is closely related to the price volatility
argument. Both are associated with the capability o f the resource rich country to translate
resources into revenues. Whereas commodity price volatility concerns the variability in
international market price for commodities, the declining term s of trade argum ent posits
' Albert Zeufack Bernard Gauthier, "Governance and Oil Revenues in Cameroon," in P lundered  Sa tions?  
Successes and  Failures in N atural Resource E xtraction , ed. Anthony Venables Paul Collier (New York, 




that over time primary commodity exporters attain less revenue for their exports as 
compared to developed countries that exports manufactured goods.
In 1950, Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer independently wrote about the woes that 
developing countries encountered in terms o f international trade, yet they arrived at 
similar conclusions. They posited that developing countries faced a significant 
disadvantage on the world market compared to developed countries. Their rationale was 
that since developing countries in general are primary commodities exporters, as a 
fam ily’s income rise, their demand for primary goods typically does not increase as well; 
thus, primary commodities are income inelastic. However, manufactured goods (which 
are exported predominantly by developed countries) are income elastic, that is, as a 
fam ily’s income rises so too does their demand for manufactured goods. Consequently, 
Prebisch and Singer posited that because o f this dynamic, developing countries tend to 
experience declining terms of trade.20
Ross concurs that “since the 1980s, the term s o f trade for developing countries 
have declined...w ith estimates o f the rate o f  decline ranging from 0.1 percent to 1.3 
percent per annum.”21 He attributes this to a myriad o f  reasons including: “the increase in 
volume of commodity exporters (which is a symptom o f the 1982 Debt Crisis and the 
subsequent structural adjustment programs), the failure o f  international comm odity 
agreements and also the collapse o f the Soviet Union in 1989.”22 He also contends that
20Raul Prebisch, The Econom ic D evelopm ent o f  Latin  A m erica  a n d  Its Principal P roblem s (United Nations 
Dept, o f  Economic Affairs, 1950).: Hans Singer. "The Distribution o f  Gains between Investing and 
Borrow ing Countries," A m erican Economic Review  40, no. 2 (1950).
2lRoss. "The Political Economy o f  the Resource Curse." 303.
:2lbid„ 302.
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“the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 further reduced the demand for international 
commodities as well.”23
A problem that Ross finds with the declining terms o f  trade argum ent however is 
linking it to the resource curse. W hile some scholars such as Prebisch and Singer find a 
link to the resource curse and declining terms o f trade, other scholars as cited by Ross 
such as Cuddington and Knudsen and Parnes disagree.24 In fact, according to Ross citing 
Knudsen and Parnes, they find that there is a positive relationship between declining 
terms o f  trade and economic grow th.25Cuddington’s study produces m ixed results, 
however the most useful information from Cuddington’s study is that the m easurem ent o f 
commodity prices instrumentally affects the findings. Cuddington argues that most 
scholars use composite measure o f commodity prices. His study on the other hand 
measured “terms o f trade for twenty-six commodities individually from 1900 to 1983.”26 
Thus, the three major problems with the declining terms o f trade argument are: 1) is there 
a relationship to the resource curse? 2) if  so, is it a consistently negative one? and 3) how 
are the changes in terms o f  trade measured?
The three predominant economic explanations for the resource curse all present 
reasonable evidence. First, Dutch disease appears to be a significant problem  for many 
countries that experience a boom in the resource sector. As the authors discuss have 
shown when the resource sector experiences a boom this crowds out other sectors such as 
manufacturing and agriculture. Furthermore the Dutch disease also creates adverse 
conditions for other exports because o f the appreciation o f  the exchange rate. As





previously discussed however what the literature on the Dutch disease fails to explain it is 
whether or not the Dutch disease is unavoidable. If  the Dutch disease a symptom o f a 
booming resource sector or is it a symptom o f  ineffective government policies?
Second, international commodity price volatility also poses a big problem for 
resource rich countries. Unlike Dutch disease, countries can do very little to avoid the 
fluctuation in commodity prices because this is set by international factors and not 
domestic ones. However, what countries can do with the knowledge that this is an 
unavoidable occurrence is to implement the measures that can mitigate the effects o f 
price volatility such as export diversification and setting up commodity stabilization 
funds.
Third, the declining terms o f trade argum ent presents compelling evidence for 
primary commodity exporters. Since the majority o f  resource rich countries are primary 
commodity exporters, this argument has been sufficiently compelling as a cause o f  the 
resource curse. But with that said one m ust be careful not to fall into a deterministic trap 
that’s nothing can be done to safeguard against this. Granted, manufactured goods are 
income elastic, some primary commodities are not wholly income inelastic. For example, 
Botswana primarily exports diamonds. Diamonds are not considered to be an income 
elastic commodity. Therefore, the declining term s o f trade argument bears more 
relevance to perishable resources such as coffee, cocoa, groundnuts and other agricultural 
products.
The next section will look at how governments respond to the resource curse. As 
we have seen in the economic explanations, many o f  the consequences that occur as a
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result o f  the Dutch disease, international price volatility, and even declining term s o f 
trade can be prevented and/or mitigated by effective governance policies.
Political Causes
One of the drawbacks o f  the economic explanations is that they tend to solely
focus on the negative economic repercussions associated with the extraction and exports
o f the natural resources as causes o f the resource curse. The problem with such an
analysis however is that they do not account for countries that have successfully escaped
the resource curse. Why is it that Botswana has been able to sustain high economic
growth despite the fact that mining accounts for 45 per cent o f its GDP, whereas
agriculture only accounts for 2 per cent?27 If resource-boom economic effects such as the
Dutch Disease were sufficient explanations for the causes o f  the resource curse, then
possibly all resource-rich countries would succumb to this crisis. However, as illustrated
by resource-rich countries that have sustained a high economic growth for several
decades such as Botswana and M alaysia this is not the case. As poignantly expressed in a
2006 World Bank Study:
"There are no sustainable diam ond mines, but there are sustainable diamond- 
mining countries. Implicit in this statement is the assumption that it is possible to 
transform one form  o f  wealth— diamonds in the ground—into other fo rm s o f  
wealth, such as buildings, machines, and human capital. Achieving this 
transformation requires a set o f  institutions capable o f  m anaging the natural 
resource, collecting resource rents, and  directing these rents into profitable  
investments. Resource policy, fisca l policy, po litica l factors, institutions, and  
governance structure all have a role to p lay  in this transformation. ”2H
:7CIA Factbook, "Botswana," Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- 
world-factbook/geos/bc.html.
28The World Bank, Where Is the Wealth o f  N ations? M easuring C apita l fo r  the 21st C entury  (W ashington 
D.C.: The World Bank, 2006).
49
This quote informs us that the economic explanations for the resource curse are 
important yet insufficient. Economic policies are implemented by policymakers. 
Therefore, the government is responsible for m aking critical decisions that play a major 
role in economic outcomes. Ignoring the fact that resource-rich governm ents have a 
choice in the decisions they make in the m anagement o f  resource revenues creates 
spurious causal relationships between the abundance o f natural resources and economic 
growth. This is where political explanations are paramount. Thus, this section attempts to 
fill this gap in causal explanations. I posit that the combination o f both economic and 
political explanations provide us with a more complete picture o f the causal dynamics o f  
the resource curse. This section is subdivided into three categories: 1) W eak Institutions 
and Poor Governance, 2) Authoritarianism, and 3) Rent seeking and Corruption.
W eak Institutions and Poor G overnance
McFerson argues that "good governance encompasses four pillars: the rule o f  law, 
transparency, accountability, and participation.”29 Furthermore, McFerson attributes the 
causes o f the resource to the failure or inadequacy o f  these four pillars. This is a major 
criticism o f resource wealth, that is, it tends to breed authoritarianism or non-dem ocratic 
regime types.
McFerson also claims that resource wealth is not the only reason that African 
countries typically engender bad governance. In addition to this, she cites the colonial 
legacy as a contributing factor for poor governance in African countries. Undoubtedly, 
colonialism has played a significant role in the formation o f  institutions in sub-Saharan 
Africa, However, despite the colonial heritage, it appears that resource-poor countries
29McFerson. "Extractive industries and African Democracy: Can the Resource Curse Be Exorcised?," 338.
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have had a relatively easier transition to democracy than resource-rich states. Also, 
resource-poor African countries are also more likely to adopt good governance strategies 
than resource-rich African states. W hether or not M cFerson’s colonialism argum ent holds 
true, there appears to be consensus in the literature that a negative relationship between 
resource wealth and governance exists.
In order to test the arguments that resource wealth has a negative effect on 
governance, I run a correlation using the variables: total natural resource rents m easured 
as a percentage o f  GDP and the Ibrahim Index o f African governance. Table 1 depicts the 
results from this correlation.





(% o f  GDP)
Pearson Correlation 1 - .374 '
Ibrahim Index Sig. (2-tailed) .012
N 46 44
Total natural resources rents 









* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
According to the statistical significant Pearson correlation r in Table 1, the total natural 
resources rents as a percentage o f  GDP is negatively associated with the Ibrahim Index o f 
African Governance. This tells us that as the amount o f  natural resource rents increases, 
the Ibrahim Index score declines. The Ibrahim Index ranks African countries on a scale o f  
0 to 100, where 100 indicates the most effective form o f governance.
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Another point that is made in the literature in regards to institutions, governance 
and resource wealth is the negative association between resource abundance and 
democratic institutions. A lack o f democracy is associated with poor governance not 
because W estern political structures are superior to non-W estern political counterparts, 
but because in non-democracies leaders are not held accountable to their populations. 
This unaccountability breeds corruption and hinders sustainable economic growth and 
development. As McPherson contends:
"Governance concerns prim arily the manner in which power is exercised, while 
democracy encompasses also the manner in which color is obtained. However, 
the two concepts tend to converge, mainly because obtaining results in arbitrary  
and  authoritarian ways does not perm it enlisting public involvem ent and  the 
results are thus more likely to be ineffective or reversed in the long-term. "30 
M cPherson attributes the causes o f  the democratic deficit to cultural factors. She 
argues that in sub-Saharan Africa the "B ig M an”syndrome is primarily responsible for 
“patrimonialism and predatory behavior.” 31 M cPherson further argues that once the 
pattern o ff poor governance and misappropriation is established, it becomes a self 
reinforcing dynamic which is hard to break.32
If one o f the political causes o f  the resource curse is a democratic deficit as 
McFerson maintains, is it important for countries to have well-established, efficient, 
democratic institutions prior to the discovery o f  natural resources? Or can they build 
these democratic institutions after m ining and extraction has began? Acem oglu, Johnson 





o f  law are implemented before governments start to manage the high influx o f resource 
revenues. Furthermore, they argue that one o f the reasons Botswana has been able to 
escape the resource curse is because they had these institutions in place prior to the 
discovery o f  diamonds in 1967.33
Moore (as cited in Rosser) argues that resource rich countries tend to have poor 
governance because leaders are not held accountable to their citizens. This 
unaccountability stems from the fact that resource rich countries tend to have a higher 
degree o f financial autonomy. Moore refers to these type o f  states as “unearned income 
states.”34 He argues that these type o f states unlike states o f  the North do not put effort 
into generating revenue by raising taxes. They do not need to tax their populations 
because o f the rents received from the extraction o f  the natural resources.35
Moore extends this argument “political underdevelopm ent stems to a large degree 
from what might be termed a disconnect between states and citizens. Com pared with the 
states o f  the rich world those o f  the poor world tend to be relatively independent o f  their 
citizens: to have autonomous sources o f finance and all the critical resources; and/or be 
able to use international connections and resources to rule over their citizens in a 
relatively unrestrained fashion. In poorer countries public authority has been constructed 
in a context in which there has been less bargaining between states and organized citizens 
that has been the norm during the process o f  state construction in the N orth.”36
33Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, "An African Success Story," in In Search  o f  
Prosperity: A nalytic Narratives on Econom ic G row th , ed. Dani Rodrik (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 2003).
,4Mick Moore. "Political Underdevelopment: What Causes 'Bad Governance',"  Public M anagem ent Review  





Because resource rich countries tend to have weak democratic institutions, this 
creates a political environment that fosters authoritarianism . Jensen and W antchekon 
empirically test the effects o f resource dependence on the level of democracy in African 
regimes. They find that in African countries with a large amount o f  resource wealth, 
democracy declined after the third wave o f democratization. On the other hand, African 
countries that are resource poor such as Benin, Mali, and M adagascar were more 
successful in the transition to democracy.37
McFerson concurs with Jensen and W antchekon. The level o f dem ocracy declines 
as resource wealth increases. She argues that it is because o f  the lack o f  accountability on 
the part o f ruling elites that makes the democratic process especially difficult in resource- 
rich African countries.38
However, it is not just the lack o f  accountability that makes the democratic 
process difficult in resource abundant states. W hen a country becomes heavily dependent 
on a single commodity, this creates a Rentier state dynamic. M cPherson defines the 
Rentier state as "states in which the governm ent is heavily dependent on revenues from 
mineral resources extracted by foreign companies, rather than on taxes or on production 
o f all the exports, and without much contribution or effort by the government itself or the 
local private sector.” 39ln his seminal 2001 article, Ross empirically test several oil
37Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon. "Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa," 
Comparative P olitica l Studies 37, no. 7 (2004).
38McFerson, "Extractive Industries and African Democracy: Can the Resource Curse Be Exorcised?."
39lbid„ 344.
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abundant countries, which are usually characterized as Rentier economies, and he found 
that countries rich in oil tend to be less democratic than non oil-rich countries.40
Rosser concurs that it appears that there is a negative relationship between 
resource abundance and regime type.41 If  we were to empirically test R osser’s argument 
by examining the correlation between the Total Natural Resource Rents as Percentage o f  
GDP and the POLITY IV polity2  variable in resource-rich African countries, we would 
observe that there is a negative association between these two variables. Table 1 
illustrates these results.





(% o f  GDP)
Pearson Correlation 1 -.380*1
Polity2 Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 7506 4405
Pearson Correlation - .3 8 0 " 1
Total natural resources rents „. .. ,, 
(% o f  GDP) S.g, (2-ta.led) .000
N 4405 8568
** Correlation is significant at the 0 01 level (2-tailed).
As you can see from Table 1, there is a negative relationship associated between 
natural resource rents and regime type, that is, as the greater the percentage o f G DP that 
is allocated to natural resource rents the lower a country scores on the polity2 variable. 
This indicates that these countries tend to be more authoritarian.
A country’s regime type is very important in terms o f  economic developm ent. 
Several scholars have argued that strong democratic institutions are positively correlated
40MichaeI Ross. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?," W orld Politics 53, no. 3 (2001).
4lAndrevv Rosser. The Political Econom y o f  the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey  (Brighton, UK: 
Institute o f  Development Studies, 2006).
55
with a higher level o f economic development. However, how does the literature account 
for resource rich countries that are authoritarian yet experience a high level o f  economic 
development? Take for example Equatorial Guinea which some might argue is a pivotal 
example o f an oil abundant African dictatorship; yet according to the 2011 Human 
Development Index, Equatorial Guinea GNP per capita at that point data was collected 
was $17,608.42
On the other hand, Equatorial G uinea’s relatively high GNP per capita does not 
necessarily mean that the country is thriving with prosperity. In fact, the mass population 
o f Equatorial Guinea continues to live below the poverty line. Therefore, again we can 
see the importance o f  measurement. What does the literature mean exactly by a high level 
o f  development or economic performance? If it simply means a high GNP per capita, 
then the authoritarianism argument is less relevant for the resource curse. However, if  
development is measured by other social, economic and political indicators such as equal 
access to education, health, and employment opportunities, political and civil freedoms, 
social welfare programs and strong democratic institutions, then the authoritarianism  
argument becomes a more plausible political explanation for the resource curse.
Rent-Seeking and Corruption
The same can be said o f  corruption. An abundance o f  resource wealth has been 
commonly identified with the rampant corruption and rent seeking behavior. Certainly, 
corruption occurs as a result o f  the previously described factors, that is weak institutions, 
poor governance, and authoritarianism. Corruption adversely affects economic growth 
and development. Leite and W eidmann citing North (1990) and Schleifer and Vishny
4" {United Nations Development Programme. 201 1 #76}
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(1993) express that corruption reduces incentives for investment and innovation and thus 
reduces overall economic performance.43 Furthermore, it is unsurprising that the most 
corrupt African countries tend to be resource rich with Botswana being the outlier o f 
course. Conversely, the resource poor African countries tend to be relatively less corrupt 
than their counterparts. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranks 
countries on a scale o f 0 to 10, where 10 indicates the lowest level o f  perceived 
corruption. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for sub-Saharan Africa on the 
corruption perceptions Index. Among these countries, 27 out o f 48 countries fall below 
the regional meeting o f 2.92. O f these 27, approximately 50% are resource rich countries. 
This tells us there is some type o f association between resource wealth and corruption. 
One can predict that as resource wealth increases, corruption is more likely to increase as 
well.
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics: Corruption Perceptions Index-Sub-Saharan Africa
Ascher (as cited in Rosser 2006) contends that the primary reason resource-rich 

















41Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann. "Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption and 
Economic Growth." IM F Working Paper (July 1999).
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the natural resources in order to gain favor with the elite classes and achieve political 
objectives.44
Conclusion
Admittedly, economic developm ent is a difficult process for any developing 
country, whether resource-rich or resource-poor. However, for resource-rich African 
countries, development comes with unique challenges because they have to efficiently 
manage the high influx o f  resource revenues in order to escape the resource curse and 
thus overcome developmental hurdles.
This poses several challenges for resource-rich African countries. As discussed in 
this chapter, these challenges can be organized along two fronts: economic and political. 
The economic explanations for the curse consist o f  the Dutch Disease dynamic, 
commodity price volatility and declining terms o f  trade. Among these three economic 
factors, the first two seem to play the most central role in negatively affecting the 
economic performance o f resource-rich countries. While, declining terms o f  trade does 
have an effect on primary commodity exporters, it does not seem to have an effect on oil 
and/or luxury mineral such as diamonds and gold as it does on agricultural products such 
as cocoa and coffee.
The Dutch Disease is associated with a drastically appreciated exchange rate as a 
result o f  a resource boom. Countries that allow their exchange rate to appreciate without 
mitigating the effects tends to experience a "crowding out" issue in other non-resource 
boom sectors such as m anufacturing and agriculture. This can greatly jeopardize the
44William Ascher, Why G overnm ents Waste N atural Resources: Policy Failures in D evelop ing  C ountries 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
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economy especially after the resource boom ends. In particular, in African countries 
where a majority o f the population's income is based on agriculture, this could have a 
detrimental impact on a significant portion o f the workforce.
Commodity price volatility can also adversely affect the economies o f  resource- 
rich countries however it can be mitigated if countries implement sound policies. 
Stability is crucial for long-term sustainable economic development. During a boom 
period many countries mismanage their windfall gains. Thus, during a bust period, the 
economy stagnates because they failed to sufficiently invest the resource revenues. Thus, 
the impact o f  commodity price volatility really boils down to choices made by 
policymakers. Do you spend the windfall gains during a boom  period or do you invest? 
These choices will play a major role in determ ining whether or not a country can sustain 
the impact o f volatile commodity prices.
Although, the Dutch disease and commodity price volatility have great 
explanatory power from the economic standpoint, they still do not tell us how the 
governments o f  these countries handle the resource booms or the variation in commodity 
prices. This is the major flaw in the economic explanations for the resource curse. They 
fail to tell us: 1) how the countries got there in the first place and 2) what can be done to 
avoid or mitigate these adverse economic conditions and 3) why is it that some countries 
have overcome these economic obstacles while other have not. It is at this juncture 
political explanations provide a more holistic picture o f the resource curse. The political 
explanations may also be divided into three categories: 1) Weak Institutions and Poor 
Governance, 2) Rent-Seeking Behavior and Corruption and 3) Tendency towards 
Authoritarianism.
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The political explanations are interrelated and thus supplement each other. The 
institutions proponents argue that resource abundance seem to erode strong democratic 
institutions. As McFerson argues this is because o f  the failure o f one or more o f  the four 
pillars o f governance: 1) rule o f law, 2) transparency, 3) accountability and 4) 
participation.
Undoubtedly, the lack o f  one or more o f  these pillars would lead to a high level o f 
corruption. W ithout transparency and accountability in the public and private sectors, and 
without a strong rule o f law to prosecute infractions, democratic institutions would o f 
course significantly erode.
A combination o f the above factors is what engenders authoritarianism  in 
resource-rich countries. Even if  the country is not a de ju re  authoritarian government, 
failure o f strong democratic institutions and rampant corruption would facilitate 
authoritarian tendencies such as the violation o f civil and political freedoms.
A corollary argument with the negative association between resource wealth and 
authoritarianism is that authoritarian countries tend to perform worse econom ically than 
countries with strong democratic institutions. A notable criticism with this position 
however is how to measure development. As discussed in this text, if developm ent is 
measured solely by GNP per capita then the argum ent is less relevant if  we look at 
authoritarian countries with a high GNP per capita such as Equatorial Guinea. In order 
for this argument to be fully compelling, we would expect Equatorial Guinea to perform 
worse than resource-rich democratic African countries. On the other hand, if 
development is measured by equality, strong civil and political freedoms, fair elections 
and a stronger rule o f  law, then the argument is more convincing. However, the drawback
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to that is measuring development by all these variables makes for a much less 
parsimonious theory.
In general I find the political explanations offer much more com pelling causes for 
the resource curse than the economic explanations. The economic explanations appear as 
deterministic and unavoidable circumstances when in fact economic decisions are made 
by policymakers.
This tells us then that in order to avoid the harm ful economic effects o f  the 
resource curse, African countries need to ensure that they have highly trained, capable, 
relatively non corrupt and efficient bureaucracies. As explained in the literature the 
erosion o f democratic institutions, rent-seeking and authoritarianism tend to have the 
most devastating effects on the economy. Thus, it is not so much Dutch Disease, 
commodity price volatility or declining terms o f trade that causes the resource curse but 
more so the political mismanagement o f revenues during resource boom periods.
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Chapter 3 
The Political Economy of Nigeria 
Introduction
Nigeria is arguably one o f the quintessential examples of the resource curse in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In 1956, N igeria discovered oil reserves and since then oil 
production has taken center stage in the Nigerian economy. This has led to a myriad o f  
economic and political problems for the country. The most salient econom ic problems 
include a high level o f income inequality and large percentage of the population living 
below the poverty line. The political problems are inextricably linked with the economic 
issues. The most critical political issues that Nigeria faces include widespread corruption, 
ethnic violence, and political instability. However, N igeria was not always a poor 
country. During the oil boom especially, the country was economically thriving, however 
after the boom ended, we started to see deteriorating economic and political conditions. 
Thus, it is important for us to understand the context from which these present economic 
and political issues emerge. In understanding Nigeria's historical background, it is 
possible that we could trace patterns that have inhibited its m odem day econom ic growth 
and political development.
The present-day entity known as Nigeria was formerly a conglom eration o f  
several tribes, empires, and territories that were linked together primarily by trade. These 
various groups o f people rarely shared anything in common among each other besides 
geographical features such as the Niger and Benue Rivers.
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The social, economic and political circumstances however changed in the late 19th 
century when Britain colonized the territory. The British were primarily concerned with 
capturing a significant portion o f  the African continent during the Berlin conference in 
1885. Therefore, it did not take into consideration the complex ethnic and religious 
configurations o f the territory now known as Nigeria.
Under British rule, many changes occurred in Nigeria. For one, because Britain 
formally abolished the slave trade in 1807 they forced Nigerian m erchants to deviate 
from the slave trade and insisted that Nigerians pursue more legitim ate form s o f  
commerce such as Palm oil production instead. In addition to this, from a religious 
perspective the colonization and influence o f the British allowed for the encroachm ent o f  
Christian missionaries onto Nigerian society. As a consequence, Nigerians were forced to 
abandon their traditional indigenous beliefs and instead pursue Christianity. This had 
profound social and cultural implications on Nigerian society. Yet another ram ification o f  
British encroachment can be seen from a political perspective; although the British 
claimed to govern Nigeria under indirect rule (a type o f colonial governance which 
claims to leave a share o f power with local leaders), Nigerian rulers were in fact 
weakened as compared to the colonial authority. In situations where local leaders’ 
decisions conflicted with that o f  the British colonial administration, the Nigerian leaders 
were overridden. This decreased the legitimacy o f  Nigerian rulers over time.
As one can expect this asymmetrical relationship eventually led to hostility and 
resentment among Nigerians. This resentment served as a catalyst for the Nigerian 
nationalist movement; especially among the educated elite who wanted equal footing 
with the colonial administrators. Several Nigerian civil servants complained about racial
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discrimination in regards to promotion and employment opportunities. Thus, from this 
class o f educated Nigerians emerged prominent thinkers and activists who laid the 
foundation for Nigerian nationalism. These included thinkers such as Herbert M acaulay 
and Nnamdi Azikiwe.
Nigeria gained independence from Britain on October 1, 1960. This victory was 
short-lived however; in less than a decade the country succumbed to civil war in 1967. In 
addition to this the country suffered from several decades of military rule with 
intermittent bouts o f civilian rule. It was not until 1999 when President Obasanjo drafted 
the new constitution that Nigeria would undergo consistent civilian Democratic 
leadership.
Since the start o f  the 20th century Nigeria has taken steps to improve its economic 
and political conditions. For one, Obasanjo launched an anti-corruption campaign that 
aims to mitigate the abuses o f political office for private gain and other public sector 
graft. In addition to this the Nigerian state has actively pursued a more market-oriented 
approach to development. One o f the reasons for this new approach to developm ent is 
motivated by N igeria’s agreements with critical W estern donors. For example, in 2006 
Nigeria settled an agreement with the Paris Club in order to alleviate approxim ately 60%  
of its foreign debt which it incurred over the years o f  misrule and m ism anagement under 
military leadership.1
Despite these attempts to undo years o f m isrule and political instability, N igeria 
continues to struggle with key indicators o f developm ent such as a significant portion o f  
the population living below the poverty line, widespread income inequality, high
'BBC News, "Nigeria Settles Paris Club Debt," (21 April 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/business/4926966.stm.
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unemployment rates especially among youth, and a relatively low literacy rate despite 
free primary education, limited healthcare facilities, and inadequate infrastructure. In 
addition to this Nigeria also continues to encounter political problems despite its 
moderate improvements since its new constitution. The m ajor political impedim ent that 
Nigeria faces is rampant corruption. Transparency International ranks Nigeria 139out o f a 
total o f 176 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index.2 Furthermore, Nigeria has 
also performed poorly on other measures o f  governance and democratic institutions such 
as the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, Freedom House m easures o f  
civil liberties and political rights and also the Polity IV measures o f political authority. 
The weak performance on these critical political factors points to a deep-rooted problem 
in the Nigerian state; some scholars have attributed these problems to that o f  a Rentier 
state. Due to the high influx o f  oil revenues, N igeria does not need to tax its population, 
thus, this leads to a breakdown in accountability and transparency on behalf o f  the 
government.
The remainder o f  this chapter is organized into the following sections. First, an 
overview o f the geography, population and ethnic com position of Nigeria is presented. 
Second, a brief historical background o f  the territory now known as N igeria is provided; 
this section is subdivided into three eras: pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial eras. 
Third, the structure o f  the present Nigerian governm ent is described. In the fourth section 
an overview o f the structure o f Nigeria’s economy is provided. The fifth section describes 
the role o f the state in the economy with a specific focus on Nigeria’s Rentier state 
nature. The sixth and seventh sections provide an overview o f  the social, econom ic and
t r a n s p a re n c y  International. Corruption Perceptions Index (Germany: Transparency International,  2012).
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political conditions present in modern-day Nigeria. And finally, concluding remarks 
comprise the eighth section.
Geography, Population and Ethnic Composition
Nigeria is a West African country that is approxim ately 356,668 square miles in 
size.3It shares borders with several countries: N iger to the north, Cameroon to the east, 
and Benin to the west. In terms o f location, the most significant feature about Nigeria 
however is its proximity to the G ulf o f Guinea, which is located at the southernm ost part 
o f the country. The G ulf o f Guinea bears significance because o f  the presence o f  
abundant oil fields which have fueled N igeria’s economy since 1956.Due to the country’s 
location and vast size the climate varies depending on the region: the climate in the 
southern region o f the country depicts more equatorial features, in the middle belt o f  the 
country a more tropical climate is present and finally the northern region is the m ost arid 
zone in the country.4
The country is divided into 36 states and 774 local government areas. With a 
population o f approximately 158.4 million people, N igeria is Africa’s most populous 
coun try .5 The World Bank estimates that its annual population growth rate is 
approximately 2.5%6; based on this estimate, the World Bank predicts that by 2020 
N igeria’s population will be 203.7 million people.7 The population structure com prises o f  
three major age groups: 0-14, 15-64, and over 65. Among these groups, 54 per cent o f  the
3! oyin Falola and Matthew Heaton. A H istory o f  N igeria  (United K ingdom: Cambridge University Press, 
2008).
4CIA Factbook, "Nigeria," Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- 
world-factbook/geos/ni.html.




population falls within the 15-64 group.8 The 0-14 and over 65 age group com prise 43 
and 3 per cent o f  the population respectively ̂ Furtherm ore, ha lf of the population resides 
in urban areas with an average annual urbanization growth o f  4 per cent.'°Falola and 
Heaton account that “Nigeria has undergone rapid urbanization and that m ost large cities 
are extremely overcrowded.” 11 Lagos alone hosts 8 million inhabitants.
Another interesting facet about N igeria’s population is the diversity o f  its ethnic 
composition. Nigeria is comprised o f over 250 ethno-linguistic groups; however, “the 
three predominant ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani in the northern savannas, Yoruba 
in the southwestern region and Igbo in the southeastern region.” l2Am ong these groups, 
the Hausa-Fulani comprises approximately 29 per cent o f  the population m aking it the 
largest major ethnic group in N igeria.l3The second largest major ethnic group is the 
Yoruba people, which comprise approximately 21 per cent o f the population, followed by 
the Igbo which accounts for 18 per cent o f  the population.14
Similar to its ethnic composition, Nigeria is also highly diverse in terms o f  its 
religion. The northern region o f  the country is predom inantly Muslim and accounts for 
approximately 50 per cent o f  the population.15 Christianity is practiced mainly in the 
middle belt and southern regions and accounts for approximately 40 per cent o f the 




"Falola  and Heaton, A H istory o f  Nigeria.
I2lbid.
n ClA Factbook, "Nigeria".
"ibid.




In order to explain this heterogeneous ethnic composition, it is helpful to have an 
understanding o f the historical processes that took place during the earlier epochs. The 
next section provides a brief history o f N igeria during three major eras: the pre-colonial, 
colonial and postcolonial periods.
Historical Background
T he P re-co lon ia l Era
The contemporary diversity o f N igeria’s geography and its people are highly 
reflective in its rich, cultural and dynamic history. The focus o f  this section is to briefly 
describe Nigeria’s pre-colonial history which is paramount for setting the tone for its 
colonial legacy and its subsequent periods. Many texts hastily identify N igeria’s history 
with the coming o f the British in the 19th century. However, Nigeria existed as a thriving 
entity prior to colonization. Therefore it is important that this rich history is captured in 
order to understand the complex identities and cultures o f  this highly populous nation.
Falola and Heaton describe the early society o f  Nigeria as a territory comprised o f  
multiple groups, both centralized and decentralized, and connected through trade in 
agricultural products.18 The authors argue that “through trade and other forms o f  
interaction, by 1500 CE societies in the areas and around modern-day Nigeria had 
developed sophisticated political, economic, and/or cultural relationships with their 
neighbors, making the region a relatively integrated economic unit.” 19
Although contemporary Nigeria bears some resem blance to its pre-colonial era, 




empires rose and fell within the geographical area that we have come to identify as 
Nigeria.20 In fact, they highlight that the country now known as Nigeria is nothing more 
than arbitrary lines that were drawn by the British Empire during colonialism. These lines 
solely demarcated the political possessions o f British rule and did not reflect the cultural 
and ethnic diversity within the region.21
Falola and Heaton account that prior to the l l thcentury, N igeria’s history was 
characterized by decentralized societies. These decentralized communities included the 
Igbo, Isoko, Urhobo, Ibibio and Tiv groups.22Falola and Heaton point out that in these 
societies “political hierarchy rarely went above the village group level even though the 
overarching cultural identity could incorporate many different village groups.”23 An 
example o f such a society is the Igbo, who existed in Southeastern Nigeria. The authors 
describe that political authority was designated according to age. “The village elders were 
responsible for making the most important decisions that affected the 
community."24Therefore, one way in which decentralized states organized their political 
life was by deference to elders. This pattern o f decentralization among societies 
continued until approximately the 11th century; by this time, more formal patterns o f 
political organization began to appear.
By 1500 CE, the most sophisticated centralized societies had emerged. These 
included: the Kanem-Borno, Benin, Jukun, and Oyo, Sokoto Caliphate, and Ile-Ife 








monarchical dynasty approach to political organization.26The Hausa states although 
dispersed among fourteen autonomous states were unified by a common language and 
religion.27 They also adopted monarchical rule.28Falola and Heaton describe that these 
centralized states '‘developed kingship institutions that placed political, and to some 
extent, spiritual authority in the person o f the king, who ruled from a capital 
city.”29Despite the variations in political rule, language, religion and ethnicity, it is 
important to note that these societies kept in constant communication through trade, 
migration, intermarriage and other forms o f  inter-group relations.30
This time period also marked the introduction o f  Islam into N igerian territories. 
Islam was introduced into pre-colonial Nigeria in the late 11th century.31 Prior to the 
advent o f Christian missionaries and the subsequent proliferation o f  Christianity, Islam 
played an active role in Nigerian society. Osaghae contends that Islamic expansion in the 
North had two major implications: 1) it ostracized non-M uslim  groups, who were already 
minorities in number. And 2)Upon the coming of the British, Islamic groups were exalted 
because the British perceived Islamic civilization as the most advanced political system 
in Africa, and thus perceived that this system should be held as a paradigm to which all 
other Nigerian territories should adhere.32
Undoubtedly, the introduction o f  Islam also facilitated centralization and 







32Eghosa Osaghae. C rippled Giant: S'igeria since Independence  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
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trade. Falola and Fleaton account that “this golden age o f Trans-Saharan trade occurred 
between the 14th and the 15th century. Gold and slaves were the predom inant 
commodities that were traded during this period.”34
Slaves especially became an increasingly important facet o f Nigerian society by 
the early 16th century. As societies grew increasingly agrarian, they diversified their 
economies even further. Slave trading was one aspect o f this diversification.35 However, 
it is important to note that slavery during this time period differed considerably from the 
19th century transatlantic slavery that also took place in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The main purpose o f slavery during this time period was not to denigrate any particular 
race based on pseudo-scientific racism. Instead, it was utilized in order to increase and 
consolidate economic power within the centralized states. Falola and Heaton describe that 
“slaves in African societies usually had the opportunity to integrate them selves into their 
new communities through assimilation, and, over time, marriage and childbirth ...S laves 
did not constitute a class in the African setting.”36 Thus, it was highly possible for a slave 
to marry into a free family thus gaining their freedom. It was also possible for slaves to 
eventually accrue wealth o f their own. Thus, Falola and Heaton conclude that slavery in 
the Hausa states and Kanem-Borno was “ integrative and domestic in nature.”37
According to Falola and Heaton, “slavery became a vital institution for increasing 
economic wealth and maintaining political stability in the majority o f the Nigerian 
states.” Slave trading continued to be critical to Nigerian pre-colonial societies up until 
the 19Ih century. In the north, the most dramatic transform ation was the establishm ent o f
,4Ibid.
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"Ib id ..  42.
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the Sokoto Caliphate.38 The jihad o f Usmandan Fodio resulted in the conquering o f  all o f  
the Hausa states and some of the Bomo states as well. This resulted in a new overarching 
Islamic government that ruled over all the form er Hausa territories and few Bom o 
states.39ln the South, one o f  the most significant changes was the fall o f  the Oyo Empire 
in 1833. In addition to this, the British governm ent formally abolished slavery in 1807. 
This had serious repercussions for Nigerian states that depended on slave labor for their 
economic wealth. By law, the British abolishment o f the slave trade meant that these 
states would have to make a shift from slave labor to more legitimate form s o f comm erce 
such as palm oil production. However, in reality, because of the intensive labor 
requirement o f palm oil production, slavery continued to be a predom inant institution 
during this time.
Mid-19th century was a crucial period for the Nigerian society. N ot only did 
society undergo the aforementioned internal transformations, but the formal intervention 
o f the British government radically altered the economic and political landscapes.
T h e C olon ia l Era
Before discussing the colonial period, it is important to note that Europeans have 
played a part in the Nigerian economy to some extent since the 15th century. However, 
initially the relationship between Europeans and Nigerians were solely based on 
commerce. In 1472, the first Europeans to arrive in the Bight o f Benin were Portuguese 
merchants.40The relationship between Europeans and Nigerians at this tim e may be 
construed as mutually fortuitous because the Nigerians welcomed the revenue and
J8Ibid.
39I bid.
40Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, H istorical D ictionary o f  N igeria  (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2009).
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merchandise received from trading with the Europeans. However, by the m id-19th century 
it became increasingly apparent that there were underlying asymmetries between the 
European powers and the Nigerians, especially in terms o f  weapons, am m unition and 
technological advances. The Nigerian society was at a clear disadvantage as compared to 
the British superpower.
The de jure abolition o f  the slave trade and the subsequent social, economic and 
political transformations that took place laid the groundwork for the eventual British 
colonization o f  Nigeria.4lIn 1841, the first British missionaries arrived in Nigeria.42 
Although, the missionaries’ purpose was to proselytize Nigerians into Christianity, and 
not to annex territory, their arrival is just as significant as the British political 
administrators. By 1861, the official colonization o f N igeria had begun with the 
annexation o f  Lagos.43 Several decades later by 1903, the British governm ent had 
conquered the territories that were formerly governed by the Sokoto Caliphate.44
According to Falola and Heaton, there were three m ajor motivational forces for 
British colonization: Christian missionaries, trade interest groups, and politicians.45 In 
addition to this, several indigenous Nigerian rulers also pushed for the establishm ent o f 
the British protectorate in Nigeria. Falola and Heaton account that many indigenous 
rulers expected that a deeper relationship with the British government would grant them a 
political and economic edge over neighboring communities.46
4lFalola and Heaton, A H istory o f  Nigeria.
42Falola and Genova, H istorical D ictionary o f  N igeria.




In addition to these domestic factors, the push for British colonization was also 
motivated by external factors. In the late 19‘hcentury, France and Germany especially 
were interested in exploring and claiming vast tracts o f  land in the African continent. The 
benefits o f  colonialism became increasingly evident to European powers. This eventually 
led to the allocation and distribution o f territories within Africa to European powers at the 
Berlin conference in 1884. Therefore, when Britain saw the eagerness o f  their European 
competitors to stake claims in the Nigerian territory, they quickly signed treaties with 
indigenous rulers in order to set up British protectorates. In areas where they could not 
persuade indigenous leaders to sign treaties they overtook territories by force.47 In 1886, 
Britain granted the Royal Niger Company a charter that allowed it to control the Niger 
and Benue rivers.48 This charter effectively allowed Britain to prevent France and 
Germany from monopolizing the trade routes along these important rivers.49
The entire process of British colonization took approximately 40 years and first 
began with the Southern territories.50 By 1899, the British established Southern and 
Northern Protectorates.5'By 1903, Lord Frederick Lugard finally defeated the Sokoto 
Caliphate.52 This defeat led to the complete amalgam ation of the Nigerian state .53 
Osaghae remarks "January 1, 1914 is regarded as the official date for the creation o f  what 





' T a l o l a  and G e n o v a .  H istorical D ictionary o f  S igeria .
'"Talola and H eaton .  A H istorv o f  S igeria .
53Ibid.
S4O sa g h a e ,  C rippled G iant: S igeria  since Independence.
74
northern and southern protectorates into one Nigeria. Frederick Lugard became the first 
governor o f colonial Nigeria and served in this capacity until 1919.55
According to Falola and Heaton, colonization under British rule was a long and
tedious process, however by the start o f  the 20th century Britain had established an 
indirect rule over Nigeria. Indirect rule allowed traditional Nigerian rulers to m aintain a 
modicum o f authority over their territories. However, in reality they were subordinate to 
British colonial administrators. Acts o f  insubordinations were rectified by simply
usurping power from a chief or ruler and replacing him with a more subservient person.
However, indirect rule was merely a formality that the British colonial
administration used to placate the local rulers. In fact, in many cases, the colonial 
administration had the power to overrule decisions made by local rulers. For example, 
Falola and Heaton cite the instance “when Governor W illiam M acgregor had several 
chiefs fined and one imprisoned for the execution o f a purported thief.”56 The local rulers 
were within their jurisdiction, however, the decision that the colonial adm inistration 
made to undercut the local ruling illustrates the point that indirect rule was in name only.
As previously discussed, one o f the lasting legacies that colonialism has had on 
sub-Saharan Africa is the construction o f  artificial boundaries that delineates political 
sovereignty. Nigeria’s political construction is by no means different in this regard. 
According to Falola and Heaton, the British administration created the artificial Nigerian 
polity during the 19th and 20th centuries.57
In addition to the demarcation o f  political territories, colonialism under indirect 
British rule also created fundamental social, cultural, and economic transform ations in
'T a lo la  and Heaton ,A  H istory o f  Nigeria.
56Jbid.
5 7 i u : , j
75
Nigeria. One o f the unfortunate circum stances o f  this transformation was the 
undermining o f  traditional Nigerian culture. The colonizers perceived non-European 
cultures as inferior and weak, thus, a part o f the colonization process in N igeria was to 
undercut traditional institutions and replace them with British customs and institutions.
Falola and Heaton express that “the British claimed to  be bringing progress and 
civilization to otherwise backward African societies by developing the economy, 
eradicating slavery in all its forms, weeding out the corruption they believed existed in 
traditional political institutions, promoting a work ethic they believed traditional societies 
lacked, and education populations on European conceptions of health, hygiene, and 
cleanliness.”58
Colonialism also transformed the Nigerian economy. Falola and Heaton discuss 
that Britain implemented three major reforms to the Nigerian economy: “ 1) expanded 
Nigerian commerce through exportation o f raw materials, 2) brought Nigeria into a cash 
economy based on the UK currency, and 3) to force Nigerians to work for that 
currency.”59 All these goals were implemented with the intent to civilize N igerian society 
(similar to the transformation o f  the political institutions). But in fact, the process and 
outcomes o f this economic transformation benefitted the British colonial administration 
more than the Nigerian people.
The long-term effect o f this transform ation was the economic decline o f  Nigerian 
society. Falola and Heaton remark that because o f  the highly exploitative nature o f  the 
extraction o f  raw materials, the Europeans enjoyed generous profits while the local
S8I bid., 112.
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population suffered from a highly imbalanced trade structure.60 Because o f  the large size 
of the extractive firms, they were able to keep their costs low and their profits high. 
Therefore, Nigerians working in the extractive sector earned the minimum wage possible 
for their labor. Falola and Heaton illustrate that “many mine workers were not paid 
enough to feed and clothe themselves; they often fled or jo ined the military to get out o f 
their forces or contracted labor term s.”61
Another effect that the Nigerian society encountered as a result o f  colonialism 
was the transformation o f  its social and cultural norms. These effects were evident in 
three pivotal changes in the Nigerian society: urbanization, education, and the consequent 
formation o f a middle class. As Nigeria moved slowly into a cash economy, many people 
migrated from the rural areas to urban centers in order to pursue employment. Because 
wage labor demanded a strong grasp o f  the English language, many N igerians were 
compelled to attain at the least a primary education. A minority o f individuals pursued 
secondary and postsecondary education. Gradually, a middle class o f  European educated 
Nigerians emerged and this created a new social dynamic within the society.
Lewis summarizes that British colonialism  affected the Nigerian society on three 
fundamental levels;
"]) Politically, most indigenous authority was undermined by the imposition o f  
British authorities and the appointment o f  warrant chiefs as local proxies. 2) 
Culturally, the open door to missionary activities had  profound effects on religion  
and education and  3) Economically, production and  trade were transform ed by
60Ibid.
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the concentration o f  commerce, investment and colonial enterprise in Lagos and  
other coastal centers, and  by the spread o f  export agriculture. ”62 
Eventually, this newly formed middle class started to resent the British for forcing 
European culture and attitudes unto indigenous Nigerian societies. They saw colonialism 
as a means to erode traditional Nigerian institutions. Prior to the 1930s this resentment 
did not result in any concrete actions or m ovem ents but by the late 1930s, Nigerian 
nationalist movements started to grow among the educated middle class.
By the late 1930s a more formal Nigerian nationalist movement emerged. The 
Nigerian nationalist movement was led by a group o f  Western educated Nigerian 
intellectuals. These groups primarily organized into labor unions and cooperatives. This 
occurred because o f the explanations provided above, that is because colonial rule 
benefited only a few, many Nigerians saw this external force as a threat to their 
indigenous institutions. Therefore, as the middle class emerged, the necessity for the 
Nigerian-run country became prominent. Consequently, the Nigerian Youth M ovement 
(NYM) became the most central pan-Nigerian organization in the late 1930s.63
T he P ostco lon ia l E ra
The Nigerian Youth M ovement (NYM ) was one o f many nationalist organizations 
that emerged during the late 1930s. By the end o f  the Second World W ar it became 
evident to the British that these movements were adamantly and forcefully pressing for 
independence.64 Falola and Heaton account that “from 1946, when the first constitutional 
reforms were enacted...the colonial government collaborated with m oderate W estern-
6:!Peter Lewis. G row ing Apart: Oil, Politics, and  E conom ic C hange in Indonesia a n d  N igeria  (A nn A rbor: 
The University o f  Michigan Press. 2007). 126.
b3Palola and H eaton. A H istory o f  S igeria.
64Falola and G enova, H istorical D ictionary o f  Nigeria.
78
educated elite nationalists to develop a system o f gradual self-government. Beginning in 
1945 the colonial government began the Nigerianization o f  the senior levels o f the civil 
service.”66 Thus, by the 1950s the colonial administration and the local leaders came 
together and negotiated the terms o f independence. On October 1, 1960 Nigeria gained 
independence from Britain. The northern-dominated political party, Northern People’s 
Congress (NPC) won the majority o f  the seats and Sir Abubaker Balewa was elected as 
N igeria’s first Prime M inister66
Nigeria’s Struggle with Dem ocracy
Unfortunately, the exuberance that came with independence was short-lived. In 
1967, Civil W ar broke out between the Eastern region and the central government. This 
resulted in the secession o f  the Eastern region to form the Republic o f  Biafra. By 1970 
the Republic o f Biafra surrendered to the central government; however this act o f 
concession did not fix N igeria’s problems with political stability. The culm inating effect 
o f this civil war resulted in an interruption o f  N igeria’s democracy and also the start o f  
military rule.
For the next several decades Nigeria struggled with democratic transition. In 
1966, Nigeria underwent its first military coup, Prime M inister Balewa was ousted and 
killed and thus from this time period until 1979, Nigeria was under military rule. In 1979 
with the appointment of President Shagari, there was a second attempt at democracy 
however this was short-lived as he was deposed in 1983. Again, N igeria succumbed to 
military rule. This period o f instability continued until the election o f  President Obasanjo
“ Falola and H eaton. A H istory o f  N igeria, 148.
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in 1999. This ushered in the Fourth Republic era. Since 1999, Nigeria has enjoyed a 
relatively brief period of uninterrupted democracy.
Structure of the Government
C lassification  o f  Political R eg im e, E lectora l System  an d  P olitica l P arties
Nigeria has a federal republic multiparty democratic system with the President 
serving as both the head o f state and chief o f  govem m ent.67The N igerian political 
structure has approximately 63 political parties, however the major political parties since 
the 2010 election have been the conservative People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the 
liberal Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), which recently merged with “the Action 
Congress o f  Nigeria, Congress for Progressive Change and the All Nigeria Peoples 
Party”68 in order to form the All Progressives Congress (APC).69Elections are held every 
four years and are based on the first-past-the-post system.
Surprisingly, Nigeria chose to abandon the British parliamentary model after the 
failure o f its First Republic (1963-1966). In 1966, the form er Head o f  State Ironsi was 
deposed and murdered. The governm ent was taken over by a military leader, General 
Gowan. The Second Republic marked the return to civilian rule. It was at this point that 
Nigeria chose to adopt the American federal democratic model instead o f  the British 
parliamentary system .70 Despite the similarities with the American model however, 
N igeria’s democratic structure stands out because o f  its highly heterogeneous ethnic
67CIA Factbook, "Nigeria".
6801.USOL.A FAB1Y1. "W e're  M erging to Save N igeria -A cn , Cpc, Anpp," 
hup;/7w w w .punehng.com /new s/w ere-m erging-to-save-nigeria-acn-cpc-anpp/.
6<>Maram M azen. "N igerian Biggest O pposition Parties A gree to M erge,"
http.v/wvvw. bloom berg.com /new s/2013-02-07/nigerian-biggest-opposition-parties-m erging-against-ru ling- 
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composition. Herskovitz discusses that because o f  the large number o f  ethnic groups in 
Nigeria, which are viewed as self-contained nations within themselves, democracy has 
been a perpetual struggle. 71 For example, as m entioned above, shortly after 
independence, a civil war broke out among the major ethnic groups (Ibo, Hausa-Fulani 
and Yoruba).72Therefore, although its federal system is based on the U.S., the strength o f  
its democratic institutions is by no means on par with that o f  the U.S.
In 1983, Nigeria experienced another m ilitary coup d ’etat and once again the 
country succumbed to military rule for fifteen years. It was not until form er head o f state 
Abubakar came into office that Nigeria would undergo civilian rule. In 1999, Nigeria 
formulated its new constitution and held its first civilian election under the Fourth 
Republic electing President Obasanjo. In the 2007 elections Obasanjo transferred power 
to President Y ar’Adua. According to the CIA Factbook, “the general elections o f  2007 
marked the first civilian to civilian transfer o f  power.”73This modicum o f  electoral 
integrity continued until 2010 whereby President Goodluck Jonathan was elected.
B ranches o f  G overnm ent
Executive, Legislative and Judicial Bodies
Despite the fact that Nigeria’s democratic institutions lack the strength and 
durability o f highly institutionalized democracies, it is nevertheless a de ju re  democratic 
political system. The constitution divides the governm ent among several tiers: federal, 
state and local. At the federal level, the governm ent is divided into three branches: the 





that the laws that the Legislature passes are enacted. It consists of “the President, Vice 
President and the remaining members o f  the Federal Executive Council. Likewise, the 
state level comprises the Governor, Deputy Governor and State Executive Council.”74
The second branch, the Legislature is the primary law-making body. Similar to 
the Executive, it is also divided among federal and national levels. The Federal level 
consists o f a bicameral chamber: a 109 m em ber Senaje (3 members from each state and 1 
from Abuja75) and a 360 member House o f Representatives.76 On the state level, each 
state has a House o f Assembly.77
The Judiciary body administers and upholds the laws o f  the country. It consists o f  
six courts. “The highest court is the Supreme Court, followed by the Court o f  Appeal, the
78Federal High Court, M agistrate Court, Area Court and the Customary Court.” Finally, 
Nigeria has 774 local governments, which represents the plethora o f ethnic and religious 
groups. Finally, the country is governed by a combination o f traditional law, Islamic Law 
(in the northern states) and English common law.79
Structure of the Economy
Despite its political drawbacks, N igeria is frequently referred to as an economic 
mammoth in West Africa. It is by far the largest West African economy in term s o f the 
size o f its markets as well as its labor force. According to the World Bank, N igeria has a 
GDP per capita o f $1501 thus making it a lower m iddle-incom e country according to the
74"Em bassy o f  the Federal Republic o f  N igeria, W ashington D.C.." h ttp ://w w w .nigeriaem bassyusa.org /.
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World Bank’s classification. The structure o f N igeria’s economy is divided into three 
major sectors: agriculture, oil and gas mining and retail trade. According to 1HS Global 
Insight, agriculture constitutes 35.5 per cent o f G D P80 making it Nigeria’s primary sector; 
therefore, despite the country’s dependence on oil revenues, mining is not the primary 
sector. Second to agriculture is the oil and gas m ining sector, which account for 29.2 per 
cent o f GD P.81 The tertiary sector includes services such as retail and wholesale trade; 
collectively, these two types o f  trade account for 14.8 per cent o f  GDP.82
Overview of Social and Economic Conditions
One could argue that because Nigeria depicts Rentier state attributes, which have 
led to many democratic setbacks that the country has undergone since its independence, 
its economy has suffered in many areas, especially in term s of public goods such as 
health, education and infrastructure. The Fourth Republic has taken steps to improve both 
its political environment and its economy. For example, in 2007, Former President 
Obasanjo launched an anti-corruption campaign that aimed to mitigate the detrimental 
effects o f  widespread rent seeking and corruption in the public sector. In addition to this, 
since the election o f  President Jonathan in 2010, N igeria has started to pursue more 
market-oriented policies. Despite these attempts to improve the political and economic 
aspects o f society, Nigeria has not shown vast improvements on several key social and 
economic indicators. The following paragraphs look at: 1) N igeria’s overall
developmental performance, and 2) governm ent spending on public goods such as 
healthcare, education, and infrastructure.




First, Figure 1 depicts trends in N igeria ’s perform ance on the U nited  N ations 
D evelopm ent Program m e H um an D evelopm ent Index (H D I) from 1980 to  2012 .83The 
HD I is a com posite index that cap tures a coun try ’s overall developm ental and 
perform ance and quality o f  life. A s depicted, N igeria  has gradually im proved  its H D I 
since 2005; how ever its score still falls below  the  regional m ean H D I. N igeria  is ranked  
no. 153 out o f  a total o f  186 countries. Furtherm ore, the U N D P classifies N igeria  as a low  
hum an developm ent country and its H D I score is 0.471. This falls below  the reg ional 
average w hich is 0.475. This tells us that on a w hole  N igeria ’s hum an  developm en t is 
w orse than  the average sub-Saharan A frican country.
Figure 3.1: N igeria's H um an D evelopm ent Index 1980-2012
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Source: United Nations Development Programme
Second, N igeria spends approxim ately  5.1%  o f  its GDP on hea lthcare .84 The 
average sub-Saharan A frican country spends approxim ately  6.5%  o f  its G D P on
83 N ote  that there  w as no data  co llected  fo r N ig eria  in 1980, 1990 an d  2000.
84T he  W orld  B ank , W orld  D eve lo p m en t In d ica to rs .
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healthcare .85 This tells us that N igeria  falls below  the regional m ean  in term s o f  
healthcare expenditure. This below  average healthcare expenditure m ore than likely has 
adverse effects on the overall status o f  the econom y because an unhealthy population  or 
an unhealthy w orkforce decreases the capacity  o f  productive sectors. In term s o f  
education spending as a percentage o f  G D P, no  data w as reported accord ing  to the 
2012W orld D evelopm ent Indicators. H ow ever, i f  one looks at the percentage o f  the 
population that has com pleted prim ary education, N igeria is above the regional m ean; 
N igeria’s prim ary education com pletion rate is 74 per cent w hereas the average p rim ary  
education com pletion rate for sub-Saharan A frica  is 67 per c e n t.86 This does not 
necessarily m ean prim ary com pletion rate  is particularly  h igh; it could  a lso  indicate that 
the reg ion’s prim ary education com pletion rate as a w hole is low. F o r exam ple, the 
prim ary education com pletion rate for the M iddle East/N orth A frica and  South A sia  
regions is 88 and 86 per cent respectively .87 A dded to this, N igeria’s adult literacy rate is 
not particularly  high either, it stands 61 per cent o f  the population that is 15 years and 
older.88 As com pared to the region as a w hole, it perform s ju s t  slightly under the average,
OQ
which has a m ean adult literacy rate o f  62 percent.
Third, N igeria has also depicted  below  average perform ance on  key  infrastructure 
com ponents such as roads, w ater provision, electricity , and telecom m unications. N igeria  
has approxim ately  193,000 km  o f  total road  netw orks.90O f  this am ount, only 15% 









the population has access to an im proved w ater source.92 This falls sligh tly  below  the 
regional average, w hich is 61% .93 In term s o f  electricity  consum ption pe r capita  it is 
surprising that N igeria  is sub-Saharan A frica’s largest oil producer ye t its e lectric  pow er 
consum ption per capita  is only 121 kW  per hour.94 This falls way below  the regional 
average, w hich is 511 kW  per hour.95 A nd  lastly , m obile  telecom m unications usage 
represent a significantly  h igher num ber o f  people w hich  is 55 subscrip tions pe r 100 
people as com pared to fixed line telephone usage w hich  stands at one subscrip tion  per 
100 people.96 O n a positive note, N igeria’s m obile ce llu la r usage stands above the 
regional average, which is 45 subscriptions per 100 peop le .97
O verview of Political Conditions
N igeria’s political conditions have undoubtedly  influenced its econom ic clim ate. 
As m entioned throughout this chapter the coun try  has struggled perpetually  w ith  
dem ocracy it w as not until 1999 that N igeria  becam e bo th  a de ju re  and a  de facto 
D em ocratic state. This w eakness in dem ocratic  institu tions is reflected  in N ig eria ’s 
perform ance on several regim e, governance, civ il and political rights, and corrup tion  
perception indices.
First, as m easured on the PO LITY  IV  political reg im es and characteristicspo///y2  
variable, N igeria depicts a value o f  4 based  on  a scale running from  -10 (com plete 










this index N igeria’s dem ocracy falls w ay below  the h ighest possible form  o f  dem ocratic  
governance. H ow ever, as com pared to the regional m ean o f  2.67 N igeria  appears to be 
m ore dem ocratic than the average sub-Saharan A frican  country .
Second, as m entioned throughout this chapter, N igeria  has struggled  w ith its ru le 
o f  governance. U ndoubtedly this is in terconnected w ith  the p rev iously  m entioned  
m easure o f  regim e authority. It is unsurprising that a country c lassified  as hav ing  a 
relatively w eak dem ocracy w ould perform  poorly  on good governance indicators. T ab le  1 
depicts N igeria’s perform ance on the W orld  G overnance Indicators. The W orld  
G overnance Indicators is a com posite  index that assesses the  perform ance o f  countries 
based on thirty  data sources. Based on these sources, coun tries’ governance perfo rm ance 
is assessed on six aggregate indicators: 1) voice and accountability , 2) po litical 
stability/absence o f  violence, 3) governm ent effectiveness, 4) regulatory quality , 5) ru le 
o f  law and 6) control o f  corruption.98
Table 3.1: N igeria’s Perform ance on the W orld G overnance Indicators




Sub-Saharan Africa Percentile R ank 
(0-100)
Voice and Accountability 2011 26.8 -0.76 32.3
Political Stability/Absence of 
Violence
2011 4.2 -1.94 34.2
Government Effectiveness 2011 12.8 -1.12 27.7
Regulatory Quality 2011 27.5 -0.69 30
Rule of Law 2011 9.9 -1.25 29.2
Control of Corruption 2011 9 -1.14 32.5
As depicted  in Table 1, N igeria  perform ed w orse than the Percentile  R ank for 
Sub-Saharan A frica on all six indicators o f  governance. T he  percentile rank  ind icates the
98D anieI K aufm ann, A art K raay, and  M assim o  M astru zz i, The W orldw ide  G o vern a n ce  In d ica to rs , ed. 
M acroeconom ics and  G row th  T eam , D evelopm en t R esearch  G roup  (W ash ing ton  D .C .: T he W orld  B ank , 
S ep tem ber 2010).
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percentage o f  countries that have perform ed w orse than the selected country ; therefore , a 
h igher num ber depicts a stronger p e rfo rm an ce ."A s expected the areas in w hich  N igeria  
perform ed the w orst were in the political stability /absence o f  violence, rule o f  law  and 
control o f  corruption indicators. Figure 2 depicts a  graphical representation o f  N ig eria ’s 
perform ance on these indicators.
Figure 3.2: N igeria's Perform ance on the W orld w ide G overnance Ind icators
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Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and fl. tta s truzz i (2010), The Worldwide Governance In d ic a to rs : 
flethodology and A naly tical Issues
Note: The Worldwide Governance In d ic a to rs  (WGI) a re  a research  d a tase t summarizing 
the views on the q u a lity  of governance provided by a large number of e n te rp r is e , c i t i z e n  
and expert survey respondents in  in d u s tr ia l and developing co u n tr ie s .
These data  are  gathered from a number of survey in s t i tu te s ,  th in k  tanks, non-governmental 
o rg an iza tio n s, in te rn a tio n a l o rg an iza tio n s , and p r iv a te  sec to r  firm s.
The WGI do not r e f l e c t  the  o f f ic ia l  views of th e  World Bank, i t s  Executive D irec to rs , 
or the  co u n tries  they rep re se n t. The WGI are  n o t used by the  World Bank Group 
to  a l lo c a te  resou rces .
In the th ird  area, civil and political rights, N igeria  has m ade som e progress since 
the Fourth Republic but it still has a long w ay to go  in term s o f  civil liberties and political 
rights. Freedom  H ouse ranks 193 countries on a scale  o f  1.0 (m ost free) to 7.0 (least free) 
in two categories: civil liberties and political rights. N igeria scores 4  on both  categories,
" D a n ie l K aufm ann , W orldw ide G overnance  Ind ica to rs: C o un try  D a ta  R eport f o r  N igeria , 1 9 9 6 -2 0 1 1 





and thus has an overall rating o f  4. A ccording to Freedom  House it is c lassified  as partly  
free. Freedom  House classifies 41 per cent o f  sub-Saharan Africa as not fre e , 37 per cent 
as pa rtly  free , and only  22 p e r cent as free . T herefore, although th is is no t a stellar 
perform ance, N igeria perform s better than the m ajority  o f  sub-Saharan A frican countries 
that fall w ithin the no t fr e e  category.
The final category in w hich  N igeria’s political conditions is assessed  is in the area 
o f  co rru p tio n .100 As m entioned previously the country  continually struggles w ith 
corruption and rent-seeking behavior. O ne o f  the m ost widely used  m easures o f  
corruption is T ransparency In ternational’s C orruption Perceptions Index w hich  assesses 
countries’ perceived level o f  corruption on a scale o f  0 to 100, w ith  0 ind icating  m ost 
corrupt and 100, least corrupt. N igeria scores 27 on the 2012 C P I.101 The regional 
average CPI is 33.4. This tells us that on average, N igeria  is more corrupt than  the typical 
sub-Saharan A frican country.
U ndoubtedly, the largest problem s that N igeria  currently faces in its econom ic 
and political clim ates are: low hum an developm ent, low  governm ent spending on public  
goods, w eak dem ocratic institutions, poor governance, m oderate civ il liberties and 
political rights and ram pant corruption. O f  these problem s, corruption appears to be the 
m ost deleterious and pervasive issue. It seem s that th is problem  is due to the R entier 
nature o f the state. Because o f  the high influx o f  o il revenues into state coffers, the 
governm ent does not see the need to m aintain  a high level o f  accountability  and 
transparency to its citizens. Furtherm ore, N igeria  has suffered several m ilitary  coup 
d ’etats since independence; therefore, it has not had the tim e needed to  slow ly  build
100 N ote  tha t one  o f  the six  a reas in w h ich  the W orldw ide  G o v ern an ce  Indicators a ssesses  co u n tr ie s  is in  the 
C on tro l o f  C orrup tion , thus there  is som e sligh t overlap  in th is ca tegory .
l0lT ransparency  In ternational, C orrup tion  P ercep tio n s Index.
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strong dem ocratic institutions. O n the positive side, how ever, N igeria has m anaged  to 
alleviate m ost o f  its foreign debt by signing an agreem ent w ith the Paris C lub in 2006.
Conclusion
Sim ilar to m ost sub-Saharan A frican countries, N igeria  has experienced  a sordid 
past with colonialism . The encroachm ent o f  the B ritish governm ent in the N igerian  
territory dram atically  transform ed its indigenous econom ic and  political institu tions. T he 
introduction o f  a cash econom y, the C hristian  religion and  the arb itrary  d ivision o f  
N igerian territories shaped and m olded m odern-day N igeria  into an artific ia l construct.
Colonialism  notw ithstanding, m odern-day  N igeria  has encountered its ow n set o f  
problem s. The discovery o f  oil, w hile providing m uch needed  revenue for the econom y, 
increased the existing ethnic tensions. In addition to this, th e  country struggled w ith its 
dem ocratic transition. A fter m any failed attem pts the coun try  finally becam e a de ju re  
dem ocracy in 1999.
Despite the coun try ’s return  to dem ocratic  rule how ever it continues to  struggle 
w ith econom ic and political issues. The m ajor econom ic issues the country  faces is its 
w idespread poverty and incom e inequality. U ndoubtedly  th is is c losely  rela ted  to its 
political m alaise, w hich is ram pant corruption and ethnic struggles. It is unsurprising  that 
its oil abundance plays a great role in these po litical d isturbances. N ig eria ’s 
overdependence on oil revenues and its use o f  these revenues to quell opposition  and 
m anipulate m em bers o f  the public sector has transform ed the society into a R entier state. 
A nother Rentier state characteristic evident is that the governm ent has no need  to  tax the 
population thus eroding dem ocratic accountability  and transparency. This erosion o f
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dem ocratic institutions and m algovem ance pose critical challenges for sub-Saharan  
A frica’s largest oil producer and are crucial elem ents in the exam ination o f  the  resource 
curse in N igeria, w hich we will turn to  next in the fo llow ing  chapter.
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Chapter 4 
Exam ining The Resource C urse in Nigeria 
Introduction
In discussing the resource curse in sub-Saharan  A frica, N igeria cou ld  be  regarded 
as a quintessential exam ple. In the 2013 O PEC  Statistical Bulletin, the value o f  N igeria 's 
petroleum  exports was p laced at $94.64 b illion .1 It is the region's largest oil exporter and 
has increasingly gained prom inence in the global oil trade. The im portance o f  N ig eria ’s 
oil resources cannot be overstated. In addition to  being  Sub-Saharan A frica 's largest oil 
exporter, it is also the sixth largest oil p roducer in the w orld. Furtherm ore, “ it is p red ic ted  
that the W est A frican region itse lf will contribu te  approxim ately 25 pe r cent o f  N orth  
A m erican oil and gas im ports by  2015, w hich  w ould  surpass Saudi A rab ia’s oil exports to 
the U .S .”2This has m ajor ram ifications no t only fo r N igeria 's econom y but a lso  the U .S. 
and its trading partners. U ndoubtedly, N igeria  w ill p lay  an im portan t ro le in this 
transform ation o f  the oil trade w ithin the next few  years.
Despite its im portance to the global oil trade and  the abundance o f  its oil 
revenues, N igeria nevertheless encounters several econom ic and po litical problem s 
outcom es associated w ith the resource curse. T hese  outcom es are d irectly  reflec ted  in 
N igeria’s socioeconom ic conditions. O PE C  reports that petroleum  revenues account for
'O P E C , O pec A n n u a l S ta tis tica l B u lle tin  (V ienna , A ustria : O P E C , 2013).
2John  G hazv in ian , U ntapped: The S cram b le  f o r  A fr ica 's  O il  (O rlan d o , FL: H ough ton  M ifflin  H arcou rt, 
2007), 8.
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70 percent o f  the country 's total export revenues.3This goes to  show that the oil secto r is 
the predom inant source o f  incom e for the N igerian  governm ent and thus the econom y is 
not w idely d iversified. A lso,46 percent o f  the country  live below  the poverty  line.4H ence, 
another problem  the country faces is incom e inequality  and a  highly stra tified  society.
Poor econom ic and political conditions are not so lely  reflections o f  the resource 
curse. They could  possibly point to m ore deep-rooted  issues o f  econom ic developm ent. 
How ever, a ttain ing sustainable econom ic developm ent goes beyond the purv iew  o f  this 
study. The critical question this study addresses is: w hy is there  a rela tively  h igher degree 
o f  the resource curse in N igeria than in B otsw ana? A dm ittedly, there is a  slight overlap  
betw een countries that have escaped the resource curse and have atta ined  high econom ic 
developm ent. H ow ever, it should be noted  that escaping the resource is ju s t  one aspect o f  
achieving sustainable econom ic developm ent in resource-rich  countries.
The m ost prom inent outcom es associated  w ith the  resource curse are  D utch 
disease, price volatility, debt burden, and corruption. First, Dutch d isease has led to  a 
decline in all the non-resource sectors in N igeria  especially agricu lture. This has 
deleterious effect on the rural populations especially  w hich depend ex tensively  on 
agricultural exports for their m ainstay.
Second, the volatility  in oil p rices d irectly  affects the N igerian econom y. O il is 
the m ost volatile com m odity on  the global m arket. D uring the 1970s oil boom  N igeria  
experienced rapid  econom ic growth. H ow ever, since the end of this boom , N igeria  has 
struggled to m aintain  this high econom ic grow th and in fact the econom y had  stagnated. 
Since the rise o f  oil prices in 2010, N igeria  has once again  experienced an  oil boom
3h ttp ://w w w . o p ec .o rg /o p ec jw eb /en /ab o u t_ u s/1 6 7 .h tm
4 W orld B ank Ind ica to rs D atabase
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which has led to an increase in its econom ic grow th. W hile this is a step  in a positive  
direction, as we can see the country 's econom ic grow th  is vulnerable to fluctuations in 
global oil prices.
Third, during periods w here oil prices are high, the  country has a tendency  to 
increase governm ent expenditures and also spend on  public  investm ents. A lso, because o f  
governm ent's short-sightedness, extensive borrow ing  fo r international financial 
institutions is not uncom m on. In the long-term  th is leaves the  country w ith  a debt burden  
that is difficult to  repay w hen the oil boom  ends.
Fourth, further com plicating these econom ic issues, is the p roblem  o f  ram pant 
corruption. B ecause the oil sector is so secretive and also  because N igeria  receives so 
m uch unaccountable revenue, there is a strong tendency  for these revenues to be 
m isallocated into the coffers o f  governm ent o fficials. T herefore, the lack o f  transparency  
and unaccountability  exacerbates the econom ic d ilem m as because a good portion  o f  the 
country 's resource revenues are not used to  sustain  and develop  the country 's econom y.
The purpose o f  th is chapter is to exam ine these issues. T herefore, it asks the 
follow ing questions: first, is there evidence o f  the resource curse in N igeria?  i f  so, to  
w hat degree? and second, how  can we explain the  degree o r extent o f  the resource curse? 
In order to address these questions this chapter is o rganized  into tw o m ain  sections. T he 
first section depicts em pirical evidence that there is a  high degree o f  the resource curse in 
N igeria. This section is follow ed by explaining th a t the reasons that N igeria  depicts such 
a  high degree o f  the resource curse is because its leadership  is w rought by  personal rule, 
the governm ent depicts high level o f  R entier sta te  characteristics and  its civil society
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while having a large num ber o f  N G O s has relatively  little clou t in influencing  
governm ent decisions as it relates to developm ental policies.
Showing the Extent o f the Resource Curse in Nigeria
The follow ing section illustrates that N igeria  experiences a high degree  o f  the 
resource curse. In order to prove this, w e look at four m ajo r outcom es o f  the resource 
curse: 1) D utch D isease, 2) Price V olatility , 3) D ebt B urden and 4) C orruption . T here  is 
one caveat in dem onstrating evidence o f  the resource curse. Some o f  these outcom es 
could m anifest independent o f  natural resources (fo r exam ple, deb t burden  and 
corruption). Thus, it is hard to d istinguish w hich o f  its problem s can  be attribu ted  to  the 
resource curse and which o f  its problem s perta in  to  other developm ental issues. 
A dm ittedly, the line betw een these tw o different subjects are  blurred at tim es. H ow ever, 
the argum ent here is that the resource curse exacerbates these outcom es.
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Dutch Disease
Figure 4.1: N igeria's E xchange R ate A ppreciation, 1960-2011




Source: World Bank Indicators
The m ost apparent econom ic outcom e that N igeria has encountered as ev idence o f  
the high degree o f  the resource curse is D utch disease. This is unsurprising as it is often 
argued that D utch D isease is one o f  the m ajor consequences that resource-rich  countries 
face. As explained in Chapter 2, the D utch D isease occurs w hen a h igh  influx o f  revenues 
from  a natural resource causes the exchange rate to appreciate. The consequences o f  this 
exchange rate appreciation include a crow ding out effect o f  non-resource boom  sectors 
such as agriculture and m anufacturing. Figure 1 depicts the  appreciation o f  N ig eria ’s 
exchange rate from  independence in 1960 to  2011. A s depicted, the exchange rate 
gradually appreciated in the m id-1980s, w hich coincides w ith  the first oil boom , then it 
stagnated during the m id-1990s, then d rastically  appreciated  from the late 1990s until 
early 2000s. The exchange rate slightly  depreciated  during the m id-2000s, then  
appreciated again from  2010 until present. The exchange rate took a dow nturn  around
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2007/2008 but this is possibly because o f  the global recession , which led to a decreased 
dem and in oil (more on th is in the next section). The exchange rate w as a t its h ighest in 
2011 .
K w akw a and others concur this drastic appreciation o f  exchange rate. T hey  report 
that N igeria started o f f  as a rapidly grow ing econom y in the 1970s fo llow ing  an oil 
boom .5 How ever, this rapid econom ic grow th w as short-lived. The au thors add  that by 
the late 1970s the econom y started to  contract and  living conditions began  to  deterio rate .6 
A dded to this, because o f  the boom  in the oil sector, o ther industries nam ely agricu lture  
and services began to  suffer as a result o f  the crow ding o u t effect o f  the resource boom  
sector.7As the exchange rate appreciated, “agricultural exports fell from  2.5 per cent to 
0 .2 per cent o f  total exports betw een 1980 and 2005 .,,8The m anufacturing secto r has also 
declined. K w akw a et al report that “m anufacturing  as a share  o f G D P p lum m eted  from  
8.4 per cent in 1980 to 5.5 per cent in 1999 and 4.6 per cen t in 2005 .”9 In o ther w ords, 
N igeria faced the heinous effects o f  the D utch D isease follow ing its oil boom s in the 
1970s.
Commodity Price Volatility
A nother econom ic outcom e that N igeria  faces as a result o f  the resource curse is 
its vulnerability to com m odity  price volatility. P rice volatility  affects m ost developing  
countries that are prim ary com m odity producers not ju s t resource-rich  ones. H ow ever, 
N igeria presents a special case because it is an oil exporter. Furtherm ore, it is overly
5V icto ria  K w akw a et a l., "B ind ing  C onstra in ts  to  G row th  in N igeria ,"  in  E conom ic P o lic y  O p tions f o r  a  
P rosperous N igeria , ed. Paul C ollier, C h u kw um a S oludo , an d  C ath erin e  Pattillo  (N ew  Y ork , N Y : P a lg rave  






dependent on oil as a prim ary source o f  revenue. F igure 2 illustrates this resource 
dependency, it depicts N igeria’s oil ren t as a percentage o f  GDP from  1960 to 2012. 
W hen oil prices are high, the econom y experiences a boom  in its econom ic grow th. O n 
the contrary w hen oil prices are low, econom ic grow th plum m ets.
Because o f  this overdependence on oil, N igeria  is no t just a  p rim ary  com m odity  
producer, it is in effect a R entier state (m ore on this in the political ou tcom es section). 
R entier states on average are ex trem ely  vulnerable to  com m odity price  shocks because 
the non-resource sectors are typically  underdeveloped and  underutilized.
Figure 4.2: N igeria O il R ents as a Percentage o f  GDP, 1960-2012  
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This volatility  can also be dem onstrated  by looking  as N ig e ria ’s annual G D P 
grow th rate over the period 1960 to 2011. Figure 3 illustrates this. A ccord ing  to  F igure 3,
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N igeria depicted the highest G D P grow th rate in  1970 (25% ). This occurred  ju s t a few  
years before the first oil boom  period. A ccording to K arl, “the p rice  o f  petro leum  
quadrupled in 1973-1974, slow ly increased from  1975 to  1978, then doub led  once again 
in 1979-1981-this tim e peaking as high as $32.50 per barrel.” 10 N igeria  experienced  its 
highest GD P grow th rate percentage in 1980. O il rents accounted for approx im ately  53%  
o f  GDP in this year.
External global events can greatly  affect the N igerian  econom y. This is illustrated  
in the fluctuation in oil prices during the 1970s and  1980s. Furtherm ore, because N igeria  
is an OPEC m em ber, the politics o f  oil during the 1970s greatly affec ted  the N igerian  
econom y. In 1973, the Arab oil-exporting countries in itiated  the first A rab O il E m bargo 
against the W est (in particular the U .S .jbecause they w ere outraged by  the U .S. support 
o f  Israel in the form  o f  m oney and a rm s .11 This d ram atically  increased the p rice  o f  oil and 
this is reflected in N igeria’s econom ic grow th during  the years 1973-1974.
l0K.arI, The P a ra d o x  o f  P len ty: O il B oom s a n d  P e tro -S ta te s , 25.
"F ran c isco  Parra, O il P o litics: A  M odern H is to ry  o f  P e tro leu m  (N ew  Y ork , NY: T au ris , 2010).
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Figure 4.3: N igeria’s A nnual G D P G row th R ate, 1960-2011




A s you can see from  Figure 3 in 1974 N igeria  experienced a little m ore than 11 
percent grow th; this is the highest econom ic grow th it attained th roughout the boom  
period. Karl notes that the 1973-1974 A rab O il E m bargo was the largest transfer o f  
w ealth  from  the developed to the developing w orld  because o f  the m ajor increase in G D P 
grow th o f  the OPEC m em ber countries during th is p eriod .12
The second m ajor oil shock took p lace in 1979, after the Iranian R evolu tion , again  
oil prices skyrocketed. Parra reports that “the cost o f  net oil imports into the O E C D  area 
rose from  $124 billion in 1978 to $180 billion  in 1979, then  peaked at $254 b illion  in
l2K arl, The P a radox  o f  P len ty: O il B oom s a n d  P e tro -S ta tes.
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1981.” 13 Again N igeria experienced h igh econom ic grow th from  1979 to 1980 as 
illustrated in F igure 4.3.
Figure 4.4: N igeria’s G D P G row th during the O il Boom  and B ust P eriods
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In 1981, how ever, econom ic grow th started  to decline. By the early  1980s w orld  
oil dem and decreased but the supply continued  to  increase. Because o f  th is oil g lu t in the 
crude oil m arket, prices dropped d ram atically .14 This drop in oil p rices is reflected  in 
N igeria’s econom ic grow th throughout the m ajority  o f  the 1980s. D ue to the drop  in oil 
prices N igeria’s export earnings reduced  substantially; from  $25 b illion  in  1980 to $10 
billion in 1983, and again plum m eted to  $7 b illion  in 1986.15 This reduction  in export 
earnings is reflected in the coun try ’s econom ic grow th. W ith the exception  o f  1985,
13Parra, O il P olitics: A M o d e m  H isto ry  o f  P e tro leu m , 238.
l4R obert H ershey, "H ow  the O il G lut Is C h an g in g  B usiness ,"  The N ew  Y ork  Times Ju n e  21 , 1981.
l5N icho las S haxson , P o iso n ed  W ells: The D ir ty  P o litic s  o f  A fr ica n  O il (N ew  Y ork , N Y : P a lg rav e
M acm illan , 2008), 21.
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N igeria experienced relatively low er econom ic grow th fo r the m ajority o f  the 1980s. In 
fact for m ost o f  the decade the country registered negative G D P grow th rates.
Figures 3 and 4 shows that N igeria’s G D P grow th has been sporadic over tim e. It 
is unclear w hether this is due to volatility  in oil p rices or som e other factor (e.g. dom estic  
factors such as regim e instability, civil war, etc.) Regardless o f  the cause o f  th is 
fluctuation in G D P grow th it is clear that com m odity  price  shocks has an im pact on the 
econom y. The A rab Oil Shocks o f  1973-1974 and  1979-1981 played an im portant ro le  in 
the transform ation o f  oil prices. N igeria ’s econom y reflected  these critical p rice  changes 
in the crude oil m arket.
Debt Burden
O ne w ould  th ink that with all o f  the revenues that Nigeria receives from  o il it 
w ould not be indebted to external creditors. O n the  contrary  however, N igeria  he ld  one o f  
the largest debt overhangs in Sub-Saharan A frica until a recen t debt reduction  deal struck 
w ith the Paris C lub in 2006 .16 The problem  w ith  R entier states such as N igeria  is that 
they substantially  increase their public spending  during a resource boom . W hen this 
boom  ends, it is difficult to cut back on public  expenditure (such as civ il se rv an ts’ 
salaries). Pegg illustrates that “m any governm ents that increase spending w hen prices are 
high are unable to  cut expenditures w hen prices decline and  find them selves incurring  
significant debt in order to  m aintain spending at boom  levels.” 17
N igeria w as no exception to this. D uring  the boom  period, bo th  N ig e ria ’s 
borrow ing and governm ent expenditure d rastically  increased. Shaxson accounts that “ in 
the boom  years N igeria had found it easy  to borrow  m o n ey ...an d  foreign debt had
l6BBC N ew s, "N igeria  S ettles Paris C lub D ebt".
17Scott Pegg, "Is T here  a D utch D isease in B o tsw ana?," R eso u rces  P o lic y  35, no. 1 (2010).
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reached $5 billion by  1980. N ow  N igeria  fell into arrears, and the penalty  paym ents 
m eant that its debt grew  even m ore: by  the end o f  the decade N igeria  w as nearly  $30 
billion in hock.” 18This dram atically  increased governm ent expenditure w as reflected  in 
lavish public investm ent projects such as the A jaotuka Steel Project, w hich  w as a 
disaster-a m ulti-m illion-dollar steel com pany built u nder the guidance o f  fo rm er 
President Shegu Shagari yet did not produce any steel. 19
This large governm ent expenditure has not changed  much since the boom  years. 
Currently, the H eritage Foundation’s Index o f  E conom ic Freedom  show s that N ig e ria ’s 
governm ent spending accounts for 29.1 per cent o f  its G D P.20How ever, h igh governm ent 
spending isn ’t necessarily  a reflection o f  a  poorly  functioning econom y (Sw eden for 
exam ple spends 51.3 per cent o f  its G D P21 bu t it is an advanced  industrial country). B ut, 
high governm ent spending presents a problem  w hen the expenditure does not contribu te  
directly to developm ent. W hen governm ent expenditure is used to prop up incom petent 
regim es o r to  construct outlandish public investm ent projects then th is presents d ire 
problem s for the econom y. Thus, it is not ju s t how  m uch a governm ent spends but m ore 
im portantly how  is this spending im proving the livelihood i f  its citizens.
A nother factor to take into consideration is w hether o r not the country  can  repay 
its debts. A gain using Sweden as an exam ple, despite  its large governm ent expenditure, it 
has a Standard and Poor foreign and local currency  credit rating o f  A A A  w hich  indicates 
that it is a credit-w orthy country. O n the o ther hand N igeria  has a S tandard  and Poor 
foreign and local currency credit rating o f  BB-. N igeria  has long struggled to repay its
l8Shaxson , P o iso n ed  W ells: The D irty  P o litics o f  A fr ica n  O il.
19Ibid.
20A rch  Pudd ing ton , F reedom  in the W orld  2013: D em o cra tic  B rea k th ro u g h s in th e  B a la n ce  (W ash in g to n  
D .C .: F reedom  H ouse, 2013).
21 Ibid.
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sovereign debt. It started to accum ulate a significant am ount o f debt during the bust 
period o f  the 1980s. F igure 5 illustrates the external debt stocks expressed as a percen tage  
o f  G N I from  1960 to 2012. A gain this reflects N igeria ’s reliance or dependency  on the 
volatility o f  the oil m arkets. Since the latter part o f  the 21st century oil p rices have spiked 
and thus N igeria has seen im provem ents in its econom ic growth. A s a resu lt o f  the 
increase in oil prices, in 2006 N igeria  w as able to  sign a repaym ent agreem ent w ith  the 
Paris C lub that allow ed it to settle the m ajority  o f  its foreign debt.
Figure 4.5: N igeria  E xternal D ebt Stocks as a Percentage o f  G N I, 1960-2012
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The boom  in natural resources produces shortsightedness in N ig eria ’s leaders. 
Typically, politicians act with a false sense o f  security that the boom  w ill last forever.
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This results in harm ful econom ic outcom es. A nd unfortunately, the reality  is that oil 
boom s and oil prices are subject to m arket volatility . Furtherm ore, increasing  public  
spending during resource boom s creates a situation  tha t leaves the coun try  h ighly 
vulnerable to  debt overhang.
Corruption
This shortsightedness is not only lim ited  to  econom ic aspects o f  the resource 
curse. A rguably, political issues associated  w ith  the resource curse have been  m ore 
prom inent and also m ore dangerous than econom ic ones. The m ost salien t political 
outcom e o f  the resource curse in  N igeria  is ram pant corruption and ren t-seeking  
behavior. It is hard to pinpoint w hether the pervasive corruption in N igeria  is a  p roduct o f  
its abundant oil revenues or w hether it is an em bedded  aspect o f  its culture. Thus, a better 
question to ask  is w ould corruption be as pervasive in N igeria i f  it w ere not for oil 
abundance? B ecause there is no corruption index that can m easure the level o f  corrup tion  
in N igeria prior to oil discovery, it is hard to  determ ine w hether the coun try  w as m ore or 
less corrupt p rio r to oil exportation.
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Figure 4.6: Trends in N igeria’s C PI Perform ance, 1996-2012
Trends in Nigeria's CPI Performance, 
1996-2012
20
Is ** 0 0  O  rH  CM
O  O  O  H  H  Ho o o o o o
( N  N  ( N  r s i  N  f N
O  rHo o o o
CM CM
N  m  ^  in  l£)o o o o oo o o o o
CM CM CM CM CM
H ow ever, it is possible to get an idea o f  the  level o f  corruption in N igeria  from  the 
late 1990s to  present. Figure 6 illustrates the co u n try ’s perform ance on T ransparency  
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index from  1996 to 2012. O ne o f  the m ajor 
caveats o f  the CPI, however, is that it only m easures the perce ived  level o f  corrup tion  and 
not the actual level. Because corruption is such an  illicit activity  it w ou ld  be im possib le  to  
accurately m easure the actual level in any country. As the graph represents, N ig e ria ’s 
corruption perception level has gradually  increased since 1996. H ow ever, because the 
CPI is m easured on a scale from  0 to 100 (w ith 100 being the low est perceived  level o f  
corruption), this m easure is counterintuitive. A ccord ing  to  the CPI, corrup tion  in N igeria  
has im proved over the period. N evertheless, N ig e ria ’s curren t score o f  27 is less than 
laudable; it ranks no. 139 out o f  174 countries.
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O ne o f  the problem s o f  corruption lies in its perception. A dvanced  industrial 
societies such as those in W estern Europe and N orth  A m erica  perceive corrup tion  as a 
heinous act that inhibits socioeconom ic progress and ju stice . H ow ever, in developing  
societies, the issue o f  corruption is not cast in such a dichotom ous view.
In countries that have w idespread poverty , inequality , w eak institu tions and /o r 
high socioeconom ic stratification, corruption m ay  be construed as a m echanism  to 
lubricate otherw ise difficult processes. This could  be som ething as sim ple as a  low - 
incom e m otorist bribing a police o fficer in order to  get out o f  a traffic ticket. C ertain ly , if  
every m otorist and police officer were to  engage in such an  illicit ac tiv ity  the long-term  
effects o f  this action could poten tially  jeopard ize  the ju stice  system ; how ever, single, 
isolated incidents o f  this corrupt activity are construed sim ply as w ays to survive a harsh  
socioeconom ic environm ent.
O n the o ther hand, corruption also has deleterious effects that jeopard izes the 
livelihood o f  a substantial portion o f  the population. A gbiboa sum m arily expresses th is 
wide variation in corruption as follows: “corrupt p ractices can  be system ic, pervasive and 
routine or they can be petty, sporadic, trivial and rare .”22 Joseph  Nye describes corruption  
as “behavior w hich deviates from  the form al duties o f  a public  role because  o f  private- 
regarding (personal, close fam ily, private clique) pecuniary  or status gains; o r vio lates 
rules against the exercise o f  certain  types o f  private-regard ing  influence.”23
A nother point that A gbiboa so poignantly  expresses is “who is getting  the b ribe?” 
or in o ther words w ho is on the beneficial end o f  the corrupt practice. H e argues that in
22DanieI Agbiboa, "Between Corruption and Development: The Political Economy o f  State Robbery in 
Nigeria," Journal o f  Business Ethics 108 (2012).
23Joseph Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," The American P olitical 
Science Review  61, no. 2 (1967): 419.
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cases w here a public official engages in corrupt activity  in order to benefit h is ethnic 
group or clan, the recipient group m ay not construe th is as corruption.24 A lso , m ilitary  
rule perpetuated corruption in N igeria. A gbiboa cites that “driven by personal gain  and 
hobbled by cronyism , m ilitary elites, aided by civ ilian  m inions, unabashedly  looted state 
property, diverted state funds into their p rivate accounts, and aw arded  questionable  
contracts to com panies ow ned by them  and their cronies.”25U ndoubtedly, the abundance 
o f  oil revenues contributed to this m entality o f  patronage and  cronyism .
This pattern contributed to an overall breakdow n in the country 's governance. As 
m entioned in the previous chapter, N igeria  has undergone a p lethora  o f  leaders and 
regim e changes. It was not until 1999 that N igeria  returned  to  dem ocratic ru le and even 
then the political clim ate was w rought w ith instability.
This lack o f  institutional quality  is reflected  in N ig eria ’s poor perfo rm ance on  a 
num ber o f  governance indicators. C hapter 3 already  described  N igeria’s perform ance on 
the W orld G overnance Indicators so I w ill no t recapitu late the results here. A no ther key 
governance indicator, how ever, that N igeria  has also dem onstrated  less than  favorable 
ranking is in the Ibrahim  Index o f  G overnance. T he m ost unique feature  o f  th is index is 
that it lim its its analysis o f  governance effectiveness to  only  African states. Furtherm ore, 
it judges the perform ance o f  the 52 A frican states based on four categories: 1) safety  and 
rule o f  law, 2) participation and hum an rights, 3) sustainable econom ic opportunity  and 
4) hum an developm ent. Out o f  the 52 states, N igeria  ranks 43 accord ing  to the 2012 
edition o f  the index. This finding is consisten t w ith that o f  the W orld  G overnance 
Indicators.
24Agbiboa, "Between Corruption and Development: The Political Economy of State Robbery in Nigeria."
25Ibid.
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Interestingly enough there is no indicator that assesses the quality  o f  governance 
p rior to the oil boom  period. H ow ever, a form er perm anen t secretary Phillip  A sidou 
accounts in an interview  with a V anguard new spaper reporter that p rio r to 1975, N igeria  
was run by com petent and carefully  selected civil servants.26 During the o il boom  period  
and under the first term  reign o f  form er President O basanjo , over 10,000 civil servants 
w ere rem oved from  their positions.27A sidou notes that th is abrupt rem oval o f  civ il service 
em ployees led to the deterioration o f  N igeria ’s governance and concom itan tly  the 
increase o f  corruption.28
Explaining the Extent o f the Resource Curse
The previous section p roved  or show ed evidence tha t there is a h igh degree o f  the 
resource curse in N igeria  by illustrating that there is a  substantially large p resence  o f  the 
Dutch disease, price volatility, debt burden  and  corrup tion  that negatively  affec t the 
country 's econom ic and political system s. The fo llow ing  section on the o ther hand  seeks 
to explain w hy this is the case. In this study, I argue that the reason there  is a  g reater 
evidence o f  the resource curse in N igeria  than in  B otsw ana can be analyzed  from  three 
levels: the leadership, governm ent and civil society. A dm ittedly, since the leader is a p a rt 
o f  the governm ent there tends to  be a slight overlap  in  som e instances. H ow ever, the 
reason for d istinguishing the tw o levels is quite sim ple. M any  works analyze the resource 
curse solely from  the state level. This is understandable because o f  the em phasis o f  the 
state in the m ainstream  realist paradigm . H ow ever, this study shows that in looking  solely




at state-level explanations it is possible to m iss subtle  but im portan t effects and 
influences that the leadership and civil society can have on  the econom ic and political 
outcom es o f  a country. Therefore, in addition to  looking at state level explanations, this 
study incorporates two other levels as w ell in order to provide a  m ore com prehensive 
analysis o f  the resource curse dilem m a.
L ea d e r sh ip
Political scientists often overlook the ro le o f  the individual w hen try ing  to 
understand the causes, consequences and explanations o f  the resource curse. T his is 
because o f  the overw helm ing influence that realist theory  has had on  the field, w hich  
places m ajor em phasis on the state in w orld politics. U nfortunately, in ignoring the 
individual level it is possible to m iss critical explanations when analyzing  com plex 
phenom ena. Therefore, in looking at such a  dilem m a as the resource  curse, it is 
im perative that one assesses this issue not ju st from  the state  level b u t from  that o f  the 
leader as well.
The study o f  the role o f  leadership can be  traced back  to 1978 in B u m s’ sem inal 
text about transform ational leadership. In 1985, “B ass extended B um s w ork  by 
identifying four com ponents o f  transform ational leadership: 1) idealized  influence- 
serving as a  charism atic role m odel to follow ers, 2) inspirational m otivation  3) 
intellectual stim ulation and 4) individual consideration.”29
In looking at N igeria’s leadership it is im portant to  look at bo th  the past and 
present leaders. The role o f  leadership is relevant to th is com parative study because 
postcolonial N igeria had very different leaders from  post-colonial B otsw ana. The m ost
29Timothy Judge and Joyce Bono, "Five-Factor Model o f  Personality and Transformational Leadership," 
Journal o f  Applied Psychology 85, no. 5 (2000): 751.
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salience difference is that N igeria  has had 14 regim e changes since independence; 
whereas, B otsw ana has had only  4 .Furtherm ore, m ost w ould  argue that N igeria  d id not 
necessarily have a charism atic or transform ational figure that led the coun try  after 
independence. Instead, its leadership could be characterized  as a succession o f  com peting  
factions that all had particular agendas and special interests.
I posit that leaders play a  great role in shaping the developm ental dynam ics in a 
resource-rich country. This hypothesis should com e as no  surprise, how ever, because 
good leadership tends to equate to a properly led country. H ow ever, w hen  one factors in 
natural resources into the equation, a poor leader in a resource-rich coun try  can  resu lt in 
even m ore harm ful effects than  a poor leader in a resource-poor country. I also  
hypothesize that past leaders p lay  an equally  im portant role as the p resen t leadership  in 
N igeria’s econom ic developm ent. W hile this is no t justification  o r rationale  for the 
present resource-curse related problem s N igeria  encounters, one cannot ignore the path- 
dependent processes that occur during the im m ediate postcolonial period. It is d ifficu lt to 
undo decades o f  econom ic m ism anagem ent, corruption  and weak institu tions in  a short 
tim efram e.
In a country that was ru led  by the m ilitary  for m ost o f  its postco lon ial period , it is 
im portant to understand why there has been a  lack o f  a single v isionary  charism atic  
leader in N igeria. The problem  w ith N igeria  is that un like m any o ther sub-Saharan  
African countries that w ere colonized by a European pow er political unity  w as 
fragm ented and disjointed. Furtherm ore, N igerians had to  figure ou t how  to function  as 
one nation instead o f  several disjo inted  territories. Because o f  this national d isunity  and 
factional com petition, N igeria did not have a dynam ic, charism atic post-independence
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leader that could unite the people in pursuing a com m on goal. This lack o f  cohesion  in 
national identity greatly jeopard ized  the stability both w ith in  the governm ent and across 
the nation. Jackson concurs, “N igeria did not develop a political system  characterized  by  
a single charism atic leader leading a single national m obilizing, a ll-encom passing  
political party .”30
Furtherm ore, during the nationalist era the  N orth and  South w ere d ivided. T he 
Southern territories pushed for independence from  B ritain  w hile the N orth  w as 
am bivalent. Som e nationalist leaders in  the N orth  w anted  independence from  B rita in  
while som e feared that an independent N igeria w ould  gran t th e  Southern states a  po litical 
advantage over the N orth. Therefore, N igeria w as tom  betw een one group o f  peop le  
fighting for independence and another group that w as sa tisfied  with the status quo pow er 
balance.
During the nationalist era N igeria  w as d iv ided  into three m ajor po litical parties: 
the N orthern People's Congress (NPC) in the N orth , the National C ouncil o f  N igerian  
Citizens (NCN C) in the East, and the A ction  G roup in the W est. T herefore, p re ­
independence N igeria  w as divided am ong m ajor regional leaders each w ith  their ow n 
political agenda. N o leader w anted the opposing regions to  gain political advantage. A nd  
therefore instead o f  w orking tow ards a unified N igeria, each leader w as looking  out 
solely for his political subdivision.
This attitude carried over into the post-independence era. Table 1 depicts a 
tim eline o f  N igeria’s leaders from  1960 to present. The political fragm entation  in p o s t­
colonial N igeria is reflected in the num ber o f  leaders that assum ed the m antle  o f  
President after 1960. As shown in Table 1, for the  m ajority  o f  N igeria’s postco lon ial era
30Larry Jackson, "Nigeria: The Politics o f  the First Republic," Journal o f  Black Studies 2, no. 3 (1972): 278.
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(from  1966 to 1999), the state was under m ilitary  rule. Arguably, the only  N igerian  
leader w ho could be considered as transform ational w as the first p residen t, N nam di 
A zikiw e, w ho w as also considered one o f  the fathers o f  N igerian nationalism . H ow ever, 
A zikiw e appeared to be m ore influential p r io r  to  N igeria ’s independence, tha t is, the 
extent o f  A zkiw e’s influence w as at its pinnacle during the nationalist era. A zik iw e w as 
eventually ousted from  pow er before the end o f  h is four y ear term  in a  m ilita ry  coup.
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T able 4.1: C hronology o f  N igeria’s Political L eaders since Independ en ce
L e a d e r D u r a t i o n
E t h n i c
O r i g i n
T y p e  o f  
R e g i m e
How d i d  t h e  R e g i m e  E n d ?
Nnamdi Azikiwe 1963 1966 Igbo Civilian Overthrown in a Military Coup
Johnson Aguiyi-lronsi 1966 Igbo Military Killed in a Military Coup
Yakubu Go won 1 9 6 6 -  1975 Angas Military Overthrown in a Military Coup
Murtala Mohammed 1 9 7 5 -  1976 Kano Military Assassinated
Olusegun Obasanjo 1 9 7 6 -  1979 Y oruba Military
Transferred Power to Elected 
Civilian Leader
Alhaji Shagari 1 9 7 9 -  1983 Fulani Civilian Overthrown in a Military Coup
Muhammadu Buhari 1 9 8 3 -  1985 Fulani Military Overthrown in a Military Coup
Ibrahim Babangida 1 9 8 5 -  1993 Fulani Military Resigned
Ernest Shonekan 1993 Yoruba Interim Deposed
Sani Abacha 1 9 9 3 -  1998 Kano Military Died in Office
Abdusalami Abubakar 1 9 9 8 -  1999 Fulani Military Transferred Power to Elected Civilian Leader
Olusegun Obasanjo 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 7 Y oruba Civilian Election
Umaru Yar’Adua 2 0 0 7 -2 0 1 0 Fulani Civilian Died in Office
Goodluck Jonathan 2 0 1 0 -
present
Ijaw Civilian N/A
In newly independent post-colonial states, transformational leaders are
particularly instrum ental because a  charism atic leaders helps to unite  the people under 
sim ilar national objectives. H ow ever, charism a is n o t a  sufficient attribu te o f  a 
transform ational leader. In fact, there are exam ples o f  m any postcolonial leaders in A frica  
that have rose to pow er yet have w reaked havoc on their people (e.g. form er U gandan 
president, Idi Am in). As Bass explains charism a has to b e  com bined w ith in tellectual and 
inspirational stim ulation. One o f  the paradigm atic figures o f  such a leader in A frica 
would be South A frica’s N elson M andela. N igeria  has had  fourteen regim e changes and 
thirteen heads o f  state since independence (O basanjo  served two term s). H ow ever, none
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o f  these political figures can be characterized as a transform ational leader. Instead, the 
type o f  leadership that N igeria  has undergone m ay be categorized as “B ig M an R ule” or 
“Personal R ule” .
Jackson and R osberg first conceptualized the idea o f  personal rule in their sem inal 
tex t Personal Rule in B lack Africa. They posit that personal ru le in A frica  is “ a d istinctive 
type o f  political system  in w hich the rivalries and  struggles o f  pow erful and w ilfu l m en, 
rather than im personal institutions, ideologies, public  policies o r c lass in terest are 
fundam ental in shaping political life.”31O gbazghi adds “ in personalist reg im es, po litical 
institutionalization largely em anates not from  the legally sanctioned institu tions o f  law - 
but as a result o f  the personal w ishes and w him s o f  those w ho happen to  hold  the reins o f  
pow er.”32The m ajor difference betw een a charism atic  transform ational leader such as 
M andela and a charism atic yet tyrannical ru ler such as Idi A m in is that a  transform ational 
leader im plem ents certain laws and institutions tha t w ill benefit the country  in the lo n g ­
term , in o ther w ords transform s or im proves the country  from  its curren t position . These 
firm ly entrenched institutions tend to continue even  after the leader steps dow n from  
power.
In contrast to  transform ational leaders, personal rulers are  en trenched  by 
neopatrim onialism . D iam ond describes that neopatrim onialism  is a paradox  in A frican  
states because “they com bine the form al arch itecture  o f  a m odem  bureaucratic  state- 
constrained in theory by laws, constitutions, and o ther im personal ru les and standards-
1lJackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant.
32
115
with the inform al reality o f  personalized, unaccountable pow er and pervasive patron- 
client ties.”33
Personal rule enveloped N igeria  a fte r independence. A fter A zik iw e w as 
overthrown, a  succession o f  shortsighted, self-in terested  leaders follow ed .M ost o f  them  
were m ilitary leaders. N o leader w as concerned  for the overall developm ent o f  the 
country. Instead, cronyism  and a significantly  h igh  level o f  corruption especially  during  
the oil boom  years characterized leadership. A zik iw e’s successor, G eneral Ironsi served 
less than a year in office and w as killed in  a m ilitary  coup. T he new presiden t, G o w on  led 
the country in an em bittered three-year civil war.
At the end o f  G ow on’s reign, N igeria w as in the heigh ts o f the oil boom . This w as 
an opportunity for N igeria to turn  its econom y around. H ow ever, because o f  the lack  o f  
stable and effective leadership, the econom y continued  to  face the harm ful effects o f  the 
resource curse. A lthough the country experienced  its h ighest econom ic g row th  in 1979 
this was because o f  the dram atic increase in oil prices due to  the Iranian revo lu tion  and 
not because o f  strong leadership. Lew is argues that:
“w ith the arrival o f  the initial petro leum  w indfall, N igerian leaders pu rsued  a  set 
o f  policies that in tensified  the m acroeconom ic distortions em bodied  in the  D utch  
disease and consequently  increased the  concentration  o f  the econom y around 
petroleum  rents.”34
In fact, during the oil boom  in 1979, N igeria  encountered ano ther reg im e change, 
this tim e it w as the transfer o f  pow er from  m ilitary  to civ ilian  rule by  O basanjo . T his 
transition to civilian rule was short-lived. Shagari only served  one four y ear term  after
33Larry Diamond, The Spirit o f  Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the W orld  
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008), 247.
34Lewis, Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and N igeria, 125.
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w hich he too w as overthrow n in a m ilitary coup. The m ajority  o f  N ig e ria ’s leadership  
continued w ith th is pattern; m ost leaders w ere overthrow n by  m ilitary coup.
C onsequently, post-independence leadership transitions in N igeria  w ere m arked  
by ethnic conflict and com petition. The culm ination o f  ethnic conflict w as reflected  in the 
1967-70 C ivil W ar. Furtherm ore, since the N orthern  region w as m ore populous than the 
south, there w as inherent tension that the H ausa-Fulani ethnic group w ould  dom inate  
politics at the expense o f  the Igbo and Y oruba ethnic groups (the o ther tw o m ajor 
groups). Leadership transitions w ere characterized by m istrust, se lf-in terest and 
corruption.
C orruption especially posed a m ajor problem  for N igerian leadership. A s 
m entioned above m ost o f  N igeria’s leaders w ere m ilitary  leaders therefore they  held  very  
little experience outside o f  the m ilitary and governm ent. A kinrinade argues that th is lack 
o f  civilian experience is a  m ajor contributing factor for the ram pant ren t-seek ing  and  
corruption that occurred under m ilitary rule. Furtherm ore, if  there  w ere few  career 
prospects after stepping dow n from  office, this w ould  encourage o r engender a  h igher 
degree o f  corruption .35 H ow ever, I argue that it is no t the lack o f  career opportunities 
after presidency that encouraged the w idespread looting and w ealth accum ulation . In fact, 
quite a few leaders started businesses after stepping  dow n from  po litics (e.g. O basanjo  
and Shagari both started farm s after their term s). O ther leaders such as G ow on, O basanjo  
and Shagari w ent on to form  civil society organizations and/or jo in  com m ittees and 
advisory boards o f  prom inent international organizations such as the U nited  N ations 
(UN). Thus, this explanation does not justify  the  accum ulation that occurred  under so
35Sola Akinrinade, "An Army o f  Ex-Presidents: Transitions, the Military and Democratic Consolidation in 
Nigeria," in Legacies o f  Power: Leadersh ip  Change and Form er Presidents in African Politics, ed. Roger 
Southall and Henning Melber (Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2006).
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m any o f  the m ilitary rulers; factional com petition  and ethnic rivalry  better explains 
unscrupulous activities during the presidency o f  m any o f  N igeria’s leaders.
The present civ ilian  adm inistration is the  longest uninterrupted dem ocratic  rule 
that N igeria has experienced. In 1999, N igeria  adopted a  new constitu tion  in w hich  
General A bubakar transferred pow er to O basanjo. Since then  N igeria has had  no m ilitary  
coups or unelected rulers. In 2010, the current president, G oodluck Jonathan  w as elected. 
Since then, N igeria has seen a resurgence o f  econom ic grow th, how ever, it is too  soon to 
tell w hether this is due to President Jonathan’s leadership  o r high oil prices.
Government
Explaining the variation in the resource curse at the state level is particu larly  
im portant in this case because N igeria nationalized its oil sector in 1971. T herefore, 
because oil is the coun try ’s m ajor source o f  revenue and the state is the prim ary  
stakeholder, this indicates that the role o f  the state is a significant ac to r in N ig eria ’s 
econom ic developm ent. The state along w ith the foreign oil com panies engage in a jo in t 
venture partnership in the extraction, production  and trad ing  o f oil. T he N igeria  state 
accounts for 57 percent ow nership in th is partnership  under the m andate o f  the N igerian  
N ational Petroleum  C orporation (N N PC), w hich w as form ed in 1977,36
U ndoubtedly, the quality  o f  governm ent a country  has is affected  by  the type o f  
leadership. A  country  led by personal rule adversely  affects the possib ility  o f  stable 
dem ocratization. V an de W alle observes that “ the  longer a leader is in pow er, the m ore 
personalized the regim e is and the harder it is to  institutionalize dem ocracy .”37Failure  to
,6Uwafiokun Idemudia, "The Quest for the Effective Use o f  Natural Resource Revenue in Africa: Beyond 
Transparency and the Need for Compatible Cultural Democracy in Nigeria," Africa Today 56, no. 2.
37Nicolas Van de Walle, "Africa's Range o f  Regimes," Journal o f  Dem ocracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 76.
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secure a dynam ic, stable leadership w as overtly  reflected  in N ig eria ’s governm ent. 
Sim ilar to its leadership, N igeria  politics is characterized  by com petition  over oil 
revenues (and other resources) am ong various ethnic and relig ious groups. This 
com petition often involves gaining the political favor o f  certa in  private business interests. 
Van de W alle refers to this relationship  as neopatriponalism  where “a  p residen t and a 
small circle use the sta te ’s resources to keep the support o f  large netw orks o f  political 
clients.” 38Van de W alle argues that clientelism  (or neopatrim onialism ) exists in every  
country (even in the strongly consolidated  dem ocracies). How ever, in coun tries w ith  a 
strong consolidated dem ocracy such as B otsw ana it is no longer the system  o f  rule. T here 
are checks and balances against the u tilization o f  public  funds for p rivate  gain. T here is 
free press, an independent jud ic iary , and other institutionalized m echanism s tha t can  
prevent the unfettered exploitation o f  resource revenues to gain po litical and econom ic 
advantage.39
It is im portant to note that unlike the W est, dem ocracy w as im posed  upon  
postcolonial A frican states. For a  num ber o f  political reasons (such as the Cold W ar and 
Structural A djustm ent Program s), m any A frican states found them selves ex ternally  
forced to  dem ocratize despite the ir internal political struggles. M kandaw ire refers to these 
types o f  states as “choiceless dem ocracies” m eaning that unlike the W est w here liberal 
dem ocratic principles w ere firm ly entrenched in the countries’ constitu tions, m any 
A frican countries found them selves forcefully  exposed  and  coerced into a governance 
structure that was foreign to them .40N igeria  is no exception  to this, and the challenges
38Ibid„ 69.
39Ibid.
40Thandika Mkandawire, "Crisis Management and the Making o f  ‘Choiceless Democracies'," in State, 
Conflict, and Democracy in Africa , ed. Richard Joseph (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).
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that it confronted in dem ocratizing can be seen not only in its many reg im e changes and 
m ilitary coups but also in the w idespread corruption and rent-seeking behav io r in the 
political adm inistration.
C orruption especially has been the m ost p rom inent challenge for the N igerian  
state since independence. It has also been the m ost sign ificant explanation for the large 
extent o f  the resource curse in N igeria at the state level. Therefore, N igeria  is caught in a 
perpetual, vicious circle w here large o il revenues create the  conditions necessary  for 
heinous corruption, and yet corruption  exacerbates all the  other negative outcom es 
associated w ith the resource curse.
It is not surprising that a  corrupt governm ent w ould  lead to a m ism anagem ent o f  
natural resources. There have been countless studies on  the deleterious effects o f  
corruption and poor governance on developm ent. A better question to a sk  is under w hat 
governm ental conditions a  country succum bs to the nega tive  outcom es o f  the resource  
curse. In o ther words, w hat is it about the N igerian  governm ent tha t engenders a  h igher  
level o f  the resource curse?  C ertainly one can see the tau to logy  in a rgu ing  that N ig eria ’s 
corrupt governm ent is one o f  the contributing factors to a greater presence o f  the resource 
curse (since corruption is arguably one o f  the political outcom es o f  the resource curse). 
Therefore, a better w ay to  go about th is section is to ask  the question  w hat causes a 
greater incidence o f  corruption in N igeria. W hy is the governm ent so corrupt?
T he R entier State E xp lanation
Because N igeria exhibits R entier state characteristics, it tends to  have a  h igher 
level o f  corruption than o ther resource-rich  sub-Saharan A frican  countries. R entier states 
are noted for having a h igher level o f  corruption than  most o ther states because
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governm ents on average are not held accountable  to their citizens because o f  the large 
influx o f  oil and m ineral revenues that the natural resources provide.41 A dded  to this, 
N igeria’s m ultiethnic dem ographic com position creates an intensely com petitive  political 
environm ent.
Ross argues that the R entier effect consists o f  three other effects: 1) the  taxation  
effect, 2) the spending effect and 3) the g roup form ation effect.42T he taxation  effect 
im plies that because o f  the high influx o f  revenues, governm ents do not need  to  tax  their 
citizens as m uch ( if  at all). Because o f  this lack o f  taxation  citizens lose their voice 
thereby producing a non-dem ocratizing effect 43T he spending effect ind icates that R entier 
states are able to engage in patronage by substantially  contributing to public  investm ent 
projects. O nce these in terest groups are pacified , th is reduces p ressure  for 
dem ocratization.44 The group form ation effect bu ilds upon previous theories p roposed  by 
Barrington M oore and R obert Putnam . Ross posits that because o f the abundant supply  o f  
m oney Rentier states have they are able to  p reven t the creation o f  social g roups that 
w ould pressure the governm ent for dem ocratization .45
R oss’ w ork prim arily  addresses o il’s capability  to hinder dem ocracy . B ut w hat 
does this non-dem ocratizing effect have to do w ith  corruption? A short an sw er is that a 
lack o f  dem ocracy tends to prom ote corruption. But o f  course as in  every th ing  in the 
social sciences it is a m ore com plex phenom ena than that. Possibly the best w ay  to test 
the effects o f  dem ocracy (or a lack thereof) on  corruption is a sim ple correla tion  test 
betw een the tw o variables. The problem  w ith  th is less dem ocracy-m ore corruption  nexus
4lRoss, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?."
42Ibid.
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how ever is how should w e m easure dem ocracy? D em ocracy can be m easure  in  a num ber 
o f  ways, from  the m easurem ent o f  free and fair elections, checks and balances on the 
branches o f  governm ent, to the political and civil rights o f  citizens. O bviously , a 
com bination o f  all these factors w ould provide a be tter m easurem ent o f  dem ocracy. 
Second, how should we m easure corruption? C orruption  in itse lf  is a d ifficu lt variable for 
which to  capture data because o f  the illicit nature  o f  the activity. A lso, corruption  exists 
on so m any levels it w ould  difficult to specify w hat level o f  corruption w e are m easuring . 
N evertheless, Table 2 presents the correlation results be tw een  the polity2 variable and the 
CPI index.
T able 4.2: C orrelation between R egim e T ype and C orruption P erceptions Index
polity2 cpi
Pearson Correlation 1 .464**
polity2 Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 164 157
Pearson Correlation .464’* 1
Cpi Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 157 176
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
A s depicted in the table, there is statistically  significant positive  rela tionship  
betw een the polity2 and CPI variables a t the p <0.001 level. This ind icates that the m ore 
dem ocracy a country has, the higher it scores on the C PI, and thus it is perceived  as 
having less corruption. A s is w ell noted, how ever, correla tion  does not equal causation , 
therefore the Rentier state explanation w hile necessary  for the explanation  o f  the 
corruption in N igeria  is not sufficient.
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T he Zero-Sum  C om petition  Explanation
Thus, I posit another explanation for the h igh  prevalence o f corrup tion  in N igeria . 
The dynam ics o f  political com petition in N igeria  can be ap tly  sum m arized w ith  a quote 
by N icholas Shaxson. Shaxson alludes to  C hinua A chebe’s use o f  a  queue to  describe 
politics in N igeria. Shaxson cites:
“A fu n c tio n in g  queue is really two queues: a  p h y s ica l one a n d  a  m en ta l one. 
D isrupt the p h ysica l queue-by nudging  a truck  through it, say, o r d o u sin g  it w ith  a  
f ir e  hose-and  i f  the m ental queue rem ains intact, then  order w ill reem erge, in the  
sam e w ay that stable countries recover fr o m  econom ic shocks o r  terrorist attacks. 
But there is a  m ore dam aging  w ay to d isrup t a  queue: push  in a t the fro n t. This 
assaults everyone's b e lie f  in it, a n d  it i f  happens enough, the scram bling  starts  
a n d  it w ill collapse. There is then no easy w ay to rebu ild  it, no m a tter  how  m uch  
yo u  shout. ”46
It is easy to say that N igeria’s econom ic w oes are  because o f  a corrupt governm ent bu t 
quite frankly that argum ent is too  sim plistic.
Jackson addresses the federalist nature o f  the N igerian  polity. He contends that it 
is because o f  the m ultitude o f  ethnic factions N igeria  decided  to pursue a  federal union 
instead o f  a parliam entary republic as m any form er B ritish  colonies (such as B otsw ana 
for exam ple) pursued after independence.47 As described  in the earlier section, N igeria  
lacked a single charism atic leader at independence because o f  the com peting  factions. 
How ever, because o f  N igeria’s unique ethnic com position, this factionalism  set the
46Shaxson, Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics o f  African Oil, 11-12.
47Jackson, "Nigeria: The Politics o f the First Republic."
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undertone for the ensuing class stratification.48Furtherm ore, Jackson con tends that th is 
class stratification creates a party system  in N igeria  that resem bles a zero -sum  gam e, 
where each political opponent attem pts to  attain  pow er for them selves at the expense o f  
the other political opponents.49 This was one o f  the prim ary reasons that con tribu ted  to 
the Biafran C ivil W ar.
This zero-sum  gam e that Jackson m entions can be illustrated in  a sligh tly  a ltered  
P risoner’s D ilem m a gam e, w hich centers around tw o hypothetical po litical 




50The story behind the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma game is that two criminals are apprehended. The district 
attorney questions each o f  them separately and presents deals to both o f  them. The deal is that if  one 
confesses (or squeals) on the other criminal, they will be set free. The district attorney presents this same 
deal to both parties. If neither o f  the criminals confess, they each will only face misdemeanor charges. If 
both o f  them confess, they both will get felony charges. So the ordered potential payoffs are essentially [Set 
Free, Misdemeanor, Felony], where Set Free is the most attractive outcome and Felony is the least desirable 
outcome. But the catch to this game is that neither criminal is able to communicate with the other player in 
order to cooperate in attaining the best outcome for both o f  them, which is the [Do not Confess, Do not 
Confess] - this is also the first Nash Equilibrium. Because o f  this lack o f  communication, the criminals 
resort to the 2nd Nash Equilibrium o f  [Confess, Confess]. Each criminal is cognizant that if  he Confesses, 
the worse case scenario is getting a misdemeanour charge if  the other confesses too. But if  he does not 
confess and the other criminal does, he could face felony charges. So the best strategy for each player is to 
confess.
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T able 4.3: M odified V ersion o f the P r ison ers’ D ilem m a G am e51
Politician #2
D o  not C h eat C heat
Politician #1
Do not 
C heat 1 5 , 1 5  5 , 2 0
C heat 2 0 , 5 __________1 0 ,  10
A s depicted in Table 3, the m ost ideal strategy for bo th  politicians w ould  be [Do not 
Cheat, Do not Cheat], H ow ever, because o f  m istrust and  the com petitive  natu re  o f  
N igeria’s politics, the risk  o f  one p layer choosing  the [D o not Cheat] strategy and the 
o ther p layer choosing [Cheat] is too great. T herefore, each  player resorts to  [C heat, 
Cheat], even though this is not the Pareto O ptim al outcom e.
Due to  the unstable nature o f  N igerian politics, it w ould  not be in the best in terest 
o f  a governm ent official to  choose the [Do not C heat] strategy. In o ther w ords, it w ould  
be in one’s best interest to  secure as m any benefits as possible at the expense o f  h is 
political opponents. B ecause i f  he chooses not to  do so, m ore than likely ano ther p layer 
will select the [Cheat] strategy and m axim ize h is benefits while m inim izing  the o ther 
po litic ian’s benefits who chose the [Do not Cheat] strategy. This argum ent supports 
Shaxson’s analogy o f  the m ental queue. B ecause trust in the system  has been b roken , 
each player sees his/her best bet as to scram ble fo r the m ost resources as possib le because 
choosing the opposite strategy is in effect choosing  the least p ay o ff structure, w hich  
w ould not be a  rational decision.
The N igerian state m ay also be described as a soft state. M yrdal’s descrip tion  o f  
such states w as originally used to refer to India under the Nehru regim e, how ever his 
account can also be applied to o ther developing countries w ith  sim ilar political structures.
5IJ.D. Morrow, Game Theory fo r  Poltlcal Scientists (Princeton University Press, 1994), 78.
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M yrdal expressed that soft states generally  have a lack o f  discipline. This lack o f  
discipline typically  result in the failure o f  the governm ent to  m anage corruption. A lso, 
public officials generally are privy to collusion w ith  influential business in terests. T here 
is also a general lack o f  obedience to law  enforcem ent and o ther d iscip linary  
authorities.52
Civil Society
Civil society participation is crucial in m itigating  the  resource curse. In  fact, the 
rise o f  the civil society m ovem ent in A frica  occurred during  the 1990s w hen m any o f  
these countries strived to dem ocratize their regim es. It shou ld  come as no  surprise then  
that an active and influential civil society is an ind icato r o f im proved  dem ocratic  
governance. Therefore, it stands to reason that i f  civil society  was im portan t during the 
early 20th century dem ocratization process in A frica, th en  it should  be equally  as 
im portant in reducing the level o f  the resource curse in these countries as w ell.
A t first glance N igeria 's civil society appears v ibrant and active. T he country  has 
over 1,000 registered non-governm ental organizations according to  theN igeria  N etw ork  
o f  N on-G overnm ental O rganizations (N N G O ).T hese g roups focus on a m yriad  o f  
them atic issues from  w om en's rights, hum an rights, poverty, and possib ly  the m ost 
prom inent issue, corruption. N igeria  w as also one o f  the first countries to  be com plian t 
w ith the international m ulti-stakeholder group aim ed specifically at com bating  the 
resource curse, the Extractive Industries T ransparency In itiative (E IT I).53 Furtherm ore, in 
2004, a  local chapter o f  EITI (N EITI) w as setup by then  President O basan jo  in a very
52Gunnar Myrdal, "The 'Soft State' in Undeveloped Countries," in Unfashionable Econom ics: Essays in 
Honour o f  Lord Balogh, ed. Paul Streeten (London: W eidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970).
53 Nigeria became a compliant member in 2001.
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public and avid anti-corruption cam paign. D espite these  efforts how ever and the 
seem ingly vibrant civil society, N G O s have been  unable to  wield sign ificant influence 
over the governm ent, and consequently  have not had as g rea t an im pact on  tem pering  the 
resource curse as they have had in B otsw ana.
There could be a num ber o f  contributing factors that could po ten tia lly  exp la in  the 
relatively w eaker civil society in N igeria. W hile both countries are dem ocracies, as 
exhibited throughout this discourse, dem ocratic  rights w ithin N igeria  are rela tively  
w eaker than in B otsw ana. Thus, the first factor w e need to  consider is the degree o f  civil 
and political freedom s in N igeria. F reedom  H ouse ranks N igeria as partly  free w ith  an 
overall rating o f  4.5 on  a scale o f  1 to 7 (1 = best, 7 = w orst). Furtherm ore, N ig e ria ’s civil 
liberties and political rights ratings are 5 and 4 respectively  (on the sim ilar scale). This 
tells us that although N igeria  is a de ju re  dem ocracy, civil liberties and  po litical freedom s 
are lim ited and in several cases threatened. The lim itations placed on civ il and  political 
rights w ould have an adverse effect on  any m obilization attem pts m ade by the civil 
society.
O ne instance o f  such threats was seen during the 2012  fuel subsidy protests. O n 
January 9, 2012, after the governm ent drastically  reduced  the fuel subsid ies (w hich 
artificially low ered the price o f  fuel to N 65 per liter54) in order to save an estim ated  1 
trillion N aira for that particular year, several N G O s and individuals took to  the streets in 
order to protest this governm ent policy that w ould  adversely  affect m illions o f  N igerians, 
w ho w ere already struggling to subsist w ith in  an econom y that w as inequitably  




liter.56 For the m ajority o f  N igerians this w ould have m ean tthat not only  w ou ld  they  have 
to pay m ore for petrol but also for alm ost every o ther consum er good and service as well. 
Shortly after the protests began the N igerian  m ilitary  and police c racked  dow n on the 
protests. Several m edia outlets reported  that droves o f  p eop le  were shot at and injured 
and at least tw o persons w ere reported dead.57 Eventually , President Jonathan  partially  
restored the subsidy to N 97 per liter in o rder to quell the p ro tests;58 how ever, the violence 
and repression that dem onstrators faced during the 2012 fuel protests po in ts to a  g reater 
overarching problem  o f  dem ocratic freedom s in N igeria.
The lack o f  dem ocratic freedom s poses severe restrictions on  civ il society. In 
N igeria’s case especially there has been a longstanding h isto ry  o f dem ocratic  repression. 
Recall from  the previous chapter that until 1999, N igeria  w as predom inantly  governed  by 
m ilitary rule. Therefore, it is not surprising that political d issen t w ould be suppressed. A s 
Ikelegbe notes: “The m ilitary incursion and dom inance o f  N igerian po litics in troduced  
m ore personalization o f  pow er, authoritarian  ru le , hegem onic agendas, pa trim onialism , 
clientelism  and repression. These characteristics m eant intolerance o f  civil society  and 
restriction o f  the space for autonom ous action, c iv il rights and  rule o f  law .”59
A lthough N igeria is presently  a de ju re  dem ocracy , o n e  cannot ignore th is h istory  
o f  repression. U ndoubtedly, the coun try ’s h istory o f  quelling  the m edia, N G O s and other 
form s o f  dem ocratic participation in o rder p ro tec t the po litical order has som e effect on 
the present day lim itations to dem ocratic  rights. T he introduction o f  o il into the econom y 




59Augustine Ikelegbe, "The Perverse Manifestation o f  Civil Society: Evidence from Nigeria," The Journal 
o f  Modern African Studies 39, no. 01 (2001).
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that oil produces Rentier effects on an econom y w here the governm ent derives the 
m ajority o f  its revenues from  oil and therefore does not need a strong ly  institu ted  tax 
regim e. This engenders an environm ent w here the  governm ent does no t feel the need  to 
be held accountable to its population and thus w ould increase the rate o f  dem ocratic  
repression in cases where political m obilization w ould  disrupt regim e stability .
Second, civil society in N igeria  appears to be relatively less o rgan ized  than  in 
Botswana. This could be attributed again to the country 's ethnic diversity . A s m entioned  
previously, N igeria has over 1000 nongovernm ental groups with various agendas. T he 
problem  with such diversity in them atic goals how ever is that p resen ting  all these 
disparate issues to the governm ent m ay not be the  m ost efficient m ethod in ensuring  that 
all these issues are well received.
Furtherm ore, it m akes sense that in a country  w ith relatively few er dem ocratic  
freedom s w ould have a greater challenge in organizing com m on in terests. T his is no t to 
say that strong dem ocracies do not have d ivergent interests but the m ajor d ifference 
betw een a relatively stronger dem ocracy and a w eaker one is that the varia tion  in in terests 
does not w eaken the strength o f  these institu tions. In fact, one could argue tha t the true 
test o f  a strong dem ocracy can be seen in its ability  to  represent d iverse  in terests ye t 
m aintain civil and political freedom s for all its citizens. W hile the N igerian  N G O  
com m unity has tried to represent all interests, m any goals have no t com e to fruition 
because o f  lack o f  organization and collaboration. Ikelegbe explains tha t "m any o f  the 
groups duplicated efforts in  parallel and m ultiple activities, propelled as it w ere by donor 
requirem ents, and rarely jo ined  energies in pursuance o f  goals, sim ilar as these w ere.
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T heir activities as a resu lt were underlined by w astage, dissipation and ineffic iency ."60 
Furtherm ore, Ikelegbe expresses that "m any attem pts a t the form ation o f  um brella , 
coordinating and national coalitions for b road  netw orks and coordination failed as a result 
o f  personal differences, arrogance, ethnic differences and personal am bition ."6'T hus, as 
in any social group, organization is critical in  order to  attain com m on goals and 
objectives, especially in cases w here resources are  lim ited. It is quite p lausib le  then  that 
these disparate interests can appear as chaos or ethnic/sectoral rifts instead o f  o rganized  
attem pts to  im prove critical aspects o f  the N igerian  society and thus lim it the capacity  o f  
the civil society to influence change at the governm ental level.
Third, the population 's level o f  education is another vital factor to civil society  
participation. A  better educated population im plies a m ore inform ed citizenry . A s it 
applies to civil society in particular, a  h ighly educated population w ould  m ean that 
organizations w ould be better able to m obilize and present their aim s and  agendas to the  
governm ents m ore effectively. A ccording to  the W orld B ank indicators, as o f  2010, 76 
percent o f  N igeria’s population had com pleted  prim ary  education ;62 how ever, the 
population’s literacy rate was on ly  51 percent63 as reported  in 2008.64 These figures 
present tw o interesting findings; first, the m ajority  o f  the population has com pleted  
prim ary school, w hich is a positive trend. H ow ever, the data also tells us that slightly  
m ore than h a lf  o f  the population is literate. Thus, im plying that while a sign ificant portion  
o f  the population has com pleted prim ary school, this has little bearing  on im proving 
literacy. This could possibly m ean the quality  o f  education at the p rim ary  level is lim ited
60Ibid.
6! Ibid.
A2World Bank, "World Development Indicators," (2013).
63Ibid.
64 No data on literacy rates was reported for 2010.
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or it could im ply that a significant portion o f  the population  has not been  able to  continue 
their education beyond the prim ary level. U nfortunately , data regard ing  N ig eria ’s 
secondary com pletion rate is no t available.
A  lim ited education system  w ould  pose severe lim itations on  civ il society 
m obilization. I f  a substantial portion o f  the population  is illiterate o r has insufficien t 
education, it w ould be very difficult for individuals to com m unicate th e ir interests and 
grievances effectively. This could possib ly  resu lt in grievances being  expressed  in the 
form  o f  violent protests, riots and other form s o f  non-peacefu l dem onstrations. This poses 
substantial problem s especially for a  society such as N ig eria ’s which has been  frequently  
em broiled in ethnic strife. Therefore, one cannot d iscoun t the im portance o f  education  
w hen analyzing the effectiveness o f  civil society participation.
A nd fourth, possibly the m ost critical factor, the source o f  an  N G O ’s funding 
plays a critical factor in its success or effectiveness. For one, know ing the source o f  an 
N G O ’s funding helps to  pinpoint w hether o r not an  organization is seem ingly  
representing the interests o f  the population so lely  to secure funds for their p riva te  gain  or 
w hether they genuinely intend to  utilize the organization as a m eans to  im prove specific 
conditions w ithin the country. E specially  w hen international organizations contribu te  a 
substantial am ount o f  m oney in order to assist in dem ocratic  developm ent, one has to 
consider the agenda or purpose o f  these o rganizations to  which funding  is d isbursed. 
C ertainly, there is no precise m ethod in w hich w e can find out w ith certain ty  the m otive 
behind a startup N G O . H ow ever, it is im portan t to consider w hether o r no t som e N G O s 
are earnestly w orking towards a developm ental agenda o r w hether they  are scram bling  to 
secure external donor funds. I f  it turns out that a substantial num ber o f  N G O s are  m erely
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interested in securing external donor funding then  this does not a lte r the fundam ental 
clientelistic nature o f  N igerian society.
A nother point to consider w here funding is concerned is w hat percen tage o f  
organizations receive funding from  the N igerian  governm ent. If there  is a h igh  rate o f  
public sector corruption, an N G O  sector that receives a substantial po rtion  o f  their 
funding from  the governm ent w ould  serve little m ore than m outhp ieces for the 
governm ent’s interests and therefore w ould  fundam entally  defeat the purpose that civil 
society ought to play.
A s it applies to  the resource curse specifically , the co llaboration  betw een  
dom estic N G O s and the global civil society has n o t been largely successful. W hile there 
has been a m odicum  o f  progress, the fundam ental patron-client structure has no t been 
revam ped. The accession o f  N igeria  to  the EITI has only gradually  im proved  its 
perceived corruption score based on the figures reported  by T ransparency International.
In 2007, the local N igerian flagship o f  the  EITI (N EITI) institu ted  the N ational 
Stakeholder W orking G roup (N SW G ) in accordance w ith the NEITI A ct. T he N S W G  is a 
perm anent body that is elected directly  by the P resident o f  Nigeria. U nfortunately , th is 
com m ission w hich is purportedly supposed to im prove transparency and accountability  
w ithin the resource extraction sector does not change the fundam ental c ronyism  structure  
in N igerian society. In appointing equally  pow erfu l and influential people to  the N SW G , 
it is highly unlikely that structural changes w ill be m ade to  com bat corrup tion  and  to 
im prove dem ocratic governance.
A n exam ple o f  this can be seen in the N E ITI audit process from  1999 to  2004 
where an independent accounting consultancy firm , the H art Group conducted  a series o f
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financial, physical and process audits in an attem pt to elucidate the m ore am biguous and 
outright concealed aspects o f  N igeria ’s oil secto r.65 U nsurprisingly, the report found that 
there w ere gross discrepancies in N igeria’s oil operations. Furtherm ore, it h igh ligh ted  
that billions o f  oil dollars w ere unrecovered and /or unaccounted  for. O ne find ing  that th is 
audit process revealed w as that there is a “ serious lack o f  inform ation sharing betw een  
governm ent entities such as the Federal Inland R evenue Service and the C entral B ank o f  
N igeria, w hich m akes paym ents im possible to reconcile .”66
O ne good point that K eblusek m akes is that transparency w ithou t accountability  
does not m ake any sense.67 E ven if  N igeria  fu lly  d iscloses inform ation about its oil 
production, this does not em pow er citizens to do  anything about the m isd istribu tion  and 
m isappropriation o f  resource revenues. In fact, know ledge o f  abuses o f  pow er in the 
resource sector w ithout the m eans or capacity  to  do any th ing  about it m ay  further incite 
conflict w ithin the population.
This is part o f  the reason w hy com pliance to the E ITI and civ il society  efforts in 
general has not led to  an overall reduction in public  sector corruption o r im provem ent in 
dem ocratic governance. In o ther w ords, no civil society organization w ill be able to  a tta in  
its full potential o r have a far-reaching im pact on  the negative aspects o f  the resource 
curse until fundam ental patron-client structures are transform ed. A lso , tim ing  is 
im portant. N igeria  is a relatively young dem ocracy. D em ocratic institu tions take tim e to 
build and im plem ent and not surprisingly, the ro le o f  the civ il society w ill be  lim ited  until
65Mary Keblusek, "Is Eiti Really Helping Improve Global Good Governance? Examining the Resource 
Curse, Corruption and Nigeria's Eiti Implementation Experience," Niger D elta Professionals fo r  
Developm ent (January 2010).
66Ibid.
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these institutions are firm ly in place. People w ill also need to feel tha t they  can  trust the 
governm ent and this again will occur w ith tim e.
Conclusion
The resource curse affects the m ajority  o f  resource abundan t develop ing  
countries. N igeria in particular has experienced  a h igh degree o f  the resource curse. 
E vidence o f  the large extent o f  the resource curse can be seen in the m yriad  o f  econom ic 
and political outcom es. The country has encountered  the negative econom ic effects o f  the 
Dutch disease, price volatility, and a large debt burden. In addition to this, the  political 
outcom es o f  the resource curse have not only deteriorated  political cond itions but they  
have also exacerbated the econom ic ones. The political outcom es include w idespread  
corruption, w eak governance and high incidences o f  conflict.
Show ing the degree o f  the resource curse is one part o f  the puzzle, how ever, m ore 
im portantly we need to explain w hy there is such a large extent o f  the resource  curse in 
N igeria. This study utilizes a three level typology in o rder to  explain the varia tion  o f  the 
resource curse. The study particularly  looks at: 1) the individual/leadership  level, 2) the 
governm ental level and 3) the civil society level. This analysis reveals th ree im portan t 
circum stances that help to determ ine the extent o f  the resource curse in N igeria.
First, due to the lack o f  a  single charism atic  and visionary leader N igeria  has not 
had a postcolonial transform ational leadership. This negatively affected  its political 
transition after independence. The country  struggled  w ith the many reg im e changes and 
also w ith m ilitary coups. A s one can im agine th is led to a h igh degree o f  factionalism  and
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corruption. It can be said that N igeria’s leadership is characterized by  personal ru le ra ther 
than a transform ational leadership.
Second, the failure to secure a developm entally  driven transform ational leadersh ip  
is also reflected in N igeria’s governm ent. T he N igerian  state is characterized  by 
com petition over oil revenues am ong the various ethnic and relig ious groups and 
corruption. C orruption especially poses a substantial problem . I po in t ou t that there are 
two plausible explanations for the ram pant corruption  and divisive com petition  in the 
N igerian governm ent.
The prim ary explanation for th is dynam ic can be  attributed to  the R entier state 
effect. This argum ent m aintains that N igeria’s oil revenues have a non-dem ocratiz ing  
effect on the state; because the governm ent does not have to tax due to  the large influx o f  
oil revenues it is unaccountable to the population. The secondary explanation  looks at the 
politics o f  oil as a zero-sum  gam e o f  com petition  w hereby each  political ac to r is 
em broiled in an analogous Prisoner’s D ilem m a gam e. B ecause o f N ig eria ’s m ultitude o f  
ethnic factions, this set the tone for in tense com petition  over oil revenues. T here is also  
m utual m istrust am ong actors and lim ited tim e in  w hich to attain as m uch benefits  as 
possible. Because each actor assum es th e ir rival is w ill pursue  sim ilar stra tegy  (w hich  is 
to acquire as m uch benefits as possib le), the rational choice is to engage in the sam e 
behavior. U nfortunately, the caveat is that both parties w ould  have atta ined  an even 
greater am ount o f  opportunities i f  they had  opted to  cooperate instead o f  defect.
The third explanation for the extent o f  the resource curse in N igeria  can be 
attributed to the m oderate effect that the civil society has had in the country. N igeria  w as 
the first com pliant m em ber o f  the E xtractive Industries Transparency Initiative (E IT I) in
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2002. H ow ever, this has not had that m uch o f  an  effect on m itigating the effects o f  the 
resource curse. In particular, it has no t been particu larly  successful in m itigating  
corruption, w hich is one o f  the m ajor in itiatives o f  the EITI. Despite the aud it p rocess 
w hich revealed severe discrepancies in N ig eria ’s financial sector, the governm ent 
rem ains unaccountable. A rguably, the transparency  that the  EITI has p rovided  could  
potentially  w orsen the resource curse condition because transparency  w ithou t 




The Political Econom y o f Botswana 
Introduction
B otsw ana is an arid, landlocked, sparsely  populated  Southern A frican  country  
slightly sm aller in area than Texas. S im ilar to m any A frican  countries it w as co lon ized  by 
the British during the m id to late n ineteenth  century. A fter its liberation from  B ritain  it 
w as one o f  the poorest countries in the w orld. H ow ever, un like m ost A frican  coun tries, it 
m anaged to dram atically  im prove its econom ic and political conditions after 
independence. M any authors posit that it w as able to  do so because o f  a cohesive, firm ly 
entrenched traditional Tsw ana elite culture that bore resem blances to  m odern-day  
dem ocratic institutions. This united elite trad ition  continued  into the post independence 
period under the direction o f  a few  central political leaders.
In addition to  the salience o f  trad itional T sw ana underpinnings, because  o f  
B otsw ana’s hostile clim ate the B ritish found it d ifficu lt to  setup settlem ents in B otsw ana. 
Furtherm ore, unlike som e o f  its o ther colonies, the B ritish  was unab le  to  exp lo it cash  
crops because o f  the arid  features o f  the country. M any authors cite these as the p rim ary  
reasons that the B ritish utilized B otsw ana as a P ro tectorate and not a  C row n Colony.
This greatly benefitted the B otsw ana peop le  how ever because the local chiefs 
w ere able to rule sem i autonom ously. U nlike m any o ther African countries, the T sw ana 
chiefs utilized this opportunity  to  im prove the econom ic conditions in the coun try  instead 
o f  trying to exploit econom ic resources for their personal gain. The decision  o f  the
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Tsw ana chiefs to take developm ental m atters in their ow n hands during  the  co lonial 
period w as particularly  im portant. B ecause B otsw ana w as a  P rotectorate and  no t a C row n 
Colony, the British did not see the necessity  o f  investing heavily  in capital and 
infrastructure. Thus, the T sw ana chiefs played a vital role in ensuring tha t the  basic needs 
o f  the population w ere met.
Conditions eventually deteriorated  w hich led to the Tsw ana ch iefs to request for 
reform s. U pon recognition that the B ritish w as not am enable  to substantial econom ic and 
political reform s, local leaders form ed the tw o m ajor political parties, the B otsw ana 
D em ocratic Party and the B otsw ana P eop le’s Party. T his ushered in the nationalist 
m ovem ent era, w hich eventually led to independence.
In 1966, Botsw ana gained independence from  B rita in  and charted  the path  fo r a 
series o f  instrum ental leaders: Seretse K ham a, Q uett M asire, Festus M ogae and Ian 
Khama. These four leaders paved  the w ay for B otsw ana’s econom ic tu rnaround  and 
strong political developm ent.
Post independence, the B otsw ana governm ent lead the coun try  under a 
developm ental state m odel. This stood in sharp contrast to the m ajority o f  the o ther p o s t­
colonial A frican states. For one, B otsw ana opted not to  pursue  statist po lic ies o r im port 
substitution industrialization policies. Instead, it pursued  a hybrid o f  sta te-led , m arket- 
oriented policy w ith  strong regard for private property  institutions. Furtherm ore, under 
the guidance o f  the first president Seretse K ham a, B otsw ana was ab le  to  renego tia te  a 
m ore beneficial deal w ith the South A frican m ining com pany, DeBeers.
The strong leadership and guidance com bined  w ith  a developm enta lly -driven  
state provided the necessary ingredients that B otsw ana needed to overcom e its initial
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developm ental hurdles. L ew in show s that “ B o tsw ana’s per capita  incom e w as a  m ere $70 
at independence.” 1 Furtherm ore, “ in the first few  years o f  independence about 60%  o f  
current governm ent expenditure consisted  o f  in ternational developm ent assistance 
(prim arily from  G reat Britain). There w ere only  12 kilom eters o f  paved  roads, and 
agriculture (predom inantly  cattle-farm ing) accounted fo r 40% o f  gross dom estic  
product.”2 By the 1980s, a little m ore than  a decade after the d iscovery  o f  d iam onds 
B otsw ana’s econom ic record started to dram atically  im prove. Lewin further illustrates 
that “by  2007 Botsw ana had 7000 km  o f  paved  roads, and p e r capita incom e had  risen  to  
about $6100, m aking B otsw ana and upper m iddle incom e3 country com parab le  to  C hile 
or A rgentina.” 4
W hat is m ost rem arkable about B otsw ana how ever is that it m anaged  to  im prove 
its econom y w hile m aintaining a stable dem ocratic  system  w ith a re la tive ly  low  level o f  
public sector corruption. The rem ainder o f  th is chap ter discusses in-depth the h istory  and 
central characteristics o f  the social, econom ic and political env ironm ent that has 
contributed to B otsw ana’s overall developm ental success. The chapter is o rganized  as 
follows: 1) G eography, Population and E thnic C om position, 2) A  B rie f  H istorical 
O verview , 3) The Structure o f  the G overnm ent, 4 ) The Structure o f  the Econom y, 5) The 
Role o f  the State in Econom ic D evelopm ent, and 6) A n O verview  o f  C ritical E conom ic 
and Political Indicators.
'Michael Lewin, "Botswana's Success: Good Governance, Good Policies, and Good Luck," in Yes Africa  
Can: Success Stories from  a Dynamic Continent, ed. Punam Chuhan-Pole and Manka Angwafo  
(Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2011).
2Ibid.
3 Upper Middle Income countries are classified as having a GDP per capita between $3,976 and $12,275.
4Lewin, "Botswana's Success: Good Governance, Good Policies, and Good Luck."
139
G eography, Population and Ethnic Com position
B otsw ana is a relatively m edium -sized landlocked  Southern A frican  country  w ith  
582, 000 square kilom eters in geographical area w id th .5 Because o f  the co u n try ’s central 
geographical feature, the K alahari Desert, the c lim ate is characterized as dry, dusty, 
subtropical and sem i-arid and thereby suffers from  extensive periods o f  drought. B ecause 
o f  this, agriculture has been a challenge for the rural population. The country  is sparsely  
populated and has approxim ately 2 m illion inhabitants w ith an  annual population  grow th 
rate o f  1.48 per cent.6In addition to this, in 2009 the UN m easured its population  density  
as approxim ately 3.4 persons per square k ilom eter.7 Thus, the population  density  is 
relatively low com pared to N igeria and o ther highly populous sub-S aharan  A frican  
countries.
H ow ever, it is im portant to take into consideration  th a t a significant portion  o f  the 
population has m igrated from  rural to urban areas. It is estim ated that six ty-one percen t o f  
the total population resides in urban dw ellings.8 A nd  the annual m ral to u rban  m igration  
rate is approxim ately 2.3 per cent.9 Therefore, a lthough the population density  is 3.4 th is 
figure accounts for the entire country; it does not take into account the ru ra l-u rban  
breakdow n. The urban centers are substantially  m ore populated  than the rural areas as is 
the case in m ost sub-Saharan A frican countries.
A nother key com ponent o f  the population  breakdow n is the age structure. 







H IV /A ID S virus. T he average life expectancy is 55 years o ld  and the m edian  age is 22.5 
years .10
B otsw ana is relatively ethnically  hom ogenous. It is com posed o f  three m ajor 
ethnic groups: “Tsw ana, K alanga and Basarw a (or San).” 11 The T sw ana group accounts 
for 80 per cent o f  the popu lation .12 It is subdivided into eigh t m ajor polities: “ K w ena, 
Ngw ato, N gw aketse, Taw ana, T lokw a, Kgatla, Rolong and  M alete.” 13 Thus, a lthough 
Botsw ana m ay not be as ethnically  fractionalized as N igeria , it is by  no m eans w holly  
ethnically hom ogenous because the Tsw ana group can be subdivided into several o ther 
ethnic identities. It is im portant to note how ever that “the governm ent has m ade a 
com m itm ent to a non-ethnic and non-racial society .” 14
The country how ever is relatively  hom ogenous in  terms o f  relig ious faith; 
approxim ately 72 per cent o f  the population is C hristian .15 English is the offic ia l language 
despite the fact that the m ajority  o f  the population  speak Setsw ana. M olu tsi accounts that 
“ 80-90%  o f  the population speak the sam e language.” 16
H istorical Background
Pre-colonial Era
It is d ifficult to pinpoint precisely  the date that people began  inhabiting the 
territory that is now  know n as Botsw ana. H ow ever, in speaking about B o tsw ana’s p re ­
10 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html
11 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html
l2Louis Picard, "From Bechuanaland to Botswana: An Overview," in The E volu tion  o f  M o d ern  B o tsw a n a , 




,6Patrick Molutsi, "Botswana: The Path to Democracy and Development," in D em o cra tic  R e fo rm  in A frica :  
The Q uality  o f  P rogress, ed. E. Gyimah-Boadi (Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner, 2004), 162.
141
colonial era, m ost texts tend to focus on the period im m ediately p reced ing  the 
establishm ent o f  the B echuachaland Protectorate. T herefore, this narrow s the tim e fram e 
dow n to the arrival o f  the Tsw ana speaking groups. There w ere  m any groups that existed  
in the area prior to the arrival o f  the T sw ana speak ing  people, how ever, because “the 
Tsw anas w ere m ore pow erful than their counterparts, they  conquered w ide sw aths o f  
territory from  the indigenous K glagadi peop le .” 17
The Tsw ana culture underpins m odern-day  B otsw ana. Thus, exam ining  the roots 
o f  this pre-colonial heritage is instrum ental in understanding B o tsw ana’s social, 
econom ic and political context. The Tsw ana w ere prim arily  cattle farm ers. B ecause o f  the 
nature o f  their industry, they w ere also itinerant. This characteristic  w orked  to  their
advantage .Due to the abundance o f  land and also the predom inance o f  the cattle-farm ing
18industry, pre-colonial tribes found it easier to  flee ra ther than to  figh t invaders. 
Consequently, m any Tsw ana tribes becam e w idely  dispersed across the c o u n try .19 
Because tribes w ere so w idely dispersed, T sw ana tribes w ere relatively autonom ous.
Picard states that “the Sotho-T sw ana speaking  groups o f Southern  A frica  started  
to inhabit this region betw een the 5th and  6 th centuries A .D .”20 Thus, the chronological 
order o f  the arrival o f  the various ethnic groups can be organized as fo llow s:, “ the 
K galadadi w ere the first to arrive, w ho m et the San people w ho  had a lready  inhabited  the 
eastern part o f  the area, follow ed by the R olong and the Tlhaping. T he last m ovem ent 
brought ancestors o f  all other Tsw ana groups into the southw estern T ransvaal and later
l7Fred Morton, Jeff Ramsay, and Part Themba Mgadla, H is to r ic a l D ic tio n a ry  o f  B o tsw a n a  (Lanham, MD: 
Scarecrow Press, 2008).
I8J.C. Leith, W hy B o tsw ana  P ro sp ered  (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005).
l9Ibid.
20Louis Picard, The P o litics o f  D evelopm en t in  B o tsw a n a : A M o d e l f o r  Success?  (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1987).
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into Botsw ana.”21 H ow ever, the Tsw ana was not the only ethnic group in the region. The 
Transvaal and O range state areas w ere also occupied  by D utch settlers, the V oortrekkers 
(or Boers).
Som e authors posit that traditional T sw ana culture bore  a resem blance to m odern- 
day dem ocratic institutions. Leith  cites C row der, Parsons and Parsons tha t the T sw ana 
culture w as rooted in a “ strong sense o f  constitu tionalism .”22 This p laced  checks and 
balances on the chiefs, so that no one w as above the law .23 Furtherm ore, Leith  quoting  
Schapera states that in  a traditional council m eeting “since anybody p resen t is en titled  to 
speak, the tribal assem blies provide a ready m eans o f  ascertaining pub lic  opinion. ..The 
discussions are characterized by considerable freedom  o f  speech, and  i f  the occasion  
seem s to call for it, the c h ie f or his advisers m ay even be severely critic ized .”24
This traditional practice could  possib ly  explain B otsw ana’s adep t capability  o f  
com bining its traditional custom s w ith m odem  post-colonial institu tions. P icard  
illustrates that “Traditional leaders in B otsw ana have been  able to selectively  adapt 
aspects o f  W eberian and  o ther E uropean bureaucratic  and political norm s w ithout 
underm ining the existing value structures o f  their societies.”25
A nother aspect o f  Tsw ana culture that Leith  h ighlights is its penchan t for long­
term  saving. Leith show s that since the clim ate in B otsw ana is so harsh , m any T sw ana 
people found them selves having to stock up during the abundant tim es. This p revented  
starvation during periods o f  d rough t.26 H arsh clim ate a lso  reinforced  the sp irit o f
21lbid„ 26.
22Leith, Why Botswana P rospered , 21.
23Ibid.
24Ibid., 21.
25Picard, The Politics o f  Developm ent in Botswana: A M odel fo r  Success?, 11.
26Leith, Why Botswana Prospered.
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egalitarianism . Leith explains that long-term  saving for d rought forced the T sw ana peop le  
to share their resources w ith less fortunate groups.27
The T sw ana occupied the B otsw ana region peacefully  up until the late 19th 
century. Eventually, they cam e into contact w ith E uropeans. Picard notes that “the first 
Tsw ana people to come into d irect contact w ith E uropeans were the T h lap ing  in 1801 
(although indirect contact was m ore than  likely established through trade p rio r to this 
tim e).”28 Eventually, this interaction led to tensions; and the T sw ana clashed  w ith  the 
Boers occupying the Transvaal and O range state areas. T he threat from  D utch settlers 
forced the Tsw ana chiefs to seek a m ore form al relationship  with the B ritish ; therefore, 
they requested protection from  the B ritish. R eluctantly  a t first “the B ritish  adm in istra tion  
setup an inform al protectorate betw een them  and the T sw ana chiefs.”29 F inally , in 1884 
the British decided to establish a  form al pro tectorate in o rder to  prevent B oer and  G erm an 
influences from  taking over the region.30 Therefore, the last group o f  im m igrants into the 
Bechuanaland were the British; w hich has had  the m ost significant im pact on the 
Bechuanaland territory.
Colonial Era
D espite the fact that the catalyst for the establishm ent o f  the B echuanaland  
Protectorate w as the protection o f  the region from  B oer and G erm an influences, the 
relationship that ensued betw een the B ritish  and Tsw ana w as p redom inantly  based  on 
trade. Thus, trade becam e the m ost im portant link betw een the Tsw ana and the British.
27Ibid.




A nother m ajor m otivational factor for B ritish colonialism  cam e from  the 
M issionaries. Tlou and Cam pbell em phasize that M issionaries w ere instrum ental in 
persuading the B ritish to colonize B echuanaland .31 The M issionaries had  several 
incentives for m otivating the B ritish governm ent to pursue B echuanaland as a  colony. 
These included: “ 1) they w anted their ow n country  to ru le  the lands o f  B otsw ana, 2) they  
w anted to use British pow er to protect their spiritual em pire, 3) they  w anted  B ritain  to 
change those A frican custom s they considered heathen  and  4) they w an ted  to prevent the 
lands from  being taken aw ay from  the B oers.” 32
D espite the potential benefits that the T sw ana people and the  M issionaries stood 
to  gain , the ultim ate decision to colonize B echuanaland  w as based on  the sign ificant 
benefits that Bechuanaland could provide the B ritish  governm ent. A ccord ing  to P icard, 
there w ere three predom inant factors tha t spurred British co lon ialism  in the 
B echuanaland Protectorate: “cultural-religious, strategic, and econom ic.”33 M oreover, the 
cultural-religious reasons w ere espoused in “B rita in ’s pseudoscientific  rac ism .”34 T he 
British believed that they could “c iv ilize” the prim itive A fricans and  thus m ake them  
better off. Second, the Protectorate also  served  as a strategic vantage poin t for the 
colonial A dm inistration. P icard rem arks that “ for C ecil Rhodes B echuachaland  w as a 
steppingstone to central A frica and it was a v ital strategic point fo r the B ritish  South 
A frica com pany’s operations north o f  the L im popo, serving as bo th  a base and  a rear 
guard.”35 A nd third, the Protectorate also possessed  vast untapped natural resources. Thus
3'Thomas Tlou and Alec Campbell, H isto ry  o f  B o tsw a n a  (Gaborone, Botswana: Macmillan Botswana, 
1984).
32lbid.




it was seen as territory that held “high prospects o f  trad ing  stations, m ineral explo ita tion  
and the possibility o f  European settlem ent.”36
D espite B otsw ana’s potential o f  untapped resources, the c lim ate  w as harsh  and 
arid and the British did not find it to be a conducive environm ent in w hich  to  settle. 
Because o f  these reasons, Leithem phasizes that “B otsw ana w as estab lished  as a 
Protectorate and not a Crow n C olony.”37 Furtherm ore, B ritain had  little incentive to 
establish a m axim al presence in B otsw ana due to the arid  clim ate and  the consequen t 
poor agricu lture .38 Therefore, “ the B ritish  adm inistra tion  allowed T sw ana ch iefs to 
govern internally .”39
The Tsw ana chiefs used this opportunity  to  se lf-govem  as a m eans to im proving  
the coun try ’s econom ic conditions. This T sw ana-driven  developm ent w as im portan t 
especially since the British invested little capital accord ing  to M orton et al.40T hey  add  
that the British exploited m ore capital than  they  reinvested . M orton et al account that 
m ajor contributions in term s o f  “developm ent projects such  as hospitals and schools cam e 
prim arily  from  the initiatives o f  A fricans them selves and M issionaries.”41
Despite the efforts o f  T sw ana chiefs, social, econom ic and political cond itions 
gradually  worsened. In addition to this because o f  the Tsw ana dom inance in in ternal 
governance, this quickly led to resentm ent by m inority  groups. B leak econom ic 
conditions com bined w ith ethnic tensions and  political strife spurred  nationalist 
m ovem ents that w ould eventually  lead to  independence. T lou  and C am pbell assert that at
36Ibid.
37Leith, Why Botswana Prospered, 22.
38Ibid.
39Ibid., 24.
40M orton, Ramsay, and Mgadla, H istorical D ictionary o f  Botswana.
4 'ibid.
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first the Batsw ana did not w ant to  overthrow  the British adm inistration; they  ju s t w anted  
reform s that w ould im prove their social, econom ic and political conditions. H ow ever, 
upon observing that the B ritish were not am enable to  m ake substan tial reform s, a 
nationalist m ovem ent eventually em erged. The nationalist m ovem ent w as instrum ental 
for B otsw ana’s independence because the first political parties w ere created  out o f  th is 
m ovem ent.
Nationalist Movement
In 1960, the first political party o f  note w as the B echuanaland P eo p le ’s Party  (this 
later becam e know n as the B otsw ana P eop le’s Party) w as form ed by  K .T . M otsete. 
U nfortunately, it w as not w idely  received by the rural class or the B ritish. “T he rural 
class rejected  it because it called for the abolition  o f  the kingship .”42 The B ritish  opposed  
the BPP because it rejected and spoke out against racism  43 H ow ever, the BPP did receive 
political support in the urban areas. U rban residents w ere draw n to the rhetoric  o f  the 
BPP because o f  the dire econom ic conditions in these areas 44
In 1962, SeretseK ham a form ed the B otsw ana D em ocratic Party  (B D P). T his party  
stood in contrast to the BPP because it w as no t as radical in its beliefs. The B D P ’s 
differences from  the BPP are also explanations for its relatively h igher rate  o f  success. 
For one, it called  for a m ultiracial B otsw ana as opposed to  a pan-A frican B otsw ana as the 
BPP espoused .45 Second, it d id  not pursue as aggressively  the abo lishm ent o f  the 
kingship. Third, Seretse K ham a’s rural background as a Ngw ato c h ie f  m ade him  a 
favorite am ong the rural population. Fourth, because it w as not as radical as the B PP it
42T1ou and Campbell, H istory o f  Botswana.
43lbid.
44Ibid.
45t u : ^
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w as better received by the British adm inistration. In fact, T lou  and C am pbell em phasize 
that even som e British citizens jo ined  the BD P.46
Postcolonial Era
As m entioned above, the nationalist m ovem ent greatly  contribu ted  to  
independence from  G reat Britain because it p roliferated  the rise o f  political parties and  
nationalist sentim ent. Thus, in 1965 the first p residential elections w ere held. T he 
Botsw ana D em ocratic Party w on an overw helm ing  m ajority  o f  votes over the B otsw ana 
People’s Party and the BD P leader, Seretse K ham a becam e B otsw ana’s first p resident. 
Picard explains that there were four m ajor reasons for the B D P ’s victory:
“First, there was Seretse 's  position  a n d  p restig e  as a  traditional leader. Secondly, 
the B D P  received  unqualified  support fro m  the co lon ia l P ro tec tora te  
G overnm ent...Third, the B D P represen ted  an intellectual tradition  w hich  w as  
clearly linked  historically w ith the in te llectual nationalism  o f  the 1 9 3 0 s ...a n d  
Fourth, the B D P  received  the fin a n c ia l a n d  organizational su pport o f  the bu lk  o f  
the fin a n c ia lly  in fluential European a n d  A sian  com m unities w hich  fe a r e d  the  
consequences o f  the m ore radical B P P  com ing  to pow er. ”47 
A year later, on Septem ber 30, 1966, B otsw ana gained  independence from  G reat 
Britain. Since independence, the B otsw ana governm ent has m ade several critical 
decisions that have im proved its social and econom ic conditions.
A key event that affected B o tsw ana’s developm ent occurred  in 1967, the 
discovery o f  diam ond ores in the K alahari D esert. From  the outset B otsw ana took  control 
o f  the m anagem ent o f  its m ineral reserves. U nder the direction o f  Seretse K ham a,
46Ibid.
47Picard, "From Bechuanaland to Botswana: An Overview."
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Botsw ana m ade the decision to  m aintain  ow nership  o f  its natural resources. This stood  in 
contrast to m any other A frican countries who allow ed fo reign  interests to ow n the righ ts 
to their resources. M orton et.al.illustrate that President K ham a made tw o pivotal choices 
that greatly influenced the outcom e o f  B otsw ana’s natural resource developm ent:
“First, Botsw ana declared  that all r igh ts o f  ow nership to  m inerals, w hether  
located in districts on fre e h o ld  land, in national parks, o r  in o ther s ta te  land, 
were vested  in the Republic  as a  whole. Second, the Botsw ana g overnm en t w as to 
decide the m ethod  by w hich these resources w ou ld  be explored a n d  exploited. ”48 
This second decision significantly  contributed to the  type o f  business arrangem ent 
in w hich Botsw ana engaged w ith the South A frican m ining com pany, D eB eers 
Corporation. M orton et al dem onstrate that the B otsw ana governm ent renego tia ted  its 
contract with D eB eers after it gained sufficient cap ital and  know ledge abou t the d iam ond  
industry.49 T hus, “ in 1975 it renegotiated  its agreem ent with D eB eers and  form ed 
govem m ent-com pany partnerships, D ebsw ana and Botsw ana D iam ond V alu ing  
Com pany.”50
Undoubtedly, the policym aking o f  individual B otsw ana leaders such as K ham a, 
M asire and M ogae has been instrum ental to its econom ic success. In addition  to th is, 
governm ent has played a  central role in the econom y. T herefore, the nex t section covers a 
m ore in-depth look o f  the structure and com position o f  its governm ent adm inistration.
48Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla, H istorical D ictionary o f  Botswana.
49Ibid.
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Structure o f the G overnm ent
Classification of Political Regime, Electoral System and Political Parties
In 1965, w ith  British assistance, B otsw ana w rote its constitu tion.51 B o tsw ana’s 
dem ocratic structure is firm ly entrenched with its traditional custom s and institu tions. 
Tlou describes that “B otsw ana’s governm ent is div ided at two levels: national and 
local.”52 The country  is a constitutional m ultiparty  parliam entary  dem ocracy  w ith  the 
“ President serving as both head o f  state and head o f  governm ent.”53 E lections are based  
on a first-past-the-post system  and are held  every five years.
Botsw ana has seven m ajor political parties: B otsw ana C ongress Party  (B C P), 
B otsw ana D em ocratic Party (BD P), B otsw ana M ovem ent for D em ocracy  (B M D ), 
Botsw ana N ational Front (BN F), B otsw ana People Party (BPP), B otsw ana T lhoko T iro  
O rganization (BTTO ), and the M ELS M ovem ent B otsw ana (M E LS). 54 Since 
independence, B otsw ana has held ten free and fair elections according to  international 
electoral observers. This is a record that is rare for any sub-Saharan A frican  country. 
Despite the frequency and fairness o f  B otsw ana’s elections how ever, the B D P has w on an 
overw helm ing m ajority o f  elections since 1965 w hich  has caused  critics to label 
Botsw ana as a one-party dom inant state despite the fact tha t it is a de ju re  m ultiparty  
dem ocratic state.
51T1ou and C am pbell, H isto ry  o f  B o tsw ana.
52Ibid.
53Picard, "From Bechuanaland to Botswana: An Overview."
54 Independent Electoral Commission Botswana, http://www.iec.gov.bw/
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Branches of Government
Executive, Legislative and  Judicial Bodies
B otsw ana's central governm ent com prises o f  the President, the V ice President, the 
Cabinet, a Legislature consisting o f  the President, the N ational A ssem bly, the H ouse o f  
Chiefs, and the Judiciary. The Executive body is prim arily  responsible fo r ensuring  that 
the laws that the legislature passes are carried out. It consists o f  the P resident, V ice 
President and the C abinet. The C abinet consists o f  the President. V ice President, the 
M inisters and the A ttorney  G eneral. The P resident is elected by the Parliam ent (the 
President and the N ational A ssem bly) and serves a five y ea r term, w hich is renew able  
once, for a m axim um  o f  ten years. H e/She serves as bo th  C om m ander in  C h ie f o f  the 
arm ed forces and is also  head o f  the N ational A ssem bly. A ccording to M orton  et al, the 
Executive Body, in particu lar the President p lays a significantly  m ore im portan t ro le  than 
the Legislative body in B otsw ana.55 T hey account that “a lm ost all b ills  o rig inate  from  the 
executive branch, and m inisters and the president play by  far a m ore im portan t role in 
policym aking than does Parliam ent.”56
The Legislative Body m akes all the law s accord ing  to the C onstitu tion  and 
consists o f  the President, the H ouse o f  Chiefs (advisory  pow ers only) and  the  Parliam ent. 
The Parliam ent serves a five year term  and consists o f  the 57 m em ber N ational 
A ssem bly, the vice president, and four specially  elected m em bers nom inated  by the 
president and other m em bers o f  the N ational A ssem bly. T he function o f  the N ational 
A ssem bly is to m ake law s or A cts w hich govern  B otsw ana. Once an ac t is m ade no 
person, not even the President can change it. T herefore, the National A ssem bly  is the
55Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla, H istorical D ictionary o f  Botswana.
56Ibid.
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only body capable o f  enacting legislation. H ow ever, a bill cannot be enacted  w ithout the 
P resident’s approval. T lou and C am pbell note tha t “ if  the President d isagrees w ith any 
bill, he sends it back to the N ational A ssem bly for further discussion. I f  the N ational 
A ssem bly disagrees w ith the President, it m ust send the bill back to h im  w ithin six 
m onths. I f  he still disagrees, “he m ust dissolve Parliam ent an d  call for new  e lections.” 57 
The N ational A ssem bly is also  responsible for approving the G o vernm en t’s B udget 
w hich is prepared by the M inistry  o f  F inance and D evelopm ent Planning. Furtherm ore, it 
is also responsible for approving the coun try ’s N ational D evelopm ent Plans. T he 
N ational D evelopm ent Plan is the prim ary docum ent that m aps out in detail governm ent 
expenditure in five year increm ents.
The H ouse o f  Chiefs w as form ed in order to  appease the dikgosi (p lural form  o f  
kgosi-chiej). Because o f  their influence in the rural areas, the  dikgosi p lays a significant 
role in the B D P ’s victory. Therefore, it w as p rudent that the G overnm ent recognized  and 
respected the im portant role that the dikgosi p layed  in the new ly independen t country. 
The House o f  Chiefs represent the eight m ain m era fe  (or tribes) in B otsw ana: B angw ato, 
Bakw ena, Bakgatla, B angw aketse, Balete, B atlokw a, B ataw ana and  Barolong. as 
m entioned above they have no legislative pow ers. They only  have the au thority  to  advise. 
How ever, because o f  their influence in the rural areas, it is in the best in terest o f  the 
N ational A ssem bly to heed the advice o f  the H ouse o f  Chiefs. T lou and C am pbell 
dem onstrate that there have been  cases o f  fo rm er m em bers o f the H ouse o f  C hiefs 
vacating their posts in order to  run fo r other political positions in the governm ent. 
Furtherm ore, “ in 1969 C h ie f B athoen II resigned from  the bogosi and jo in e d  politics ju s t 
in tim e for the general election. He later becam e a m em ber and leader o f  the B otsw ana
57T1ou and C am pbell, H istory o f  Botswana.
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National Front (B N F).”58 This exam ple illustrates the influence o f the trad itional chiefs in 
Botswana.
B otsw ana has an independent Judiciary  Body. This m itiga tes against any 
interference in the ju d g es’ rulings from  the Executive or the Legislative B ody. N ot even  
the President has the righ t to interfere in the judgm en t o f  the Courts. H ow ever, he does 
have the prerogative to  grant m ercy  after a ru ling  has been passed.59 The Jud ic iary  B ody 
consists o f  a High Court, the C ourt o f  A ppeals, the M agistra tes’ Court and the C ustom ary  
Courts. The m em bers o f  the C ourt o f  A ppeals are appoin ted  by the p residen t (at the 
nom ination o f  the Judicial Services C om m ission) and occupy their positions until the age 
o f  70, have the pow er to in terpret the constitu tionality  o f  any legislative act, upon  appeal 
from  any party from  a low er court.
L ocal G overnm ent
The local governm ent is com prised o f  five tow n councils and n ine d istric t 
councils. T lou and Cam pbell describe that the local governm ent is im portan t because  it 
allows the local populations to voice their opinions. The local governm ent does not 
replace or override the national governm ent; how ever, the local governm ent can quick ly  
resolve m atters that are relatively  easier to handle at the local level. Furtherm ore, T lou  
and Cam pbell express that “the local governm ent w orks under the d irect superv ision  o f  
the national governm ent.”60 In cases w here the m atters supersede the  local governm en t’s 





Judiciary Body operates under a com bination o f  the influences o f  R om an-D utch  law , 
B ritish com m on law, and indigenous legal institutions.
Structure o f the Econom y
Upon independence B otsw ana’s econom y w as strongly gu ided  by the 
governm ent. How ever, unlike its counterparts it d id  not im plem ent im port substitu tion  
industrialization (ISI) policies. Instead, it pursued  m ore o f  a m ixed econom y w ith  a 
strong role for the private sector. P resently , B otsw ana is classified as an upper m iddle 
incom e country according to the W orld Bank. Its estim ated  G D P per cap ita  is $7 ,238 .61
B otsw ana’s econom y is com prised o f  three m ajo r sectors: industry  (w hich 
includes m ining), services, agriculture and m anufacturing. Am ong these three sectors, 
services is the prim ary sector. It com prises approxim ately  52 per cen t o f  the co u n try ’s
f t '?G D P and includes activities such as tourism . Industry  is the secondary  sector and 
accounts for approxim ately 45 per cent o f  B o tsw ana’s G D P.63 T he industry  sector 
includes m ining production o f  not only  d iam onds but a lso  other m inerals such as as 
copper, nickel, and coal. A griculture and m anufacturing  com prise the tertiary  sector. 
Each accounts for 3 per cent o f  B o tsw ana’s G D P and thereby con tribu te  the  least to 
G D P.64 One o f  the m ajor reasons fo r the decline o f  the agricultural secto r is because o f  
inadequate rainfall and frequent bouts o f  drought. This poses a challenge for sm all rural 
farm ers because a m ajor portion o f  the B otsw ana population continues to  earn  their 
livelihood from  arable agriculture. In  addition to th is, the dom inance o f  the m ining  sector
6lThe World Bank Indicators (2013).
62Punam Chuhan-Pole et al., Africa's Pulse (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2012).
“ ibid.
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since the discovery o f  d iam onds in 1967 has dram atically  decreased the im portance o f  
non-resource boom  sectors such  as agriculture and m anufacturing. T he d iscovery  o f  
diam onds has placed less im portance on agriculture and m anufacturing as m ajo r drivers 
o f  econom ic growth. This is evidence o f  the D utch  D isease problem  that the resource 
curse literature discusses. H ow ever, w hat is puzzling  is that it does not appear to 
negatively affect the overall econom ic developm ent o f  the country a lthough it adversely  
affects two very im portant sectors o f  the econom y.
A nother im portant sector o f  the B otsw ana econom y is its governm ent. P resently , 
the governm ent provides a significant percentage o f  em ploym ent. M orton  et al illustrate  
that “the governm ent o f  B otsw ana w ill probably  rem ain the nation’s largest em ployer, 
because o f  the steady expansion o f  infrastructure, public services and energy  supplies, 
and business and com m erce w ill rem ain dependent on governm ent con tracts ra ther than  
creating wealth and em ploym ent through m anufacturing for export.”65 Thus, it is a m ajor 
source o f  incom e for a substantial portion o f  the population.
Last, it is also im portant to m ention th a t B o tsw ana’s cattle farm ing  industry  
continues to be an im portant source o f  incom e for the elite (despite the overall low  
contribution o f  agriculture to GDP). R ecall that h istorically  the elite  c lasses garnered  
their w ealth from  cattle farm ing. Therefore, th is  industry continues to be  a  valuable  
source o f  incom e for a very sm all percentage o f  the population.
It is often cited that the unique com bination  o f  B otsw ana’s governm enta l structure 
and its econom ic structure has been central to its overall success and strong  econom ic 
perform ance. The literature frequently  refers to  B otsw ana as a developm enta l state 
because o f  the close connection betw een the state and its developm ental interests. The
65Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla, H istorical D ictionary o f  Botswana, 20.
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purpose o f  the next section is to look at the role o f  the state in B otsw ana and  how  this has 
had an im pact on social, econom ic and political conditions w ithin the country.
O verview o f  Social and Econom ic Conditions
T he m ajor social and econom ic areas in w hich  Botsw ana has overcom e 
developm ental hurdles include: health care, education and  infrastructure. A cem oglu , 
Johnson and Robinson em phasize that in addition to  “a fiscally responsib le  regim e, 
strong system  o f  law  and contract, lim ited state and p rivate  predation and a m inim al 
public service sector, the Botsw ana also  invested heavily  in infrastructure, health  and 
education.”66 The im provem ent in these critical areas have led to an overall h igh level o f  
developm ent for the country. Table 1 depicts the UN H um an D evelopm ent Index score 
for Botsw ana. It also presents data for o ther regions o f  the W orld  in  o rder to 
contextualize B otsw ana’s HDI perform ance across countries. As indicated , B o tsw ana is 
categorized according to the UN as a m edium  hum an developm ent country . Its score o f  
0.634 stands above the average m edium  developm ent score o f  0 .630. Furtherm ore, 
B otsw ana’s score is h igher than the m ean HD I score for Sub-Saharan A frica, w hich  is 
0.475. Finally, as com pared to the global average H D I score o f  0.682, B otsw ana 
perform s slightly low er than the mean.
66Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, "An African Success Story."
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Botswana 0.634 53.2 8.9 12.2 13,049
Very high human development 0.889 80.0 11.3 15.9 33,352
High human development 0.741 73.1 8.5 13.6 11,579
Medium human development 0.630 69.7 6.3 11.2 5,276
Low human development 0.456 58.7 4.2 8.3 1,585
Arab States 0.641 70.5 5.9 10.2 8,554
East Asia and the Pacific 0.671 72.4 7.2 11.7 6,466
Europe and Central Asia 0.751 71.3 9.7 13.4 12,004
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.731 74.4 7.8 13.6 10,119
South Asia 0.548 65.9 4.6 9.8 3,435
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.475 54.4 4.5 9.2 1,966
Least developed countries 0.439 59.1 3.7 8.3 1,327
Small Island Developing States 0.640 69.6 7.3 10.8 5,200
World 0.682 69.8 7.4 11.3 10,082
Source: United Nations Human Development Index
In term s o f  health, Botsw ana spends approxim ately  8.3 per cent o f  its G D P on 
health care67; m ore than several other A frican  coun tries.68 How ever, one should  note that 
this does not necessarily  lend support to the  developm ental state argum ent. The 
governm ent o f  B otsw ana was com pelled to contribu te  substantially to the fight against 
the H IV /A ID S epidem ic since the 1990s. Thus, the governm ent’s large spending  budget 
on health  care could very well be a palliative m easure against a d isease th a t has ravaged  
the country and reduced the population’s overall life expectancy. O n the o ther hand, an 
above average health  expenditure could im ply that the Botsw ana state  perceives health  
care as a vital com ponent o f  a strong developm entally  o rien ted  m andate.
67Chuhan-Pole et al., Africa's Pulse.
68 The average health expenditure for Sub-Saharan Africa is 6.5 per cent according to the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators.
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A nother area in w hich B otsw ana has m ade vast im provem ent is in education. 
Sam atar citing Luke notes that upon independence “m ost o f  the co u n try ’s schools w ere 
single-room  ‘triba l’ schools staffed by untrained teachers.” 69Sam atar further no tes that a 
lack o f  education also  m ade other developm ental challenges more d ifficult because o f  the  
lack o f  a skilled labor force.70 Presently, approxim ately  94  per cent o f  the population
have com pleted prim ary education.71 In addition to this, th e  adult literacy rate is 84 per
12cent.
Finally, sim ilar to m ost new ly independent A frican  countries, B o tsw ana did no t 
have w orthw hile infrastructure such as com prehensive road  netw orks and basic  u tilities 
such as electricity, running water, and telephone land lines. The lack o f  basic road  
netw orks especially com pounded developm ental obstacles fo r Botswana. W ithou t paved  
roads trade becom es increasingly difficult and m ore costly . Furtherm ore, as B eaulier and 
Subrick point out “w ithout sufficient road  coverage the state does n o t bu ild  social 
infrastructure that allow s for increased specialization.”73 B y 2010, B otsw ana had  25,798 
km  o f  total paved road netw orks.74 Furtherm ore, approxim ately  92 pe r cen t o f  the rural 
population have access to an im proved w ater source.75 In term s o f  electricity , the W orld  
B ank uses electric pow er consum ption per cap ita  as an  indication o f  the level o f  a 
coun try ’s developm ent because reliable and  affordable  p o w er is critical no t on ly  for the 
functioning o f  dom estic households and businesses, bu t it is also an attractive feature for
69Samatar, "National Institutions for Development: The Case o f  Botswana."
70A n  A frica n  M iracle  (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999).
7lChuhan-Pole et al., A fr ica 's  P ulse.
72Ibid.
73Scott A. Beaulier and J. Robert Subrick, "The Political Foundations o f  Development: The Case 
o f  Botswana," C o n stitu tiona l P o litica l E co n o m y  17 (2006).
74Chuhan-Pole et al., A frica 's  P ulse.
75The World Bank, W orld  D eve lo p m en t Ind ica tors .
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foreign investors. B otsw ana’s electric pow er consum ption  per cap ita  is 1,503 kW h.76 
Lastly, fixed line telecom m unications has also  im proved  w ith approx im ately  7 
subscriptions per 100 p e o p le .77 H ow ever, the  burgeoning  o f  telecom m unications 
technology has substantially  benefited  the population  m ore than fixed  subscrip tion  lines 
(approxim ately 1118 subscriptions per 100 peop le).78
O verview o f Political Conditions
U ndoubtedly, B otsw ana has been able to  m aintain  this rela tively  h igh  level o f  
econom ic developm ent because o f  its conducive political environm ent. B otsw ana has 
portrayed four critical attributes that has facilitated  strong political developm ent: 1) it is a 
stable dem ocratic state, 2) the governm ent has exercised  good governance practices, 3) 
the state upholds a high regard for civil and political liberties and 4) the public  secto r is 
relatively non-corrupt. 1 will elaborate on each  o f  these features in the fo llow ing  
paragraphs.
First, B otsw ana is one o f  the few  A frican  countries that has m ain tained  a stable 
dem ocratic state since independence. There has been no  coup d ’etats, no m ilitary  
takeovers, assassinations o r o ther form s o f  interruption in governance. A  strong  indicator 
o f a s ta te ’s reg im e type is the p o lity2 variable in  the PO L IT Y  IV dataset. T his variab le 
m easures the type o f  governing authority  in a country  on a scale o f  -10 to 10; w here -10 
indicates a fu lly  autocratic state and +10 indicates a fu lly  dem ocratic sta te .79 T able  2 




79Monty Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Gurr, P o lity  I v  P ro ject: P o litica l R eg im e  C h a ra c te r is tic s  a n d  
Transitions, 1800 -2010  (Center for Systemic Peace, 2011).
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the regional m ean for the p o lity2  variable is 2.67. B o tsw ana’s polity2  score o f  8 im plies 
that w hile it m ay not be a fully  institutionalized dem ocracy  such as the U .S . or C anada, it 
certainly is a strong dem ocratic state. A s com pared  to  o ther countries in  the sub-Saharan  
African region, B otsw ana has one o f  the m ost stable dem ocratic  polities.
Table 5.2: Polity IV  Political A uthority Indicators-B otsw ana com pared  to Sub-
Saharan A frica
N Min. Max. Mean Botswana Std.Deviation
Type o f  Governing Authority (-10 to 10) 43 -9 10 2.67 8 5.112
Institutionalized Democracy (0 to 10) 43 0 10 4.47 8 3.232
Regime Durability (No. o f  Years) 43 0 44 13.21 44 10.776
Regulation o f  Chief Executive Recruitment 
(1 to 3) 43 1 3 2.26
2 .492
Competitiveness o f Executive Recruitment (1 
to 3) 43 0 3 1.65 2 1.110
Openness o f  Executive Recruitment (1 to 4) 43 0 4 3.02 4 1.711
Executive Constraint 43 2 7 4.40 7 1.775
Regulation o f  Participation 43 2 5 2.84 2 .814
Competitiveness o f Participation 43 0 5 3.30 4 1.013
Valid N (listwise) 43
Second, B otsw ana has also exercised good  governance practices. T he W orld  
G overnance Indicators dataset assesses 215 countries accord ing  to six m ajor d im ensions: 
“voice and accountability, political stability, governm ent effectiveness, regulatory  
quality, rule o f  law , and control o f  corruption” 80 and ranks coun tries along these 
dim ensions according to their governance score.81 The governance score ranges from  -2.5
80K.aufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, The W orldwide Governance Indicators.
8 ’ibid.
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to +2.5. Furtherm ore, coun tries’ perform ance is also m easured accord ing  to  their 
percentile rank. Again, B otsw ana depicts above average perform ance on  all six 
governance indicators.
Table 5.3: W orld  G overnance Indicators- 
















Political Stability 2010 78.3 34.1 0.91
Government Effectiveness 2010 67.5 26.5 0.51
Regulatory Quality 2010 67.5 29 0.47
Rule o f  Law 2010 67.8 28.4 0.66
Control o f  Corruption 2010 79.9 32.1 0.97
Third, Botsw ana has also  dem onstrated a  relatively  higher level o f  respect for 
civil, econom ic and political freedom s. Freedom  H ouse annually reports da ta  on “the  
degree o f  political rights and civ il liberties in 195 coun tries.”82 Countries are ranked  on  a 
scale from  1 to 7 for each category w ith  1 indicating “m ost free” and 7 ind icating  “ least 
free.”83 Based on these scores, countries are assigned  a freedom  rating: “  Free (1.0 to 
2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), o r  N ot Free (5.5 to 7 .0).”84 B otsw ana w as ranked  as “ free” 
with a political right score o f  3 and a civ il liberty score o f  2. As com pared  to  the region, 
Botsw ana is in the m inority. The report further show s tha t only 22 per cen t o f  Sub- 
Saharan A frica is free, 37 per cen t is partly  free and  41 per cen t is no t free .85





Fourth, the country has also m aintained a relatively  low  level o f  corruption  in its 
public sector. T ransparency In ternational’s C orruption Perceptions Index (C PI) illustrates 
that Botsw ana is the reg ion’s top perform er on the CPI w ith a score o f  65. T he CPI 
m easures countries perceived level o f  corruption based on  calculations from  a num ber o f  
governance sources and ranks them  on a scale from  0 to 100 where 0 indicates the h ighest 
perceived level o f  corruption and 100 indicates the low est perceived level o f  corruption. 
The regional CPI average is 33.4, w hich im plies that the  overall perceived  level o f  
corruption in sub-Saharan A frica is m uch higher than  the level in Botsw ana.
D espite the positive facets o f  B otsw ana’s econom ic and political developm ent, it 
continues to  face significant social and econom ic challenges. C ritical am ong these 
include: rural poverty, incom e inequality  and the H IV /A ID S epidem ic. O ne o f  the m ajor 
contributing factors for the first challenge, rural poverty  can be a ttribu ted  to  the 
dom inance o f  the m ining sector and the directly  re la ted  slow perfo rm ance o f  the 
agricultural sector. A s reported in the literature, the population segm ent that has been  
m ost adversely affected by the dom inance o f  the diam ond sector is rural farm ers. The 
second challenge, incom e inequality  also seem s to  be significantly  h igher in the rural 
areas. M olutsi accounts that “close to 40  percent o f  the ru ra l household are estim ated  to 
live in poverty, and inequality o f  incom es is high, w ith the Gini coeffic ien t o f  over 50 
percent.”86 Therefore, there is a  distinct d ifference betw een the standard  o f  liv ing in the 
rural areas as com pared to the cities. Third, the H IV  epidem ic is another m ajor challenge 
for the Botsw ana governm ent. Leith illustrates that “m ore than one th ird  o f  the sexually  
active population is now  HIV positive.”87 The governm ent has apparently m ade dram atic
86Molutsi, "Botswana: The Path to Democracy and Development," 174.
87Leith, Why Botswana Prospered, 16.
162
im provem ents in its response against th is disease. A  substantial portion  o f  its G D P is 
allocated tow ards health expenditure. W hether o r  no t this is effective in m itigating  the 
spread o f  the disease goes beyond the purview  o f  th is study.
R egardless o f  these few  draw backs (as im portant as are), B o tsw ana’s econom ic 
and political conditions are above average. In  term s o f  its econom ic developm ent, 
B otsw ana invests m ore in health care, education  and  infrastructure than  the m ajority  o f  
the other sub-Saharan A frican countries. This dedication  to  its developm ental goals is 
evident in its strong perform ance on  several social and econom ic ind icators such as the 
H um an D evelopm ent Index. Furtherm ore, it has done so in a free, dem ocratica lly  stable, 
and relatively non-corrupt environm ent.
Conclusion
Sim ilar to m any A frican countries, B otsw ana was im poverished  upon 
independence. How ever, the country m ade a positive econom ic transform ation during  the 
1980s. U ndoubtedly, the discovery o f  diam onds p layed  a significant ro le  in its econom ic 
grow th, how ever this is ju s t one piece o f  the puzzle. I f  the discovery o f  d iam onds in itse lf  
w as enough to transform  B otsw ana from  a low  incom e to  an upper m iddle incom e 
country then every resource-rich  A frican  country w ould have  encountered sim ilar fates. 
Instead, the m ost significant contributing factor to  B otsw ana 's econom ic transform ation  
can be found in the constitutional nature o f  the T sw ana culture.
B otsw ana’s traditional roots have overw helm ingly  contributed to its econom ic 
trajectory, m ore so than the d iscovery o f  diam onds. Furtherm ore, the con tem porary  
Botsw ana elite has syncretically b lended traditional Tsw ana cu ltu re  w ith  B ritish
163
postcolonial institutions. This is evident in the decision to  appoint selected  m em bers o f  
each tribe to the H ouse o f  Chiefs. The decision  to m aintain  an adv isory  governm ental 
body in order to reflect the opinions o f  represented tribes depicts the em phasis that the 
B otsw ana state places on its traditional culture.
Presently, B otsw ana continues to  depict a  strong econom y w ith in  a stable po litical 
environm ent. This is reflected by  its continually  good perform ance on  several critical 
m easures o f  econom ic developm ent and governance. D espite  a few  draw backs such as 
the H IV /A ID S pandem ic and a high rate o f  econom ic inequality, the  coun try  overall 
represents an 'A frican m iracle' in that it is a thriv ing dem ocratic po lity  desp ite  the fact 
that it is resource-abundant. A s such, one cannot ignore the glaring question , w hat sets 
Botsw ana apart from  other resource-rich  A frican countries? The follow ing chap ter show s 
and explains the relatively low er incidence o f  the resource curse that B o tsw ana has had in 
relation to  N igeria.
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Chapter 6 
Exam ining The Resource Curse in Botswana  
Introduction
A  resounding them e throughout th is discourse is the exceptionality  o f  B o tsw ana’s 
econom ic success. How ever, the im portance o f  th is study is not m erely  to  elucidate the 
salient aspects o f  B otsw ana’s econom ic growth. M ore im portantly, the goal is to  find out 
w hy there are substantial differences betw een these tw o countries in term s o f  the degree 
o f  the resource curse. S im ilar to N igeria, B otsw ana confronts the resource  curse; 
how ever, Botsw ana depicts a  significantly  low er degree o f  the resource curse than 
N igeria. Thus, the purpose o f  this chapter is to  explain  w hy that occurs.
Before explaining the variation o f  the resource curse in Botsw ana it is im portan t 
to first illustrate i f  there is a  resource curse in B otsw ana and i f  so to w hat extent. Second, 
w e m ust explain  w hat is special or d ifferent about Botsw ana that can  explain  the 
relatively low extent o f  the resource curse. C onsequently , th is chapter is d iv ided  into tw o 
m ajor sections: 1) Show ing the E xtent o f  the R esource C urse and 2) E xplain ing  the 
Extent o f  the R esource Curse.
The first section show s that B otsw ana has experienced  a low to m oderate  degree 
o f  the resource curse. It show s this by  analyzing the sam e four m ajor aspects o f  the 
resource curse as exam ined in C hapter 5. First, it show s tha t the D utch D isease has no t 
been an im pedim ent to developm ent as seen in N igeria. A lthough som e au thors disagree 
that B otsw ana has not escaped the m ajor facets o f  the D utch disease: exchange rate
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appreciation and the crow ding out o f  m anufacturing  and agricultural industries, the 
m ajority o f  the evidence show s that o ther factors outside o f  resource abundance could  
have accounted fo r these experiences. The m ajo r reason  cited  for B otsw ana 's exchange 
rate fluctuation is attributed to the country 's com plex trading rela tionship  w ith  South 
Africa and the U.S. Botsw ana prim arily  im ports consum er products from  South A frica  
which are priced in rand, w hile the m ajority  o f  its d iam ond  exports are p riced  in U.S. 
dollars. Thus, at various points th roughout B otsw ana's history, the p u la  has e ither 
appreciated against South A frica's rand o r depreciated  against the U .S . dollar. In regards 
to  the agricultural sector, the evidence show s that because o f  geographical factors such as 
drought and B otsw ana's overall arid clim ate, the industry  started to  decline since the 
1980s irrespective o f  natural resources. L ikew ise, the crow ding  out o f  the m anufactu ring  
sector is due to extraneous factors. The literature show s that because o f  B otsw ana 's close 
proxim ity to South A frica, it is m ore cost effective to im port goods ra ther than to  produce 
them  dom estically. Therefore, the evidence show s that although B otsw ana has 
experienced an appreciation o f  its exchange ra te  and the crow ding out o f  non-resource 
boom  sectors, it is am biguous as to w hether or n o t this w ould  have occurred  regard less o f  
resource wealth.
Second, it show s that although one w ould  assum e that B otsw ana w ould  be less 
vulnerable to com m odity price volatility  than N igeria  because o f the rela tive  stab ility  o f  
world diam ond prices, this is no t the p redom inan t reason that B otsw ana appears to  be 
im m une from  this aspect o f  the resource curse. In fact, the  evidence show s that the 
dem and for diam ond output significantly  decreased  during the 2008-2009 global 
recession period. U ndoubtedly, this exogenous shock had an effec t on  B o tsw ana’s
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econom y. How ever, the m easure that allow ed B otsw ana to  escape or ra ther m itigate th is 
phenom enon associated w ith the resource curse is the im plem entation o f  its stab ilization  
funds, w hich served as a safety net during periods o f  external vicissitudes.
Third, the country also depicts a relatively low degree o f  debt burden . C ontrary  to 
the m ajority o f  resource-rich A frican countries, w hich enlarged their governm ent 
expenditure during the boom  years o f  the 1980s, B otsw ana kept their expenditu re  a t a 
m inim um  and also chose to invest a substantial portion o f  their resource revenues in to  
foreign exchange reserves. T hese reserves have assisted the country during  econom ic 
dow nturns and therefore obviating the need to  look tow ards in ternational financial 
institutions for assistance.
Fourth, corruption has neither served as an im pedim ent to developm en t in spite o f  
resource abundance. C ontrary to the m ajority  o f  resource-rich A frican  countries, 
Botsw ana has m anaged to keep their public  secto r corruption at a re la tive ly  low  level. 
U ndoubtedly, this has contributed to the consistency in its econom ic developm en t and 
also to its political stability. A ll these factors com bined has led to an  overall low  degree 
o f  the resource curse in Botsw ana.
W hereas the first section shows the rela tively  low  extent o f  the resource  curse in 
Botswana, the aim  o f  the second section is to explain  w hy this occurs. In  o ther w ords, 
w hat unique attributes does B otsw ana possess along these three levels that could  
potentially  account for the relatively low  extent o f  the resource curse. T herefore, it 
analyzes the country through the sam e three lenses as seen in Chapter 5: 1) leadership , 2) 
governm ent and 3) civil society. One, I find that B otsw ana's leadership has been  m ore 
cohesive and unified in scope as com pared to N igeria. Furtherm ore, w hereas N igeria 's
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leadership has succum bed to personal rule, B otsw ana's leaders have m anaged  to o ffer a 
collective vision across leadership transitions, w hich  allow ed the country  to  transform  its 
d iam ond w ealth into sustained econom ic grow th  w ithout succum bing  to ethnic 
skirm ishes and internal division.
Tw o, its governm ent w hile expected to be as vulnerable to the sam e R entier state 
dilem m a as seen in N igeria has m anaged to  overcom e th is dynam ic com m only  seen in 
resource-rich countries and instead has fostered a  developm ental state type approach  to 
econom ic grow th and sustainability. In this regards, B otsw ana has fo llow ed m ore c losely  
in the footsteps o f  the East A sian T igers rather than  that o f  a  typical resource-rich  A frican  
country. It has been able to do so prim arily  because it has m anaged to  syncretically  b lend  
its pre-colonial and postcolonial institutions, m aintains an insulated bu reaucracy , uphold  
a highly efficient civil service, and m eticu lously  im plem ented stringen t developm en t 
planning.
Three, w hile its civil society has been criticized as being w eak, it is rela tively  
stronger than N igeria 's. Also, its w eak civil society  has actually helped  to buttress the 
strength o f  the B otsw ana state, w hich have in tu rn  increased state capacity . W hile th is is 
not a  positive attribute o f  a dem ocracy by W estern  standards, in the case o f  B o tsw ana it 
has seem ingly w orked to am eliorate som e aspects o f  the resource curse such as public  
sector corruption. The rem ainder o f  the chap ter is thus organized into three m ajor 
sections: 1) Show ing the Extent o f  the R esource Curse, 2) Explaining the E xtent o f  the 
Resource C urse and 3) C oncluding Rem arks.
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Showing the Extent o f the R esource Curse
C hapter 4 analyzed the extent o f  the resource curse in  Nigeria by looking  at four 
critical outcom es o f  the resource curse. This chapter section uses the sam e set o f  
outcom es in o rder to test w hether or not there is a resource curse in B otsw ana and i f  so, 
to w hat extent? Thus, we will assess the level o f  four m ajor outcom es o f  the resource 
curse in Botswana: 1) Dutch D isease, 2) Price V olatility , 3) D eb t B urden and  4) 
C orruption. A lso  as explained in chapter 4  arguably  som e o f  these elem ents could  occur 
w ithout resource abundance. H ow ever, the argum ent here is that the resource curse 
exacerbates these outcom es. In the case o f  B otsw ana how ever, w e observe that these 
aspects usually associated with the resource curse has not hindered the country  from  
sustained econom ic developm ent. It is for these reasons that I argue that B otsw ana has 
experienced a low to m oderate effect o f  the resource curse; while the country  is no t 
im m une to the curse; it has been able to overcom e the developm ental hurdles o r obstacles 
associated w ith the resource curse.
D u tc h  D ise a se
First, w e w ill look at i f  there is ev idence o f  the D utch  D isease and i f  so to  w hat 
extent? D utch disease is typically d iagnosed by  an appreciation o f  the exchange rate 
during a resource boom  and is one o f  the m ost com m on features associated  w ith  the 
resource curse. The appreciation o f  the exchange rate m akes the exports in the n o n ­
resource sectors uncom petitive and thus the decline o f  agricultural and m anufacturing  
sectors are typical negative outcom es o f  the D utch disease. Figure 1 show s the varia tion  
in B otsw ana’s exchange rate during the period 1960 to  2012. As depicted , the p u la  has 
steadily appreciated since the early 1980s. A gain , as m entioned before, it is d ifficu lt to
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prove w hether or not an appreciation in the exchange rate is due to resource revenues o r 
other aspects o f  the econom y. A rguably, a num ber o f  other factors could  po ten tia lly  lead 
to exchange rate appreciation such as increase in interest rates or low er inflation.
Figure 6.1: B otsw ana's E xchange R ate  A ppreciation, 1960-2011
Botswana's Exchange Rate Appreciation(LCU per US$), 
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N evertheless, several scholars show that B otsw ana depicts D utch  disease 
sym ptom s. Pegg argues that although B o tsw ana’s econom y is functioning excep tionally  
better than m ost sub-Saharan A frican countries, the econom y rem ains h igh ly  specialized  
and und iversified .'M ogotsi also show s that B otsw ana experienced a D utch  d isease during  
its boom  period because it depicted  a reduction in m anufacturing ou tpu t.2S arra f and 
Jiw anji illustrate that although agriculture accounts fo r 70% o f  the labo r force, 
agricultural productiv ity  as m easured as a percentage contribution to  G D P d ropped  from
’Pegg, "Is There a Dutch Disease in Botswana?.”
2Imogen Mogotsi, "Botswana's Diamonds Boom: Was There a Dutch Disease?," South African Journal o f  
Economics 70, no. 1 (2002).
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13% in 1980 to 4%  in 1995.3 Good concurs that B o tsw ana’s agricultural sector steadily  
declined after 1980; eventually , B otsw ana began to use its diam ond revenues to im port 
food because o f  the relatively unproductive agricultural secto r.4
O n the o ther hand, several scholars a lso  h igh ligh t that there has not been  
substantial evidence that Botsw ana has experienced the D utch  disease. Sam atar contends 
that Botsw ana did not encounter the D utch disease because “ it carefully invested  som e o f  
its resources in physical and social infrastructure and in productive areas o f  the econom y 
such as industry.”5 H illbom  concurs th is evidence by c iting  that “B otsw ana has escaped 
the resource curse and D utch disease by im plem enting a long-term  p lan  for the ex traction  
o f  diam onds.”6
Pegg sheds some clarification on  this debate  by arguing  that although  B otsw ana 
has depicted som e effects o f  the Dutch disease it is not fo r the  typical reasons as cited  in 
the literature. In regards to the appreciation o f  the  exchange rate, Pegg cites that there  is 
insufficient evidence to  conclude undoubtedly tha t B otsw ana has seen  a  sign ifican t long­
term  appreciation o f  its exchange rate.7 In fact he  show s that at various tim es throughout 
B otsw ana’s h istory, the pula has either appreciated  against the South A frican  rand  and 
depreciated against the U.S. dollar or v ice versa b u t this cou ld  be because  “ South  A frica  
accounts for approxim ately  75%  o f  B otsw ana’s total im ports which are p riced  in rand, 
while diam onds w hich are priced in U S dollars have accounted  for nearly  80%  o f  to tal
3Maria Sarraf and Moortaza Jiwanji, B ea ting  th e  R eso u rce  C urse: The Case o f  B o tsw a n a , Environment 
Deaprtment Papers (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2001).
4Kenneth Good, "Resource Dependency and Its Consequences: The Costs of Botswana's Shining Gems," 
Jo u rn a l o f  C on tem porary  A fr ica n  S tud ies  23, no. 1 (2005).
5Samatar, A n  A frica n  M iracle , 4.
AEllen Hillbom, "Diamonds or Development? A Structural Assessment of Botswana's Forty Years o f  
Success," The J o u rn a l o f  M odern  A frican  S tu d ies  46, no. 02 (2008).
7Pegg, "Is There a Dutch Disease in Botswana?."
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export revenues over the six year period from  2000 to 2005.” 8 Thus, one cannot 
conclusively argue that B otsw ana’s fluctuation in exchange rate is strictly  due to the 
Dutch disease; one also has to take into consideration  its com plex trade rela tionship  w ith 
the regional hegem on as well as the U.S.
In regards to  agriculture, Pegg show s that the c row ding  out o f  this industry  is due 
to other factors besides the D utch disease. First agricu ltural productiv ity  has been  lim ited  
by B otsw ana’s arid clim ate.9 T his forces the country  to  prim arily  pursue cattle  ranch ing  
in lieu o f  crop fanning. N evertheless, cattle ranching  is a lso  lim ited during  ex tended  
periods o f  drought w hich is no t uncharacteristic fo r B otsw ana. In addition  to this, cattle 
farm ing creates d isparity  betw een w ealth ier ranch  ow ners and sm all-scale farm ers; the 
cattle farm ing industry favors larger scale ow ners to sm all scale farm ers thus creating  an 
inequality w ithin the secto r.10 Further com plicating th is dynam ic is the lim ited  investm ent 
from  the governm ent in the agricultural secto r.11
B otsw ana’s m anufacturing sector has a lso  w itnessed  a decline no t necessarily  
because o f  the D utch disease but again  because o f  its trade relationship  w ith  South 
Africa. As m entioned above, Botsw ana obtains the m ajority  of its im ports from  South 
Africa. It is possib le that im porting cheap goods from  its closest trad ing  partner is m ore 
cost effective than dom estically  m anufacturing these sam e goods.12 In addition  to  this, 
Pegg shows that “B otsw ana’s tiny  m arket, landlocked location, high transporta tion  costs




1 international Monetary Fund, Botswana: Selected Issues and S tatistical Appendix, Imf Country Report 
No. 07/228 (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2007).
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and lack o f  entrepreneurs” 13 have all con tribu ted  to the lackluster perfo rm ance o f  its 
m anufacturing sector.
In order to em pirically test the validity  o f  these argum ents, T able  1 depicts the 
results from  a bivariate correlation analysis assessing  the relationship betw een  m ineral 
rents as a percentage o f  G D P, agriculture value added  a percentage o f  G D P, 
m anufacturing value added as a percentage o f  G D P, and  the offic ia l exchange rate 
expressed as local currency units per US dollars. W hile it is im portant to  rem em ber that 
correlation does not signify causation, w hat this tab le  tells us is that there is som e type o f  
association o r relationship am ong these variables.
l3Pegg, "Is There a Dutch Disease in Botswana?."
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N 42 42 37 37
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*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
As Table 1 depicts the only statistically  sign ificant rela tionship  is be tw een  
m ineral rents as a percentage o f  G D P and the official exchange rate  expressed  in local 
currency units per US$. It is a positive relationship  w ith significant a t the p <  0.05 level. 
This indicates that as the percentage o f  m ineral rents o f  G D P increases, there tends to be 
an appreciation o f  the official exchange rate. T he non-significance o f  the correla tion  o f  
m ineral rents w ith agriculture and m anufacturing  could imply that there  are o ther 
extraneous factors that could affect these sectors as prev iously  discussed.
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C o m m o d ity  P r ice  V o la tility
The second aspect o f  the resource curse that we w ill analyze is the vulnerab ility  o f  
B otsw ana to price volatility. C om bes and G uillaum ont describe vulnerability  as  “ the risk  
o f  being negatively affected by exogenous unforeseen  and uncontrollable shocks.” 14 It is 
argued that resource rich countries are m ore vulnerable to  com m odity price  volatility  than  
resource poor countries for a num ber o f  reasons. O ne, because  o f the c row ding  out effect 
o f  the D utch D isease, resource-dependent econom ies are often left vu lnerable  to the 
fluctuation in com m odity prices. The literature argues that resource-rich countries are 
m ore subject to com m odity price volatility  than resource-poor countries because they are 
so dependent on one specific resource for their revenues. In other w ords, resource-rich  
countries lack econom ic diversification and w hen com m odity p rices decrease, their 
econom ies are adversely affected. O n the con trary  how ever, when com m odity  prices are 
high, the econom y tends to  perform  w ell because o f  the increased value o f  the resources. 
Two, m any o f  the resource-rich countries are also developing econom ies and thus lack 
institutionalized safety nets thus it is m ore d ifficu lt for these countries to  bounce back  
from  external shocks to the econom y than  in developed econom ies. T hus, developing  
countries are less resilient to external shocks than advanced industrial econom ies.
C om pared to N igeria, B otsw ana has been  rela tively  less vu lnerab le  and  m ore 
resilient to com m odity price shocks. This is because o f  the relative stab ility  o f  d iam ond  
prices. A s m entioned in C hapter 4, the oil trade is the m ost volatile com m odity  m arket in 
the w orld so com paratively speaking one w ould  expect that since B otsw ana is a m ineral 
exporters and not an oil exporter, one w ould  expect that price volatility w ould  not have as
14 Jean-Louis Combes and Patrick Guilaumont, "Commodity Price Volatility, Vulnerability and 
Development," Development Policy Review  20, no. 1 (2002).
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large an effect on the econom y as it w ould  have in oil exporting countries. H ow ever, 
despite the relatively stability o f  d iam ond prices, this does not m ean that B otsw ana is 
com pletely im m une to price volatility.
B otsw ana has been particularly  vulnerable to price volatility especially  during  
global recessions. “In 2009, w orld diam ond ou tpu t decreased by abou t 29%  to 109 
m illion carats com pared with 153 m illion  carats in 2008. A frican d iam ond  production  
decreased by alm ost 36%  to about 54 m illion carats in 2009 com pared w ith  about 84 
m illion carats in 2008.” l5These external shocks have not devastated B o tsw ana’s econom y 
how ever because the country has invested substantially  in stabilization funds. T herefore, 
it has been able to bounce back  from  recessions w ithout a  significant am ount o f  harm  
done to the econom y.
Figure 1 illustrates the m ineral rents as a  percentage o f G D P in B otsw ana. As 
Figure 1 shows B otsw ana’s m ineral ren ts as a percentage o f  GDP significantly  declined  
during the recession in the 1980s and during the recen t global recession starting  in  2008. 
It also experienced a slum p during the m id-1990s to early 2000. F igure 2 show s 
B otsw ana’s G D P grow th rate during the sam e tim e period. As depicted , a lthough 
B otsw ana’s G D P grow th rate fluctuated, the decline in m ineral ren ts B o tsw ana’s 
econom y did not devastate the econom y during  these slum ps because it used  its 
stabilization funds as its econom ic safety  net. In 1972 B otsw ana established the R evenue 
Stabilization Fund in order to m itigate against the harm ful effects o f  p rice  v o la tility .16
l5Harold Newman, Omayra Bermudez-Lugo, and Phillip Mobbs, Usgs 2009 M inerals Yearbook: The 
M ineral Industries o f  Africa (U.S. Department o f  the Interior, September 2011).
l6Pegg, "Is There a Dutch Disease in Botswana?."
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Figure 6.2: Botsw ana M ineral R ents as a percentage o f G D P, 1960-2012
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Figure 6.3: Botsw ana's A nnual G D P grow th , 1960-2012
Botswana's GDP growth (annual %), 1960-2012
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Also, during recessions, the dem and fo r d iam onds significantly  decreases and 
likewise so does the dem and; consequently , a norm al reaction for d iam ond  exporters is to
177
reduce production output. For exam ple, in 2008, in response to the global recession  
D ebsw ana closed dow n all o f  its diam ond m ines .17 The tem porary c losing  o f  the m ines in 
2008 helped B otsw ana to adjust to the decreased dem and o f  diam onds.
G lobal events are not the only factors that affect the volatility  o f  com m odity  
prices. Since such a large portion o f  B otsw ana’s econom y relies on its d iam ond m ining  
industry, fluctuation in diam ond prices is d irectly  reflected  in the econom y. U ntil 2001, 
d iam ond prices have been set m ore or less by a cartel, the DeBeers group. Furtherm ore, 
van W yk citing  M inew eb shows that “The global d iam ond industry operates as a  De 
Beers dom inated cartel. Through vertical in tegration, De Beers dom inates prospecting , 
production and m arketing. D ebsw ana, as a De B eers’ subsidiary, is a p rom inent producer: 
contributing 80%  o f  revenue and 70%  o f  production for D e Beers.” 18 M artin  also  argues 
that the price o f  diam onds is controlled  by De Beers central selling office. V an  W yk 
concurs this in expressing that although D e Beers and its subsid iaries produce 
approxim ately 50 per cent o f  the w orld ’s diam onds, the m ajority  o f  d iam ond  m arketing  is 
done by De Beers and thus it is able to set and m anipulate diam ond prices.
O n the contrary, price volatility  could  also potentially  benefit B otsw ana. A s 
em erging m arkets such as China and India expand their m iddle class, these househo lds 
will dem and a greater share in the luxury m arket. D iam ond being one o f  the m ost 
precious and rarest gem s is undoubtedly  in h igh  dem and among the m iddle c lasses in 
these countries. The problem  is, how ever, there is a lim ited  or set am oun t o f  know n 
supply sources for diam onds. C atherine B oyle argues that “ In both base m etals and bulk  
com m odities such as copper and iron ore there  are know n resources w hich  can be
17Ibid.
l8Jay van Wyk, "Double Diamonds, Real Diamonds: Botswana’s National Competitiveness," A cadem y o f  
Marketing Studies Journal 14, no. 2 (2010).
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exploited. By contrast, there are lim ited know n resources and hence very  lim ited  new  
supply is being forecast in d iam onds.” 19 Thus, as the dem and fo r d iam onds increase 
dram atically  and the supply rem ains lim ited, the price o f  these gem s undoubted ly  w ill 
increase.
B ased on the evidence recently  described  it w ould  be safe to  argue that w hile  
price volatility  adversely affects B otsw ana during  periods o f  recession, fo r the m ost part 
it has not greatly  harm ed the coun try ’s econom y. W e can conclude that p rice  volatility  
has had a m oderate effect on the econom y.
D e b t B u rd en
Third, B otsw ana has m aintained a  rela tively  low deb t burden despite  its resource 
abundance. It is im portant to note that it is no t only resource-rich countries that have 
encountered a large debt overhang. For a  num ber o f  reasons, Sub-Saharan A frica  has had  
an extensive relationship w ith the international donor com m unity since the 1970s.
Stym ne highlights that A frica’s struggle w ith  debt burden began  shortly  after the 
first oil crisis in 1973. This struggle was tw o-fold . O n the one  hand oil im porters found it 
increasingly d ifficult to purchase oil because o f  the p rice  increase and  thus had  to 
succum b to external borrow ing in order to  facilitate  continued  industrialization. Tw o, oil 
exporters w ho w ere elated by the sudden increase in value o f  their exports started
borrow ing from  international financial institutions in o rder to support lavish  public
20investm ent projects.
’’Catherine Boyle, "Diamond Prices Set to Sparkle," CNBC  June 9, 2011.
20Joakim Stymne, "Reducing the Debt Burden o f  Sub-Saharan Africa," in Economic Crisis in Africa: 
Perspectives on Policy Responses, ed. Magnus Blomstrom and Mats Lundahl (London: Routledge, 1993).
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A lthough the 1980s debt crisis a ffected  the m ajority  o f  A frican  countries, 
resource-rich states accrued m ore debt than  resource poor ones prim arily  because o f  the 
increase in public spending during com m odity boom s. D uring these periods, countries 
tend to increase their governm ent expenditure that is increase public se rvan ts’ salaries, 
spend on large w hite elephant type projects. W hen the boom  ends countries usually  find 
it very difficult to cut back on the increased spending especially  in term s o f  governm ent 
w orkers’ salaries. Therefore, resource-rich  countries typically  borrow  heavily  from  
international financial institutions and thus acqu ire  an overw helm ingly  h igh  debt burden.
A s m entioned throughout this d iscourse, shortly after independence B otsw ana 
was very im poverished and thus depended greatly  on B ritain  for foreign aid. D espite  th is 
initial reliance on foreign aid, Botsw ana has not borrow ed  extensively from  in ternational 
donors. This behavior stands contrary to m any resource-rich  countries that accum ulate  a 
large am ount o f  foreign debt during resource boom s; F igure 5 shows B o tsw ana’s ex ternal 
debt stocks as a percentage o f  its GN I over the period  1960 to 2012. A s dep ic ted  in the 
graph, the highest points o f  debt accum ulation  w ere during the early  to  m id-1970s 
(shortly after independence) and again in the early  1980s (during the m ajo r d rought 
period). Recently, how ever, during the 2008 global recession, the country  had to  borrow  
from  the A frican D evelopm ent Bank. H ow ever, one cannot say that th is is as a  resu lt o f  
increased governm ent expenditure due to a resource boom  but ra ther th is is m ore 
attributed to  a dow nturn in the global econom ic m arket.
In addition to a low reliance on foreign assistance, Botsw ana has a lso  used its
21 •foreign exchange reserves in order to provide a cush ion  during  resource busts. F igure 6 
illustrates B otsw ana’s total reserves (w hich include foreign exchange reserves) for the
2’Leith, Why Botswana Prospered.
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period 1960 to 2012. As the figure depicts, total reserves have gradually  increased  over 
the years. There w as a slight decrease in reserves in the early  2000 and  betw een  2008 to 
2010. The coun try ’s extensive foreign exchange reserves protect the econom y from  a 
num ber o f  econom ic setbacks such as those d iscussed in the aforem entioned sections. In 
addition to protecting the country from  the effec ts o f  D utch  disease and price  volatility , 
foreign exchange reserves have also enabled B otsw ana to limit the am ount o f  foreign 
debt it accum ulates during resource busts.
Figure 6.4 Botsw ana External D ebt Stocks as a P ercentage o f  G N I, 1960-2012





Figure 6.5: B otsw ana Total R eserves (includes gold , current U S$), 1960-2012
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C orruption is yet another prevalent problem  associated  with the resource curse. 
As in the case o f  debt overhang, it is difficult to assess w hether o r no t the level o f  
corruption in B otsw ana is associated  w ith the abundance o f  natural resources. 
A dm ittedly, ram pant corruption can occur because o f  a w idespread institu tional 
breakdow n in the public sector regardless o f  resource w ealth .
Every country has som e degree o f  corruption w hether it is a resource-rich  or 
resource-poor country. But, in resource-rich  countries w ith  weak institu tions, corruption  
is a m ore far-reaching and insidious problem  because the lack o f  accountability  and 
transparency creates the opportunity  for looting and o ther form s o f ren t-seek ing  behavior.
B otsw ana again stands out as the outlier in th is regard. D espite  having  an 
abundance o f  natural resources it has a  relatively  low er corruption ra te  than  N igeria  and 
m ost other resource-rich A frican countries. In fact, ev idence shows that B otsw ana is one 
o f  the least corrupt countries in A frica overall. Table 2 depicts data  from  the 2012 
Transparency International C orruption Perceptions Index. A s shown, B otsw ana is ranked  
as the least overall corrupt country in Sub-Saharan A frica. H ow ever, it is unclear as to 
w hether or no t the level o f  corruption in B otsw ana can be associated w ith  the  p resence o f  
natural resources. The low  extent o f  corruption could possib ly  occur independently  o f  
natural resources because o f  the coun try ’s strong institu tional capacity.
O ne o f  the reasons B otsw ana has such a low level o f perceived  corruption  is 
because the Botsw ana governm ent im plem ented policies which w ou ld  deter corruption  
and bribery activities. Hope supports this by explain ing  that “B otsw ana enacted  the 
Corruption a n d  E conom ic Crime B ill in 1994. This bill eventually paved  the w ay for the
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establishm ent o f  the D irectorate on C orruption and Econom ic C rim e (D C E C ), an 
independent com m ission dedicated to prosecu ting  all perpetrators gu ilty  o f  corruption  
and bribery.”22 Hope goes on to  explain that:
“The D C E C  is responsible f o r  the  investigation o f  a lleged  a n d  su sp ec ted  o ffences  
o f  corruption a n d  offences aga inst the f is c a l  law  o f  Botswana. I t w ill a ssis t any  
law  enforcem ent agency o f  the governm ent in the  investigation o f  o ffences  
involving dishonesty o r  chea ting  o f  the pub lic  revenue a n d  it w ill a ss is t the  
A ttorney  G eneral in the prosecu tion  o f  the offenders, including those instiga ting  
a n d  abetting  in such  offences. ”23 
Thus, these policies have served the country  w ell in reducing  and p reven ting  ram pant 
corruption.
22K.empe R onald  H ope, "D evelopm ent P o licy  and  E conom ic  P e rfo rm an ce  in B o tsw ana : L essons fo r the 
T ransition  E conom ies in S ub-S aharan  A frica ," J o u rn a l o f  In te rn a tio n a l d eve lopm en t 10, no. 4  (1998).






C orruption  Perceptions Index
Country Regional 
R ank Rank C ountry CPI
30 1 Botswana 65 118 25 M adagascar 32
39 2 Cape Verde 60 123 26 Mauritania 31
43 3 Mauritius 57 123 26 Mozambique 31
50 4 Rwanda 53 123 26 Sierra Leone 31
51 5 Seychelles 52 128 29 Togo 30
58 6 Namibia 48 130 30 Cote d 'Ivoire 29
64 7 Ghana 45 130 30 Uganda 29
64 7 Lesotho 45 133 32 Comoros 28
69 9 South Africa 43 139 33 Kenya 27
72 10 Sao Tome and 
Principe
42 139 33 Nigeria 27
75 11 Liberia 41 144 35 Cameroon 26
83 12 Burkina Faso 38 144 35 Central African Republic 26
88 13 Malawi 37 144 35 Congo Republic 26
88 13 Swaziland 37 150 38 Eritrea 25
88 13 Zambia 37 150 38 Guinea-Bissau 25
94 16 Benin 36 154 40 Guinea 24
94 16 Djibouti 36 157 41 Angola 22
94 16 Senegal 36 160 42 Democratic Republic o f  the 
Congo
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102 19 Gabon 35 163 43 Equatorial G uinea 20
102 19 Tanzania 35 163 43 Zimbabwe 20
105 21 Gambia 34 165 45 Burundi 19
105 21 Mali 34 165 45 Chad 19
113 23 Ethiopia 33 173 47 Sudan 13
113 23 Niger 33 174 48 Somalia 8
Based on the evidence provided in this section, it could be argued  that B otsw ana 
has experienced a low to m oderate degree o f  the resource curse. T he D u tch  disease and 
com m odity price volatility  has m oderately  affected  the econom y. T his is because the 
governm ent has im plem ented several m easures in order to m itigate  som e o f  the 
unavoidable econom ic aspects o f  resource abundance. How ever, the area  in w hich 
B otsw ana significantly  stands out com pared  to N igeria  is in its m anagem ent o f  debt and
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its corruption rate. Botsw ana depicts a low  degree o f  debt and corruption despite  be ing  a 
resource-rich country. The follow ing section w ill provide explanations for the ex ten t o f  
the resource curse in Botswana.
Explaining the Extent o f the Resource Curse
The previous section illustrated that B otsw ana has experienced a low  to m oderate  
level o f  the resource curse by exam ining the im pact o f  four critical resource curse 
outcom es on the country’s econom ic and political perform ance: D utch  disease, price 
volatility, debt burden and corruption. This section proffers plausible reasons that explain  
w hy it is that B otsw ana has experienced a low degree o f  these effects. T h is section  is 
organized according to three levels o f  analysis: 1) L eadership , 2) G overnm ent and 3) 
C ivil Society.
L e a d e r sh ip
The first explanation looks at the role that leadersh ip  has p layed  in overcom ing  
econom ic and political challenges associated  w ith  the resource curse in B otsw ana. T he 
m ost salient aspect o f  B otsw ana’s leadership in com parison  to N igeria  is that no leader 
has ever been overthrow n in a  m ilitary coup. In fact, B otsw ana is the only sub-S aharan  
A frican country that has never had a m ilitary  coup or overthrow n governm en t since its 
independence in 1966. It consistently  has had dem ocratically  elected leaders w ho  have 
served their respective term s and then  peacefu lly  transferred  pow er to  their successors. 
The fact that it is the only sub-Saharan A frican country  to  do this ind icates that there  is 
som ething uniquely exceptional about the type o f  leadership in Botswana.
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Thus, the aim  o f  this sub-section is to identify  the unique traits and  patterns that 
have contributed to the overall effectiveness o f  B otsw ana’s leadership. I f  leadership  is 
one o f  the independent variables that cause varia tion  in the degree o f  the resource curse 
then one w ould  expect that there are substantial differences betw een  the type o f  
leadership in B otsw ana and N igeria. In  chap ter 4 we show ed that the m ajority  o f  
N igeria’s leaders have been  characterized by personal rule. B otsw ana’s leadership  stands 
in contrast to N igeria’s because not only  has its leadership  been m ore effective in 
m aintaining legitim acy, political stability  and dem ocracy  but it has a lso  been  m ore 
cohesive and unified in  scope.
In describing B otsw ana’s leadership it is im portant to  bear in m ind  com m on traits 
am ong all four presidents. H ow ever, it is a lso  im portant to note the  d istinctively  
exceptional traits o f  the first president, Seretse K ham a as w ell because he w as 
instrum ental in setting precedents for subsequent leaders to follow. A rguab ly , K ham a is 
the first president that gave B otsw ana’s leadership  its transform ational nature. A lthough 
this section by  no m eans represents an autobiographical sketch o f  Seretse K ham a, key 
aspects o f  his life are im portant to m ention  in o rder to fully understand the undertones o f  
his dynam ic and charism atic leadership. These aspects can be  organized a long  the lines o f  
personal traits and approaches to decision-m aking  and the im plem entation o f  critical 
policies that d irectly  and indirectly affected  B o tsw ana’s diam ond m ining industry.
The Im portance o f  the F irst President: Sir Seretse K ham a
One o f  the m ost salient aspects o f  K ham a’s personal life was that he w as the heir 
to the Bam angw ato chieftainship. This is a very  im portan t facet o f  B o tsw ana’s p o s t­
independent leadership not only because it stands in direct contrast to  N ig e ria ’s bu t also
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because it has several ram ifications. For one, the  fact that K ham a w as in line for the 
regency on the tribal level buttressed his legitim acy and also  the popu lar support o f  his 
presidency on the national level. In addition to  th is, because K ham a’s fam ily  had vested  
interests in cattle farm ing, he earned the support o f  both the wealthy cattle  elite  and the 
rural population. A nd finally, since he d irectly  descended  from  chiefs, un like m ost post­
independent A frican leaders, K ham a felt a deep-rooted  sense o f  alleg iance and 
responsibility to his people because o f  th is regal lineage.24
The second personal attribute that stood  out w as K ham a’s uncom prom ising  
steadfastness to  m oral principles. R otberg  accounts that “K ham a favored nonracialism  as 
opposed to m ultiracialism  and affirm ative action. Furtherm ore, he w as also  actively  
against anti-w hiteism .,,25Contrary to  the m ajority  o f  A frican  leaders du ring  the post­
independent era, K ham a did not adopt a  pan-A frican  stance. The im plication  o f  th is w as 
that he did not im petuously expel B ritish  expatriates from  Botsw ana afte r independence 
in order to support the w idespread pan-A fricanism  that w as enveloping the m ajority  o f  
the pro-socialist A frican countries. H e also opposed  tribalism , w hich  w ou ld  partially  
explain his decisions to transfer m ineral rights from  the tribes to the state .26
K ham a also adopted th is steadfastness to  nonracial principles in h is personal life. 
This was m ost poignantly  dem onstrated  when K ham a chose to m arry  a  w hite B ritish  
wom an, Ruth W illiam s. K ham a m et W illiam s w hile  studying law in B ritain . In 1948, the 
tw o m arried and shortly thereafter they  returned to  B otsw ana. K ham a’s uncle, Tshekedi 
K ham a w ho was then regent o f  the N gw ato tribe, w as outraged by  this interracial 
m arriage. The British colonial adm inistration a lso  abhorred  the in term ing ling  o f  these
24R otberg , T ransform ative  P o litica l L eadersh ip .
25lbid.
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two races and dem anded the dissolution o f  their m arriage. Despite the d isapproval o f  his 
interracial m arriage how ever, Kham a refused to concede to racial segregation. A dded to 
that, as m entioned above, K ham a was in line fo r chieftainship  w hich w ould  have been 
abrogated if  he defied the regen t’s orders. N evertheless, he was w illing to  relinqu ish  his 
title in order to rem ain steadfast to his p rincip les.27 Consequently, because K ham a w as 
unw illing to divorce his wife, they w ere eventually  exiled  from  Botsw ana in  1952 and did 
not return to B otsw ana until 1956.
The th ird  personal attribute that K ham a possessed  was his dem onstration  o f  
com posure and self-control during his ru le  as president. A dm ittedly, th is tra it is d ifficu lt 
to assess or quantify, nevertheless it is w orth m entioning  because it is yet ano ther w ay in 
which K ham a stood out from  his contem poraries. In  his account o f  K h am a’s presidency , 
R otberg describes K ham a as a “calm  and steady leader, conscious o f  self-m astery , alw ays 
prudent and dem ocratic, w ith grow ing rational legitim acy and som e understa ted  
inspirational abilities to add to this trad itional abundance o f  leg itim acy .” 28 T his 
com posure w as a critical attribute especially  because  B otsw ana’s po litical and econom ic 
institutions w ere new ly created.
The fourth  trait that contributes to K h am a’s exceptionality  w as his ab ility  to 
gam er w idespread political support despite  the poor econom ic cond itions after 
independence. R otberg accounts that K ham a w as ab le  to obtain th is support by 
“dem onstrating a quiet vision, by gaining support for that vision am ong h is party  and his 
peers and follow ers throughout the territory, and  by a series o f  princ ip led  political 
m aneuvers that slow ly m ade loyal follow ers o f  potential opponents, w hether local or
27Ibid.
28lb id ., 80.
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colonial.” 29 This ability to  foster political support w as critical no t only  to  K ham a’s 
success as president bu t it was also im portant fo r im planting  an overall sense o f  m orale 
and trust in the B otsw ana adm inistration.
In term s o f  approach to  decision-m aking  and po licy  im plem entation, K ham a 
adopted a m ore gradualist approach. T his pattern  also stood in con trast to  N ig e ria ’s 
leaders. A n exam ple o f  this gradualist approach w as illustrated by K ham a’s slow  and 
deliberate indigenization o r A fricanization o f  the  civil service. U ndoubtedly , K h am a’s 
reluctance to  prom ote or support pan-A fricanism  or anti-w hiteism  con tribu ted  to  his 
decision to keep several senior level British civil servants in  his governm ent. H ow ever, it 
is prim arily  his gradualist policies that con tribu ted  to the careful and steady process o f  
indigenizing B otsw ana’s civil service. Furtherm ore, K ham a’s stance on this aspect o f  the 
adm inistration depicted h is prioritization o f  m aintain ing efficiency in h is adm in istra tion  
rather than appealing to nationalist sentim ent.
In addition to a gradualist approach to po licy  im plem entation, K ham a w as a lso  in 
favor o f  pro-dem ocratic policies. A gain, this attribu te w as uncharacteristic for m any 
A frican leaders during th is postcolonial period. K ham a chose  to pursue a  pa th  that w as 
not m ilitaristic, authoritarian o r based on a p lanned  econom y. Instead, K ham a pu rsued  a 
m odel that w as prim arily m arket-driven w ith  lim ited  state intervention. R otberg  cites that 
“ K ham a had fortuitously been influenced m ore by the B ritish  and the w orld  than  by 
parochial A frican politics.” 30K ham a’s strongly p ro-dem ocratic  attitude p roved  beneficial 
no t only in term s o f  political developm ent but it w as also instrum ental in securing  foreign 




Botsw ana’s m ineral resources, this assistance from  external donors also con tribu ted  to 
B otsw ana’s rapid econom ic developm ent. A nd it was K ham a’s pro-dem ocratic  a ttitude 
and approach to developm ent policy that a llow ed B otsw ana to procure  a substan tial 
am ount o f  foreign aid during the im m ediate post independent period.
K ham a also im plem ented critical policies that d irectly  affected the degree o f  the 
resource curse in B otsw ana. The first im portant decision  K ham a m ade w as to  transfer the 
m ineral rights from  the tribes to  the state. In do ing  so, K ham a preven ted  any possib le  
ethnic skirm ishes or conflict over the d istribution o f  ren ts from natu ral resources. In 
addition to preventing conflict, by transferring m ineral righ ts from the tribes to the state, 
K ham a buttressed the ro le o f  the state. Leith confirm s tha t“ K ham a’s choice o f  vesting 
m ineral rights in the central governm ent w ould  prove to be the key to estab lish ing  the 
authority o f  the nation-state. R ather than choosing  to favor his hom e tribe, and thereby  
risk losing support elsew here in the country, K ham a chose to  direct the s ta te ’s share o f  
m ineral w ealth to national purposes.”31
The second critical decision that K ham a m ade that directly affected  the ex ten t o f  
possible problem s associated w ith resource revenues w as the  decision no t to  nationalize 
the diam ond sector. In fact, K ham a decided to  en ter into a jo in t venture partnersh ip  w ith 
De Beers instead o f  transform ing diam ond m in ing  activities into a sta te-ow ned enterprise. 
The prim ary reason for this decision w as because the m ajority  o f B o tsw ana’s labor pool 
lacked the necessary  skills and education in o rder to efficiently  run a d iam ond  m in ing  
operation at that tim e period. “B otsw ana had w eak educational and health  system s and 
hardly any skilled local professionals; even by  1972, only 30 percen t o f  the top 
adm inistrative and professional positions w ere held  by citizens in 1966, there  w ere only
3! Leith, Why B o tsw ana  P rospered , 61.
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tw enty-tw o university graduates and about 100 secondary school certificate  
holders.”32Furtherm ore, Sebudubudu and  B otlhom ilw e citing  Beattie show  that at that 
tim e Botsw ana lacked the technological know ledge and  skills to  ex tract and take 
advantage o f  their diam ond w indfall.33Thus, K ham a m ade one o f  the m ost pruden t 
decisions to m erge w ith an external m ining com pany  in o rder to m axim ize the po ten tia l 
benefits from  the diam ond m ining sector.
Identifying C om m on L eadersh ip  Patterns and T raits
Sim ilar patterns o f  shrew d decision-m aking and po licy  im plem entation w ere also 
observed in subsequent adm inistrations. This leads one to question, are there any  
sim ilarities am ong these leaders that could possib ly  contribute to the effective 
m anagem ent o f  B otsw ana’s natural resources and consequently  con tribu ting  to its 
relatively low er degree o f  the resource curse .S ince this level o f  analysis strictly  looks at 
individual or personal traits, the assum ption is tha t m ost or all leaders shared som e type 
o f  sim ilarity in personal characteristics, socioeconom ic conditions o r experience.
One plausible explanation for the con tinu ity  in efficiency and p ruden t dec ision ­
m aking in Botsw ana leadership and its ability to  transfer this effectiveness from  one 
leadership adm inistration to the next can be a ttribu ted  to a  cohesive co llective vision 
shared by its leaders. A rguably, it is because o f  th is  collective vision in addition  to unique 
traits and background experiences shared am ong  Seretse Kham a, Q uett M asire, Festus 
M ogae and the current president, lan  K ham a that has a llow ed  B otsw ana to  overcom e not 
only its initial developm ental hurdles but was a lso  able to  avoid  the negative ou tcom es o f
32R otberg , Transform ative  P o litica l L eadersh ip , 78.
33 D avid Sebudubudu  and  M okganed i B o tlhom ilw e, "T h e  C ritica l R o le  o f  L ead e rsh ip  in B o tsw ana 's  
D evelopm ent: W hat L essons? ," L eadersh ip  8, no. 1 (2011).
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the resource curse. R otberg accounts that “W ithout their m utual v ision  and  K ham a’s 
careful efforts, the young Botsw ana m ight have rem ained  a collection o f  tribal fiefdom s 
or a purely cattle econom y controlled by barons like h im self.”34
Two, B otsw ana’s leaders also shared sim ilarities in education and socioeconom ic 
experience. S im ilar to Kham a, M asire received his prim ary education at the p restig ious 
T iger K loof boarding school. M ogae received his tertiary  education in econom ics at 
O xford University. Ian K ham a stands in contrast w ith these m en, how ever, in term s o f  his 
tertiary education. U nlike his predecessors, instead o f  studying  law or econom ics, K ham a 
w ent to the Sandhurst M ilitary  A cadem y in 1972.35 D espite the sligh t varia tions in the 
education received by the coun try ’s four presidents, the com m on feature shared am ong  
all is the cosm opolitan scope o f  this education. This helped to  engender a sense o f  liberal 
values and W esternized th inking that undoubtedly  have contributed to  the d ifference in 
B otsw ana’s approach to political and econom ic developm ent. B o tsw ana’s leaders also  
share sim ilarities in socioeconom ic conditions. Sam atar explains that the m em bers o f  
B otsw ana’s post-independence leadership w ere all m edium  to large cattle  farm  
ow ners.36This sim ilarity in education socioeconom ic conditions is possib ly  one o f  the 
m ajor contributing factors to the hom ogeneity  in B otsw ana’s leadership structure. W hile 
each leader im printed their personal stam p on B otsw ana during their respective  
adm inistrations, the socialization process w as com m on am ong  them.
W ith that said, the aim  o f  th is section is not to show o r confirm  that all 
B otsw ana’s leaders w ere sim ilar. In fact, som e m ight argue that the d ifferences in 
leadership style have aided Botsw ana. For exam ple, Q uett M asire w as m ore o f  a
34Rotberg, Transformative Political Leadership.
35Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla, H istorical D ictionary o f  Botswana.
36Samatar, An African Miracle.
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technocrat than an inspirational leader as Seretse K ham a was. H ow ever as M orton  and 
Ram say point out, it w as under M asire that B otsw ana rea lly  overcam e its developm ental 
challenges and poverty. M asire’s efficient bureaucratic  approach w as instrum ental in the 
developm ent o f  the N ational D evelopm ent Plans. Leith show s that “cen tral to  the success 
o f  the N D Ps was the role o f  M asire. As m inister, v ice-president and B D P secretary 
general, he carried  considerable clout in cab inet and the governing party . U nder his 
leadership, the planning process w as not a m ere public  relations exercise to  a ttract donor 
funds, to  be ignored in actual practice; ra ther it becam e a central part o f  the process o f  
govem m ent.” 37N evertheless, the com m on trait betw een K ham a and M asire  is that they  
possessed a m utual vision for B otsw ana’s developm ent and  prosperity.
G o v er n m e n t
A rguably, the structure o f  B otsw ana’s leadership has influenced its governm ent to 
an extent. Sam atar describes B otsw ana’s political system  as “being  dom inated  by  a 
coalition o f  w ealthy, w ell-educated, cattle ow ning  political elites w ho are com m itted  to
38rapid econom ic grow th in the fram ew ork o f  a  largely  free enterprise system .” T herefore, 
it w ould be rem iss to assum e that the effectiveness o f  its governm ent is un rela ted  to its 
cohesive and com petent leadership. N evertheless, its governm ent structure  in itse lf  bears 
further looking into because a strong leadership in itse lf does not y ie ld  a low  degree o f  
the resource curse. W ithout the cooperation and effort o f  the governm ent adm inistra tion , 
it is unlikely that a resource-rich  country can overcom e its developm ental challenges 
even w ith a strong and effective leader.
37Leith, Why Botswana Prospered , 58.
38Samatar, An African M iracle, 67.
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B otsw ana stands out as the exception in th is level o f  analysis as w ell. T he country  
often  has been hailed as the A frican m iracle not only for its econom ic perform ance but 
also its political success. It is the only A frican  coun try  that has m ain tained  an 
uninterrupted constitutional dem ocracy since independence. T he literature o ften  describes 
B otsw ana as a pinnacle o f  good governance. T able  1 illustrates the 2013 Ibrahim  Index o f  
A frican G overnance. As pictured, one can  see tha t B o tsw ana’s rating in re la tion  to  o ther 
resource-rich A frican countries is significantly  higher. The only o ther country  that ranks 
above B otsw ana is the resource poor country o f  M auritius. O f  course one w ould  expect 
that a country that is m ore politically  stable and that exercises good governance w ould  
have less difficulty  w ith the resource curse, how ever, w hat is m ore im portan t in th is 
circum stance is the reason w hy B otsw ana has exercised such  efficiency in m ain ta in ing  a 
stable dem ocratic regim e since independence w hereas N igeria  has not.
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Table 6.3: Botsw ana's Perform ance on the Ibrahim  Index of A frican  G overnan ce
2013 O VERALL IBRAHIM  INDEX SCO RE
Rank Change ChangeCountry Score etnce
2000
Rank Country Spore since
2000
1 Mauritius 82.9 +7.3 28 Niger 50.4 +7.6
2 Botswana 77.6 +5.6 29 Liberia 50.3 +24.8
3 Cape Verde 76.7 +6.0 30 Djibouti 48.2 + 1.7
4 Seychelles 75.0 +5.5 31 SietfaLeofte 48.0 +14.8
5 South Africa 71.3 +0.6 32 Comoros 47.8 +6.9
6 Namibia 69.5 +2.3 33 Rftkfiia 47.6 +5.1
7 Ghana 66.8 +5.3 34 Mauritania 47.3 +0.7
8 TAuiia 66.0 +4.4 35 -Clitiiiriot m o ' .+32 ' .
9 Lesotho 61.9 +7.7 36 Togo 45.8 +8.2
10 Senegal 61.0 +4.3 37 Madagascar 45.7 -11.7
11 Sao Tome & Principe 59.9 +3.2 38 Libya 45.3 -0.4
12 Zambia 59.6 +8.6 39 Angola 44.5 +18.1
13 Benin 58.7 +2.5 40 Burundi 43.8 +8.8
14 Morocco S8.0 +5.1 41 . Nigeria / 43.4 +0.8
15 Rwanda 57.8 + 10.9 42 Guinea 43.2 +6.2
16 Malawi 56.9 +5.2 43 CORgO
Cote
43.0 +8.0
17 Tanzania 56.9 + 1.4 44 d'Ivoire 40.9 + 1.8
18 Uganda 56.0 +5.5 45 EquatorialGttiftea
Guinea-
40.9 +8.8
19 Egypt 55.0 +0.4 46 Bissau 37.1 -1.8
20 — - Mozambique — —54.8— +2.3----- — . _ .4 2 Zimbabwe . I S A 2*L3L.-j.
21 Kenya 53.6 + 1.5 48 Chad
Central
33.0 + 1.2
22 Gambia 53.6 +4.0 49 African
Republic
32.7 +3.8
23 Burkina Faso 53.0 + 1.2 50 Eritrea
Congo,
31.9 -5.5
24 Gabon 32.8 +6.4 51 Democratic
Rep.
31.3 +7.3
25 Algeria 52.5 +1.3 52 Somalia 8.0 -1.7
26 Swaziland 50.8 +4.3
27 Mali 50.7 -0.0
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D evelopm ental State A spects
Insu la ted  B ureaucracy
One obvious explanation for this phenom enon is the fact that B otsw ana is a 
developm ental state. It is unsurprising that the top  tw o countries on the Ib rah im  Index are 
the ones that are frequently  deem ed as developm ental states in the literature. T he concept 
o f  the developm ental state in A frica is no t a foreign o r novel concept. B ecause  o f  A frica 's 
history and struggle w ith state-led developm ent during  the 1970s, how ever, it is o ften  an 
overlooked elem ent in  analyzing and explaining developm ent issues. V ery  few  A frican  
states have found the righ t m ix o f  governm ent in terven tion  and free enterprise. B otsw ana 
stands am ong these few  countries that have m anaged  to  do that. B o tsw ana achieved  
sustained high econom ic grow th rates under a dem ocratic  regim e yet pursued  state-led  
policies. W hereas m ost other A frican countries that enlarged the ro le o f  the state 
succum bed to  authoritarian regim es or inept and corrupt pseudo dem ocracies.
Leftw ich describes Botsw ana as a “dom inant-party  developm ental dem ocratic  
state”39, thus im plying that it is possible for a country to be au thoritarian  yet dep ict 
aspects o f  a developm ental state. N evertheless, B otsw ana has m anaged to m ain tain  this 
developm ental state m odel w hile thriv ing as a strong  constitutional dem ocracy . Leftw ich 
pointed out that the sim ilar central features am ong all these states (w hether dem ocratic  or 
non-dem ocratic), include: “a dedicated developm ental elite, relative au tonom y for the 
state apparatus, a com petent and insulated econom ic bureaucracy, a  w eak  and 
subordinated civil society, the capacity  to  m anage effectively  local and foreign  econom ic 
interests and a varying balance o f  repression, legitim acy and  perform ance, w hich  appears
39Leftwich, States o f  Development: On the Prim acy o f  Politics in Development.
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to succeed by offering a trade-o ff betw een such repression  as may ex ist and the delivery  
o f  regular im provem ents in m aterial circum stances.,,40A lthough Lefitwich’s analysis o f  
this type o f  state is by no m eans w holly positive it does present an im portan t argum ent 
and that is the pow er, efficiency and autonom y o f  the bureaucracy. H olm  show s that “T he 
tw o presidents (referring to  Seretse K ham a and Q uett M asire) have pro tec ted  the civil 
service from  m ost political interference. Politicians m ust deal only  w ith  perm anen t 
secretaries w ho both presidents have insisted should  give no political favors.”41
The e ffic ie n c y  o f  the  C ivil Service
There are two predom inant reasons tha t can be  attributed to  the efficien t 
functioning o f  Botsw ana's civil service. The first is that entry into the civ il service is 
contingent upon successful com pletion o f  the c iv il service exam ination. In o ther w ords, 
the civil service is strictly based on a m eritocratic  system  as opposed to  the notorious 
patron-client system  that can be found in N igeria 's bureaucratic adm inistra tion . H olm  
w rites that "entry into the civil service and the position  obtained is based  a lm ost 
com pletely on the level o f  form al education  com pleted and perfo rm ance in 
exam inations."42
Second, the indigenization o f  B otsw ana's civil service proceeded at a gradual 
pace. As m entioned in the previous section, th is can be partly ascribed  to K ham a's 
steadfastness to  nonracialism . In addition to K ham a's reluctance to quick ly  expel B ritish  
officials, B otsw ana also faced a severe labor shortage upon  independence; therefore  it 
w ould not have been prudent to rapidly indigenize the civil service because there w as the
40Ibid., 176.
41John Holm, "Development, Democracy and Civil Society in Botswana," in Dem ocracy and D evelopm ent, 
ed. Adrian Leftwich (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996).
42lbid.
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w orkforce w as insufficiently educated. Because o f  this labor shortage the coun try  had to  
im port several British expatriates in o rder to fu lfill the labo r requirem ents in the new ly  
independent adm inistration.43 W hat this gradual localization showed w as tha t no t only  
d id B otsw ana abstain from  the rapid A fricanization o f  public  servants, dep icting  the 
country 's steadfastness to non-racialist principles; it also show ed that the governm ent w as 
w illing to em ploy the m ost capable and qualified peop le  in order to run  the adm in istra tion  
regardless o f  their citizenship o r nationality.
G radual indigenization o f  the civil service also served  another purpose. B ecause 
the British expatriates w ere experienced bureaucrats and a lso  non-B otsw ana nationals, 
they w ere not easily sw ayed b y  political influence. As one author posits “ A frican ization  
proceeded at a very slow  pace, thus insuring th a t m ost technical m anagem ent positions 
rem ain w ith persons inclined to  resist political in fluence.”44 This w as a critical step  in 
m itigating corruption w ithin the civil service.
The com bination o f  m eritocratic civ il service system and the gradual 
incorporation o f  B otsw ana local population into the  civil service crea ted  an unparalle led  
efficient and relatively non-corrupt bureaucratic adm inistration.
The Prim acy o f  Pre-colonial and P ostcolon ia l Institutions
A nother w ay in w hich B otsw ana m arkedly  differs from  N igeria is ev iden t in the 
strength o f  its institutions. A gain, it is an obvious answ er th a t the resource-rich  country  
w ith stronger institutions w ould  experience a low er degree o f  the resource  curse, bu t as 
seen as in the previous section, a m ore im portant or interesting question  is to  find out 
w hy that is the case. I put forth here that in the case  o f  Botsw ana, a sim ple  yet overlooked
43Samatar, An African Miracle.
44Holm, "Development, Democracy and Civil Society in Botswana."
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explanation can  be found in the seam less m erging o f  its pre-colonial and  postco lonial 
institutions.
In looking at the im pact o f  good institutions on the level o f the resource curse in a 
country it is easy to overlook the effect that pre-colonial institutions have had  on the 
coun try ’s econom ic and political viability. This is especially  relevant to countries that 
were form er colonies because m any once subjugated developing countries have 
w itnessed the erosion o f  their traditional institutions in lieu o f  the postco lonial institu tions 
o f  the respective colonizer. N igeria is a prim e exam ple o f  this.
In contrast to m any postcolonial A frican countries B otsw ana on the o ther hand  
did not experience an erosion o f  its traditional institu tions. As d iscussed  in C hap ter 5, 
because B otsw ana was a protectorate and not a  crow n co lony  the B ritish  allow ed the 
Tsw ana chiefs to play and im portant ro le in the form ation o f  the B otsw ana postco lonial 
state. It is unusual to  look at culture as a contributing fac to r to a co u n try ’s econom ic 
and/or political success, how ever in this circum stance it is critical to  assess the im pact o r 
the extent that the m ajority T sw ana group has had  on B o tsw ana’s h istorical 
developm ent.H jort finds that “econom ic success is m ore likely  in coun tries w here post­
colonial econom ic institutions are consisten t w ith pre-ex isting  inform al arrangem en ts.”45 
Therefore, the m aintenance o f  its trad itional institu tions contributed to the capacity  to  
build sound dem ocratic institutions, w hich  underg ird  the country's ab ility  to  m itigate 
harm ful political outcom es o f the resource curse.
T raditional culture is not only im portant for the  continuation o f  indigenous 
institutions but it is also a crucial aspect o f  m ain tain ing  legitim acy. A ccord ing  to
45Jonathan Hjort, "Pre-Colonial Culture, Post-Colonial Economic Success? The Tswana and the African 
Economic Miracle," Economic H istory Review  63, no. 3 (2010).
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Engelbert, the m ajor d ifference betw een A frican  states that are econom ically  and 
politically successful and those that are not can be found in their legitim acy. H e view s 
states that have m aintained their traditional institu tions in to  the postco lonial period  as 
‘legitim ate s ta tes’. W hereas, those countries in w hich  traditional institu tions have been  
supplanted or undercut by colonial regim es as ‘illeg itim ate’. Engelbert a rgues that the 
consequence o f  such a break in continuity  is that the  illegitim ate states have to obtain  and 
m aintain pow er by force rather than by the w ill o f  the people.46This cou ld  explain  the 
unchallenged dem ocratic transition w ithin B otsw ana 's governm ent adm inistration . 
Because o f  the state 's unchallenged legitim acy, there has been rela tively  little d issen t 
from  traditional com m unities; especially  since the traditional ch iefs have been  
incorporated into an advisory ro le in the governm ent, the H ouse o f Chiefs. T herefore, the 
preservation o f  pre-colonial institutions has been  param ount in m ain tain ing  leg itim acy 
which in turn contributes to  the overall political stability  ev ident in B otsw ana.
The S e x  us betw een  Pre-colonia l a nd  P ostco lon ia l In stitu tio n s
The next question w ould be w hy  is it th a t B otsw ana's pre-co lonial institu tions 
were preserved w hile N igeria's w ere not. Both countries w ere  form er B ritish  co lonies ye t 
have experienced divergent paths in term s o f  the developm ent o f f  postco lon ial 
institutions. W hereas N igeria has w itnessed  m ore  o f  a supplanting o f  its p re-co lonial 
institutions w ith B ritish inspired postco lonial ones, B otsw ana has m anaged  to 
syncretically blend its institutions.
As m entioned above one possible explanation  for th is could be because B otsw ana 
was a Protectorate and not a Crow n Colony. U ndoubtedly , th is had an im pact on  the type
46Pierre Englebert, State Legitimacy and D evelopm ent in Africa (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002).
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o f  governance approach the British adm inistration em ployed under co lonial rule. R otberg  
describes the British rule in B otsw ana as that o f  a ‘neglectful tru s tee .’47 T his w as 
prim arily because o f  B otsw ana’s arid clim ate; it w as d ifficult for B ritish adm in istra to rs to 
settle. Som e authors see this neglectful trustee relationship  betw een co lon izer and 
colonized as an im pedim ent to institution build ing. A cem oglu  et al show  that postco lon ia l 
countries w ith strong private property institu tions tended to  have a  large co lon ia l settler 
population.48In  contrast, colonies w ith w eaker p riva te  p roperty  institutions had  a sm aller 
settler population.49B ecause o f  this hands o ff  approach  tha t the B ritish  adm in istra tion  
em ployed in the m anagem ent o f  B otsw ana, one w ou ld  expect that institu tions w ou ld  be 
relatively w eak in Botsw ana. This goes to show  that there must be o ther con tribu ting  
factors to  B otsw ana’s strong institutions besides the  fact that it was a  P ro tecto rate  and  not 
a C row n Colony.
A  com pelling explanation for B otsw ana’s strong institutions could  possib ly  be 
found in the structure, organization and cohesiveness o f  the pre-colonial T sw ana culture. 
Due to the fact that B o tsw ana’s arid clim ate m ade it d ifficu lt for the B ritish  to  settle, a 
large num ber o f  T sw ana chiefs w ere left in pow er. Furtherm ore, because  o f  the efficien t 
organization and stm cture o f  the T sw ana group, the British saw little need  to uproo t the 
pre-existing institutions. H jort explains that “the centralized  and hierarchical na tu re  o f  the 
T sw ana polities, w hich proved useful for the B ritish, is one o f  the reasons w hy 
B otsw ana’s political institutions and cu lture  w ere n o t ob litera ted  by
47Rotberg, Transformative Political Leadership.




colonialism .”50A dded to this, by the late 19th century  the  m ajority o f  the dom inance 
Tsw ana group, the N gw ato, had  all converted  to  C hristianity . This fu rther bu ttress the 
overall cohesion and unity w ithin the T sw ana ethnic group.
The im portance o f  the Tsw ana group in the developm ent o f  curren t institu tions 
cannot be overstated. O ne exam ple o f  a trad ition  that has carried over into contem porary  
politics is the use o f  the com m unal advisory council, the kgotla. The prim ary  purpose o f  
the kgotla  w as to m itigate tyranny by the chiefs. It a lso  served the purpose to  resolve 
conflicts and disputed am ong com m unity m em bers. R otberg  describes the kgotla 's 
functions as:
“A ga thering  o f  a ll the p eo p le  a ro u n d  a c h ie f  fo r  period ic  consu lta tions a n d  the  
thrashing ou t o f  village, chiefly o r param oun t-ch ie fly  business. The severa l layers o f  
kgotla fu n c tio n e d  to resolve disputes, to advise the village heads o r  superio r chiefs on  
how p la in tiffs  or defendants shou ld  be trea ted  a n d  their cases adjudicated, to decide  a n d  
to im pose collective responsibility, to enable notables a n d  others to a ir  opinions, a n d  to 
discuss a n d  to p rovide  advice on threats to the  village o r  the tribe. The kgo tla  co u ld  
fu nction  as a  parliam ent, a  court o f  law, o r an adm in istra tive  body. ”51
This goes to show that pre-colonial T sw ana culture set the p receden t for present- 
day policies and actions as regards to d ispute resolution.
In term s o f  the m anagem ent o f  natural resources, traditional T sw ana cu lture is 
also evident in present day policies and decision-m aking. Leith accounts that because 
B otsw ana’s clim ate is so arid the Tsw ana becam e accustom ed  to sav ing  du ring  tim es o f  
providence so that during the periods o f  drought they had a  stockpiles o f  food supply  in
50Hjort, "Pre-Colonial Culture, Post-Colonial Economic Success? The Tswana and the African Economic 
Miracle," 694.
5'Rotberg, Transformative Political Leadership, 68.
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order to sustain their com m unities during these harsher periods.52L eith  argues that th is 
attitude has carried  over into the post-independent period.53 We can clearly  w itness th is 
pattern o f  saving and long-sightedness during the m odern-day adm inistration. A s stated  
in the previous section, B otsw ana's foreign exchange reserves have served  the purpose as 
a safety net during periods o f  recession and o ther harsh  econom ic tim es w here the 
com m odity prices have drastically fluctuated. A rguably, the use o f  the kgo tla  and o ther 
Tsw ana traditions has had a great im pact on  B o tsw ana’s efficien t developm en t 
planning.54
D evelopm ent P lanning
Thus, in addition to the syncretic b lend ing  o f  pre-colonial and  post-co lon ial 
institutions B otsw ana's governm ent has also carefu lly  engaged  in developm ent p lanning . 
This careful planning and com m itm ent to developm ent can be found in the 
im plem entation o f  projects through the use o f  the  N ational D evelopm ent Plans. T hese 
plans also entail strategies on how to spend and invest its resource revenues. H olm  notes 
that the developm ent planners set the developm ental agenda. He p resen ts ev idence that 
“the developm ent planners block others from  access to  this agenda by rigorously  
enforcing a planning regulation that no developm ent funds are allocated unless a p ro ject 
is in the current plan or has gone through a supplem entary  review process w hich  takes a 
year.”55
This p lanning becam e instrum ental upon  the discovery o f  d iam ond  m ines. In 
order to successfully m anage its m ineral revenues the governm ent created  several funds.
52Leith, Why Botswana Prospered.
53Ibid.
54Ibid.
55Holm, "Development, Democracy and Civil Society in Botswana."
204
As m entioned in the first section o f  th is chapter, one o f  these funds w as the R evenue 
Stabilization Fund, w hich it created in 1972 in order to guard against the  vo latility  in 
com m odity p rices.56 A nother fund it created w as the Public D ebt Service Fund  w hich  w as 
also created in 1972 in order “ to save m oney rather than spending it; it kep t expenditure  
growth below  revenue grow th.” 57Pegg also h ighlights that Botsw ana has m itigated  
against the m ost harm ful effects o f  the D utch disease by  only spending nonrenew able  
resource revenues on public  goods and capital investm ent.58
The im portance o f  sound developm ental p lann ing  has also  con tribu ted  to 
econom ic diversification. A dm ittedly, the B otsw ana econom y is no t as d iversified  as it 
could potentially  be, how ever w hat is m ore im portan t is that the developm ent p lanners 
have identified the urgency or the need  to  im prove in this area. H olm  points ou t that “ in 
the 1980s and 1990s, state planners focused on reinvesting  th is incom e in to  coal and soda 
ash m ines, w hich was an em erging m anufacturing  sector, and also in transporta tion  and 
com m unication system s.”59
As one can expect, success in the governm ental sector was and  con tinues to  be 
crucial in B otsw ana's econom ic success. As a  resource-rich  country, it w as im perative 
that the governm ent im plem ent policies that w ould  benefit the country in both the short 
and long-term . In particular, the strength  and autonom y o f  its bureaucracy  has been  
crucial in this regard. It is prim arily  because o f  th is  bureaucratic  autonom y that B otsw ana 
has been labeled a developm ental state. This stands in contrast to m any o f  its resource- 
rich counterparts such as N igeria. Instead  o f  adop ting  characteristics o f  a  R en tier state,
56Pegg, "Is There a Dutch Disease in Botswana?."
57Ibid„ 16.
58Ibid.
59Holm, "Development, Democracy and Civil Society in Botswana."
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the Botsw ana governm ent has obviated these effects entirely  and instead pursued  the path  
o f  a developm ental state fram ew ork.
C iv il S o c ie ty
The th ird  and final aspect that contributes to  the degree o f the resource curse in a 
country can be seen in its civil society. B otsw ana again presents an exception  in th is 
regard because the governm ent has utilized the co u n try ’s diam ond revenues in  o rder to 
fund social and developm ent services. A rguably , because the  country has had  such an 
efficient provision o f  public goods and a  stable econom y, its civil society  has no t been  as 
vociferous about socioeconom ic issues as seen in N igeria.
W hile arguably Botsw ana does not have a strong civil society  by W estern  
standards, it appears to  be relatively m ore influential than N igeria's fo r several reasons. In 
this section I show  that Botsw ana has exhibited  a h igher level o f  dem ocratic  freedom s, an 
overall better educated and m ore inform ed citizenry, and a  greater level o f  collaboration  
am ong organizations. A ll these factors com bined have contributed to  a re la tive ly  m ore 
influential civil society w hich have been m obilized  to address socioeconom ic and 
developm ental challenges and thus reducing the resource curse. S im ilar to the N igeria  
chapter, donor funding is not as significant as the aforem entioned factors because the 
m ajority o f  N G O s in Botsw ana derive a substantial portion  from m em bersh ip  dues and 
foreign donors.
Several studies have criticized the lim ited influence that civil society  has had in 
Botswana. T aylor asserts that although B otsw ana has been  a stable dem ocracy  since 
independence, a true test o f  a dem ocracy should b e  w itnessed  beyond the polling  stations. 
He argues that the strength o f  a country 's civil society  is a be tte r indicator o f  the degree o f
r
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dem ocracy. Furtherm ore, he claim s that B otsw ana's civ il society is w eak  and under 
threat.60 Taylor cites that a m ajor reason for this is because "the governm ent ow ns several 
m edia outlets including "several radio stations and the daily new spaper, The D a ily  
News. "^T aylor also describes several law s that h inder the  progress o f  the civil society  in 
Botswana: "the N ational Security A ct o f  1986, w hich gives the S tate po ten tia lly  
repressive pow er to penalize legitim ate reporting; the A nthropological A ct o f  1967, 
w hich restricts research and lim its access to inform ation; and  Section 59 o f  the Penal 
Code, which provides for penalties for causing ‘public  a la rm ’. In addition , the E conom ic 
Crim es and C orruption A ct o f  1994 restricts bo th  access to and coverage o f  in form ation  
regarding ongoing police investigations into corruption  allegations."62 U ndoubtedly , 
Botsw ana faces several im pedim ents to  civil society  organization, in  add ition  to the 
reasons Taylor cites, o ther explanations for B otsw ana 's purported w eak  civil society 
include: “ lack o f  sufficient N G O  funding, lack o f  organizational capacity , lack o f  hum an 
capital and a high turnover o f  senior staff.”63
In addition to this, although B otsw ana has been a stable m ulti-party  dem ocracy  
since independence, the dom inance o f  the BD P in every election has m ade B o tsw ana a de 
facto one-party state. Popular contest o f  this one-party  dom inance is reflec ted  in the 
em ergence o f  opposition political parties. Som olekae citing  D ingake (1998) po in ts to  the 
im portance o f  m ultiple political parties. She show s that "political parties provide the 
m achinery w ithin w hich  differing political view s can be form ulated and  translated  into
60Ian Taylor, "Botswana's Civil Society: Weak and under Threat," in S ta te  o f  R esis tance: P o p u la r  S tru g g les  
in the G loba l S o u th , ed. Francois Polet (London, UK: Zed Books, 2007).
61Ibid.
“ ibid.
63Zein Kebonang and Kabelo Kenneth Lebotse, "Reflections on the Legislative Environment for 
Nongovernmental Organizations in Botswana," The In te rn a tio n a l J o u rn a l o f  N o t-fo r-P ro fit L a w  12, no. 4 
(2010 ).
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concrete program m es. This affords individuals the chance to take part in po licy  m aking  
process."64
Furtherm ore, unlike m any other A frican countries, B otsw ana w as for the m ost 
part neglected during B ritish colonial adm inistration. Som olokae show s that "B otsw ana’s 
poverty and inadequacies at independence w ent beyond the scarcity o f  financial resources 
and skilled m anpow er. The country a lso  lacked the institutional in frastructu re  for 
developm ent. The sm all civil service inherited  at independence had  been  geared  
predom inantly to the m aintenance o f  law  and order. It w as inadequate for the  dem anding  
developm ent agenda o f  the new  governm ent."65 T herefore, upon independence, the 
governm ent had to  engage in w idespread state-building. In fact, it is because  o f  the 
lim ited role that the B ritish governm ent p layed  that p ropelled  the en largem ent o f  the state 
in Botswana. This heavy involvem ent o f  the state in institution bu ild ing  and  econom ic 
growth severely lim ited the scope o f  civil society.
D espite these lim itations how ever since the 1990s Botsw ana has w itnessed  a 
resurgence o f  its civil society. C arroll and C arroll show  that in the 1980s on ly  2 local 
organizations consistently  lobbied the governm ent, how ever by the 1990s th is burgeoned  
into over 100 civil society groups.66This goes to show  that the country’s civ il society  has 
been progressing despite the initial im pedim ents to  civil society participation . In addition  
to this the governm ent has recognized the need to  incorporate NG Os into the dem ocratic  
process and in fact has m ade concrete efforts in o rder to  do so. In 2001, the  M in istry  o f  
Labour and Hom e A ffairs enacted a N ational Policy  for N on-G overnm ental
64Gloria Somolekae, "Democracy, Civil Society and Governance in Africa: The Case o f  Botswana," 
( 1 9 9 8 ) .
65Ibid.
66Carroll and Carroll, "The Rapid Emergence o f  Civil Society in Botswana."
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O rganizations. This policy  clearly stated the u rgent need for im provem ent in state-civ il 
society relations:
“N G O s are an im portant sector in national developm ent. As w ith  governm ent and 
the private sector, they are strategic institutions that facilitate the developm ent and 
sustenance o f  a vibrant dem ocracy. Experience has a lso  shown that N G O s are key 
in prom oting peoples participation. A s the  econom y unfolds, the ro le o f  N G O s 
w ill continue to  increase and expand. By creating alliances w ith  governm ent and 
the private sector, the N G O  sector w ill strengthen the  environm ent in w hich  real 
dem ocracy can flourish. This underlines the need for a healthy civil society  tha t is 
supported by N G O s, the private sector and the G overnm ent.”67 
Therefore, w hile there is room  for im provem ent in B o tsw ana’s civil society, because the 
governm ent has m ade a conscious effort to include the participation o f  organizations into 
policy discussions, the country has experienced a  m ore profound im pact o f  civil society 
m obilization. This is reflected by the increased civil society  participation in B otsw ana. 
A ccording to the civil society um brella  organization, B otsw ana C ouncil o f  N on- 
G overnm ental O rganizations (B O C O N G O ), w hich  was established in 1995, there are 
approxim ately 130 registered organizations. A lthough th is  is a substan tia lly  low er 
num ber o f  organizations than reported in N igeria, it is n o t necessarily  because civil 
society is less vibrant in B otsw ana but it could be  because o f  the d isparity  in  population  
betw een the tw o countries.
In addition to the fact that the B otsw ana governm ent has been  m ore recep tive to 
the concerns o f  the civil society, B otsw ana’s relatively  stronger perfo rm ance in the
67The G overnm en t o f  B o tsw ana, "N ationa l Policy  for N o n -G o v ern m en ta l O rg an iza tio n s ,” M in is try  o f  
L abour a n d  H om e A ffa irs  (February  2001): 8.
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follow ing areas allows for a relatively m ore influential civil society, w hich  in turn  has 
had the effect o f  m itigating certain aspects o f  the resource curse such as corrup tion  and 
conflict.
First, in contrast to  N igeria, B otsw ana is a  strongly consolidated dem ocracy  w ith  
firm ly instituted civil and political freedom s. F reedom  H ouse ranks B otsw ana as free 
w ith an overall rating o f  2.5 (on a scale o f  1 to  7, w here 1 =  best; 7 =  w orst). 
Furtherm ore, the coun try ’s civil liberties and po litical righ ts were ranked  as 2 and 3 
respectively. This evidence runs contrary  to T aylor's assessm ent that the governm ent 
infringes on the rights o f  the press. This evidence also  im plies that B otsw ana w ould  have 
a m ore conducive dem ocratic environm ent in w h ich  civil society m obiliza tion  w ould  be 
successful.
Because o f  the strength o f  B otsw ana's civ il and political rights, civ il society  
organizations have been  afforded latitude to freely  p ro test and voice their op in ions in 
regards to grievances. A n exam ple o f  this was illustrated  in  2011, w here there  w as a 
nationw ide public sector strike that included approx im ately  100,000 un ion  w orkers. 
W orkers dem anded a  16 percent increase in w ages from  the governm ent. U nion  leaders 
argued that the governm ent had not increased the  salaries o f  public service w orkers for 
m ore than 3 years. This resulted in a w eek-long strike w here several pub lic  services w ere 
disrupted. The resolution o f  the m atter resulted  in  the governm ent p rov id ing  a 3 percen t 
increase in public sector salaries. D espite the fact that the initial 16 percen t increase w as 
not m et, the fact that union leaders and the B otsw ana governm ent w ere ab le  to  com e to  a 
resolution signifies the latitude that civ il society  organizations have in  pe tition ing  for 
change in governm ent policies.
210
As m entioned in the previous section, the  strength o f  B otsw ana's institu tions has 
its underpinnings in traditional T sw ana culture and  politics. This w as especially  ev iden t 
in the consultative nature o f  the council o f  elders, the kgotla. To som e exten t th is 
tradition o f  engaging in dialogue betw een leaders and the com m unity has continued  into 
m odem  day practices. The strength o f  B otsw ana's civil and  dem ocratic freedom s w ould  
allow  for a m ore receptive governm ent and  thus a  relatively  m ore influential civ il society. 
Furtherm ore, the introduction o f  d iam onds in to  the econom y has no t eroded  these 
dem ocratic rights and freedom s. In fact, as A cem oglu, Johnson and R obinson  have cited, 
it is because o f  B otsw ana's firm ly institu ted  dem ocratic institutions p rio r to  the d iscovery  
o f  diam onds that have allow ed the country  to escape the resource curse. U ndoubted ly  
then it is also because o f  Botsw ana's relatively  stronger dem ocratic institu tions that has 
allow ed to have a  relatively h igher degree o f  to lerance for civil society  than  seen  in 
N igeria.
Second, there is also a relatively  h igher level o f  collaboration betw een  civil 
society and the state in B otsw ana instead o f  confrontation. Again, th is cou ld  be because 
o f  the relative hom ogeneity  o f  B otsw ana. In con trast to  N igeria, w hich  has so m any 
com peting ethnic factions all w orking tow ards d issim ilar goals, B o tsw ana’s society  is 
relatively cohesive. C ohesiveness does no t necessarily  guarantee effectiveness but it does 
guarantee a certain  level o f  unity  w hich not only  low ers the degree o f  po ten tia l ethnic 
rivalry w ithin and across civil society organizations but also  contributes to  a low er level 
o f  corruption and nepotism  w ithin the N G O  sector. T he establishm ent o f  the um brella  
N G O  organization, B O C O N G O  especially  cem ented  the relationship betw een  civil 
society and the state. C arroll and C arroll report that "governm ent offic ia ls saw  the
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establishm ent o f  um brella organizations as a w ay  o f  sim plifying and system atiz ing  
interactions w ith  civil society."68
C ontrary to  Taylor's criticism s, B otsw ana's governm ent has been  w illing  to 
engage in civil society strengthening and co llaboration  program s. In 2012, FH I360 in 
collaboration w ith the USA ID  and the B otsw ana governm ent im plem ented "the M aatla  
project, a five-year project aim ed at significantly  and sustainably strengthening  the 
capacity o f  the civil society sector in B otsw ana to  support HIV and A ID S and  rela ted  
health  service delivery ."69 This project is one exam ple o f  the am enab le  rela tionsh ip  
betw een the civil society and the B otsw ana governm ent.
M audeni expresses that the state 's w illingness to  address socioeconom ic and 
developm ental issues in collaboration w ith the civil society  is a b e tte r ind ica to r o f  the 
strength o f  a  dem ocratic society rather than  the strong state/w eak society  dynam ic in 
w hat he term s as "m utual criticism  in each other's p resence."70 A s m entioned  before, 
often tim es a  strong civil society is m easured by  its po ten tia l to challenge and confron t 
the state, how ever, in the case o f  B otsw ana, w hile the governm ent is receptive to 
dialogue, it is not so m uch receptive to  open confrontation. Furtherm ore, 
M audeniaddresses the purported w eakness o f  B otsw ana's civil society in elaborating  that 
"the m ain reason w hy Botsw ana's civil society is o ften  considered w eak  is because it has 
staged very few  violent clashes w ith the governm ent leading to reversal o f  policies, the 
hallm ark o f  a  strong W estern civil society. T h is E urocentric w ay o f  m easuring  the
68C arroll and  C arro ll, "T he R apid  E m ergence  o f  C iv il S oc ie ty  in B otsw ana."
69U SA ID , "M & E  G lobal C apacity  B u ild ing  S eries #1 M aa tla  P ro ject,"  B uild ing  C a p a c ity  in  A n a ly s is  o f  
D istr ic t H IV /A ID S  D ata : W orkshop R ep o rt fr o m  C hobe H ea lth  D istr ic t (O ctober 2012).
70Z ibani M aunden i, "M utual C ritic ism  and S ta te /S o c ie ty  In te rac tion  in B otsw ana," J o u rn a l o f  M odern  
A frican  S tud ies  42 , no. 4 (2004).
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strength o f  civil society seem s to be inappropriate  for B otsw ana politics, w here lengthy  
debates are com m on and confrontations are unusual."71
This could  be attributed to traditional T sw ana institutions and since B otsw ana 's 
population is relatively hom ogenous, the m ajority  o f  the stakeholders in  the civ il society  
com m unity ascribe to this position  o f  non-confron tation  in favor o f  dialogue. 
M audeninotes that "in Tsw ana political culture, v io len t clashes and public  rid icu le are 
rejected, but the state leadership is often w illing to  m eet w ith  trade un ions and  N G O s and 
share views w ith them ."72 This shows us therefore  that an  active civil society  is no t 
necessarily depicted by vociferous outbursts o f  d isconten t b u t instead it cou ld  be  show n 
by m utual critical debates and dialogues.
On a th ird  and related note, another possib le  ind icato r o f the rela tively  h igher rate  
o f  effectiveness in B otsw ana's civil society can  be found  in the country 's level o f  
education. B otsw ana has a 95 percent prim ary com pletion  rate.73 Furtherm ore, its adu lt 
literacy rate (15 years and older) is 85 percen t.74 W hile arguably a h igher level o f  
education does not necessarily  guarantee greater success in civil society  m obilization , it 
certainly helps in the organization and d issem ination  o f  inform ation, suggestions and  
policy recom m endations in a non-violent m anner. As previously m entioned  the 2011 
labor strike w as a good exam ple o f  labor unions and N G O s com ing together in o rder to 
address a m atter o f  social inequity.
A ddressing issues in a peaceful m anner is crucial for successful nego tia tion  
betw een N G O s and the state. It is unclear as to  w hether th is is because o f  its po litical
71 Ibid.
72Ibid.
73 W orld  B ank Ind ica to rs, h ttp ://d a ta .w o rld b an k .o rg /in d ica to r/S E .P R M .C M P T .Z S
74 W orld  B ank Ind ica to rs, h ttp ://da ta .w orldbank .o rg /ind ica to r/S E .A D T .L IT R .Z S
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culture or because o f  the high rate o f  education o r both. H ow ever, one w ould  expect that 
the degree o f  education certainly plays a part in m itigating v io len t incidents o f  
m obilization because education opens up alternative channels o f  com m unication. I f  th is is 
the case then B otsw ana’s h igher literacy rate and p rim ary  com pletion  rate w ould  
contribute to the h igher level o f  civil society effectiveness as com pared to  N igeria.
The fourth and final factor addresses the topic o f  N G O  funding, B otsw ana bears 
sim ilarities to N igeria  in that N G O s derives a substantial portion o f  their funding  from  
m em bership fees and a m yriad o f  donor sources. N G O s have lim ited their requests for 
funding from  the governm ent for fear o f  political persuasion  and corruption . C arro ll and 
C arroll show that "a num ber o f  N G O leaders v iew ed that relying on the state for funding 
o ther than for specific projects w ould be dangerous."75 This presents challenges for 
B otsw ana's civil society because a substantial portion  o f  external foreign assistance has 
been reduced over the years because their econom y has g row n  so rapidly.
O n a final note, the collaboration betw een dom estic  NGOs and the  global civil 
society has a lso  been relatively  m ore successful in B otsw ana. The K im berley  P rocess 
C ertification Schem e, w hich is a m ultistakeholder in itiative consisting  p rim arily  o f  
governm ents has been m ost pivotal in curbing the  course. T h is  KPCS w as first form ed in 
2003 in order to  m itigate the prevalence o f  conflict d iam onds in w ar to m  d iam ond-rich  
countries such as A ngola and Sierra Leone. M oore elaborates that "the schem e regulates 
the rough diam ond trade by  outlining the rules tha t d iam ond producers, d iam ond  traders, 
and diam ond consum ers m ust follow. Its aim  is to  pro tect the legitim ate trade in rough 
diam onds w hile preventing the flow o f  conflict d iam onds."76 A dm ittedly, B otsw ana did
75C arro ll and C arro ll, "T he R ap id  E m ergence  o f  C ivil S o c ie ty  in B o tsw ana ."
76B rig it M oore, "T he K im berley  P rocess" (A m erican  U niversity ).
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not have an issue w ith d iam ond-related conflicts, how ever its accession to the K PCS 
dem onstrated once again the governm ent's com m itm ent to engaging in  non-state  
approaches to  curb the resource curse. In fact, B otsw ana was one o f  the founding  
governm ents o f  the KPCS. This com m itm ent to  reducing the negative socioeconom ic 
factors associated w ith conflict d iam onds has been  illustrated  by the overall rela tively  
low er incidence o f  corruption and conflict in B otsw ana. However, the fact that the 
Botsw ana governm ent has spearheaded the initiation and im plem entation o f  the K PCS 
again points to the heavy-handedness o f  the state and the limited scope o f  the civil 
society.
Conclusion
Botsw ana has experienced a low degree o f  the resource curse n o t because it has 
avoided all the econom ic and political aspects o f  the resource curse, bu t ra ther it is 
because it has tem pered the harm ful effects o f  the curse by im plem enting  specific  
m easures in order to  prevent or reduce the negative consequences associated  w ith  
resource dependency.
First, this chapter show ed that there is som e degree o f  the resource curse evident 
in Botswana. It has struggled w ith diversifying its econom y, a com m on sym ptom  o f  the 
Dutch disease and it has been vulnerable to external com m odity shocks such as g lobal 
recessions like any other resource-rich  country. H ow ever, it has tem pered these aspects o f  
the resource curse w ith the use o f  stabilization funds and  other p ruden t saving and 
investm ent policies.
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Furtherm ore, we have no t seen a high rate o f  foreign debt o r p revalen t corrup tion  
in Botswana. O ne o f  the reasons for this is again  because the governm ent has carefu lly  
im plem ented developm ent plans that have allow ed the country  to  lim it the am ount o f  
governm ent expenditure during boom  periods. C orruption has also been  kep t a t a 
m inim um  w ith the im plem entation o f  specific po lic ies in order to  address such illicit 
crim es such as bribery and rent-seeking. Thus, in  show ing the extent o f  the resource curse 
in B otsw ana one could  say that it has had a low  to m oderate  im pact on  the coun try  
because o f  critical m easures u tilized  by  the governm ent in  order to tem per these com m on 
aspects o f  the curse.
W hat is m ore im portant how ever is to  explain  w hy  o r how B otsw ana has been 
able to tem per these aspects o f  the resource curse, w hich  have allow ed it to  experience 
such a low degree o f  this phenom enon that ram pantly  afflic ts  the m ajority  o f  resource- 
rich A frican countries. The research show s tha t the coun try  has done so because o f  
certain unique attributes that can be found w ithin  its leadership, governm en t and  civil 
society.
For one, B otsw ana’s leaders have dem onstrated  a  cohesive and united  leadership  
stem m ing from  sim ilar socioeconom ic and educational backgrounds. This consistency  in 
socioeconom ic standing and unity  w ith in  its leadership has facilitated consisten t dec ision ­
m aking. W hat this m eans is tha t the potential fo r factional conflict o r strife w ith in  the 
leadership has been relatively m inim al. In no sm all term s d id  the first p resident, Seretse 
K ham a contribute to this unity and cohesive v ision  o f  B otsw ana’s leadership . K ham a’s 
charism a, com posure, m oral steadfastness and overall gradualist approach  to
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developm ent w as param ount in setting B otsw ana on the righ t path to sustained  econom ic 
growth.
Two, another factor central to  B otsw ana’s ability to  tem per the resource curse can 
be attributed to the stability and effectiveness o f  its state. It is o ften  argued  in the  
literature that B otsw ana is a developm ental state. A rguably, this is one o f  the facets o f  the 
state that has helped to  facilitate its efficiency in tem pering certain aspects o f  the  resource  
curse. The m ost critical com ponents o f  the developm ental state include an insulated  
bureaucracy and an efficient civil service. B otsw ana has depicted all o f  these a ttributes. 
Evidence show s that entry into the coun try ’s civil service is strictly based  on m eritocratic  
standards and not nepotism  o r cronyism  as seen in m any other resource-rich  A frican  
countries. This has contributed to the relative au tonom y and  insulation o f  B o tsw ana’s 
bureaucracy. It is difficult to politically  sw ay bureaucrats by  granting favors because o f  
the rigid m eritocracy.
U ndoubtedly, as a resource-rich  country, the state-level attribu tes have greatly  
helped to curtail critical aspects o f  the resource curse. B otsw ana is perce ived  as one o f  
the least corrupt A frican countries according to T ransparency  International. Indisputably , 
upholding the standards o f  m eritocratic  entry into the civ il service and keep ing  its 
bureaucrats aw ay from  the political sw ay o f  private in terest groups have con tribu ted  to 
the overall low level o f  corruption in B otsw ana. This has in turn o f  course  a ided  the 
country from  succum bing to ram pant rent-seeking despite its resource w ealth  as seen  in 
other resource-rich countries such as N igeria.
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Three, Botsw ana, sim ilar to m ost o ther A frican  countries has an em erging  yet 
weak civil society. M any critics have argued that despite the fact that B otsw ana is a  de 
ju re  dem ocracy, the governm ent has repressed political oppression.
Regardless o f  these criticism s how ever, it is im portant to rem em ber that B otsw ana 
is still a relatively young dem ocracy in com parison  to  the U.S. and W estern  E uropean  
countries. Thus, in analyzing its civil society it is im portan t to  com pare it no t to  advanced  
industrial econom ies but instead to countries o f  sim ilar historical underpinnings. A nother 
im portant point to rem em ber is that the em ergence o f  the civil society w as p rim arily  in 
response to the state’s failure to  provide certain key  services that are necessary  for a  fully 
functioning dem ocratic society. B ecause the B otsw ana state for the m ost part has been  
largely effective in providing the requisite goods and services to its population , the rise o f  
an influential civil society has been less urgent than  it has been  in o ther A frican  countries.
It is also im portant to rem em ber that B otsw ana has invested a sign ificant portion  
o f  its diam ond revenues into public  services. The dem and fo r increased transparency  and 
accountability from  grassroots organizations in term s o f  reporting resource revenues have 
not been as salient or urgent as depicted  in N igeria. B otsw ana is often  c ited  as escaping 
the resource curse because o f  its governm ent's capable and  effective m anagem ent o f  its 
diam ond revenues. In o ther w ords, because the governm ent has already done such a good 
jo b  in curtailing the harm ful econom ic and  political ou tcom es o f the  resource curse, the 
civil society’s influence is lim ited in scope because the  people do n o t see th is is a 
developm ental issue.
An im plication o f  this is that the B otsw ana governm ent is able to  shape and 
im plem ent such policies that are prudent to the  effective m anagem ent o f  its resource
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revenues because o f  the lim ited scope and reach o f  B otsw ana's civil society. T his begs 
the question is civil society really  an independent variable that explains the ex ten t o f  the 
resource curse or is it m ore an antecedent variable that helps to explain  the rela tionsh ip  
betw een other independent variables and the resource curse.
O verall, we can see based  on the evidence that B otsw ana’s leadership  and 
governm ent bear the greatest m agnitude in explaining the extent o f  the resource curse. 
Because o f  critical decision m akers that the first set o f  leaders m ade, nam ely  Seretse 
Kham a and Quett M asire, B o tsw ana’s econom ic success was shaped by  a path  
developm ent dynam ic. Further, because o f  the cohesive nature o f  its leadership , the 
continuity o f  these policies only  assisted in im proving the coun try ’s econom y and 
dem ocracy, which have led to an  increased resilience in tem pering dam aging  aspects o f  




One w ould expect that oil and  hard  m inerals w ould  be a v iab le source o f  
econom ic prosperity  for developing countries; in o ther w ords, natural resources shou ld  be 
a blessing and not a curse. H ow ever, in m any developing countries, in particu lar sub- 
Saharan A frican states, the evidence has been the contrary . This is the core o f  the 
resource curse argum ent, that is, there  is an observable inverse rela tionsh ip  betw een  
resource abundant countries and econom ic grow th. T he literature h igh ligh ts several 
causes o f  the resource curse; the m ost prevalen t o f  w h ich  are: the D utch  disease, 
com m odity price volatility, debt overhang and corruption.
Dutch disease occurs as a resu lt o f  the appreciation  o f  the exchange rate due to  a 
sudden influx o f  foreign exchange revenues. T his in turn  appreciates the value o f  the 
local currency rendering exports m ore expensive and im ports cheaper. A  cycle begins 
w here the country significantly increases the ra te  o f  im ports at the expense o f  dom estic  
production. A gricultural and m anufacturing sectors typ ica lly  decline w hen  a  country  
endures the D utch disease problem .
Resource-rich countries are h ighly  vulnerable to  external p rice  shocks because 
their econom ies are so dependent on the export o f  their m inerals and/or oil. T his can be a 
double-edged sw ord for a resource-rich  country because w hen  global com m odity  prices 
are high, the country experiences a sudden  increase in revenues. This s ituation  causes the 
previously aforem entioned problem , the D utch disease. B u t on the o ther hand, w hen 
global com m odity prices plum m et, resource-rich  countries typically encounter a bust o r a
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slum p. Again, because o f  the lack o f  econom ic diversification and sole dependence  on 
the export o f  one particular m ineral or oil, these countries are  generally very  vulnerable  
to  any fluctuation in m arket prices.
R esource-rich countries also experience a  problem  with foreign external debt. 
During boom  periods, countries tend to  engage in short-sighted borrow ing . B ecause o f  
the high prices o f  their com m odity, m any o f  these countries borrow against the hope that 
prices will rem ain high for a long period o f  tim e, w hich is usually not the case. A dded  to  
that, during boom  periods, governm ents tend to  enlarge their expenditures and pub lic  
sectors. This usually results in the purchase o f  w hite  elephant projects.
The m ost heinous o f  effects how ever has been corruption. W idespread  corruption  
occurs predom inantly because m ost resource-rich  countries (especially oil exporters) do 
not need to tax their populations in o rder to generate governm ent revenues. B ecause o f  
the lack o f  a firm ly institutionalized tax system , governm ents within these countries are 
unaccountable to  their populace. A dded to  this problem , m any resource-rich countries are 
based on neopatrim onial politics; therefore, resource revenues are w idely  used  to buttress 
clientilistic netw orks.
D espite the salience o f  the resource curse thesis, som e countries have m anaged  to 
tem per the effects o f  it. One exam ple o f  such a country  is Botsw ana. D espite  be ing  
diam ond rich, B otsw ana has m aintained a steady  econom ic growth in a  stable political 
environm ent. This study has presented a com parative case study o f  B otsw ana w ith  sub- 
Saharan A frica’s largest o il exporter, N igeria. S tanding  in contrast to  B otsw ana, N igeria  
has endured foreign debt, negative econom ic grow th, poverty  and inequality . In addition  
to this the country has had a sordid past w ith  m ilitary  rule, political corrup tion  and  regim e
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instability. Som e o f  the rem nants o f  N igeria 's h istory  continue to adversely  affect the 
country presently  such as public sector corruption.
B ased on the d ivergent experiences that these tw o countries have had w ith the 
resource curse, this study had posed the question: W hat accounts fo r  the d ifference  in the  
degree o f  the resource curse betw een N igeria  a n d  B otsw ana?  I use the  w ord  degree here 
to indicate that the resource curse should be construed  no t as a d ichotom ous value as 
m any studies have suggested, but instead shou ld  be analyzed  as a  con tinuum  rang ing  
from  very low to very high. I have argued in th is  thesis tha t N igeria has experienced  a 
very high degree o f  the resource curse w hereas B otsw ana has encountered a  rela tively  
low degree because o f  critical differences in the  countries' leadership, governm ent and  
civil society.
First, B otsw ana's presidency has been  characterized by  transform ational 
leadership and cohesiveness. T he country 's first p residen t, S ir SeretseK ham a, especially  
w as pivotal in paving a path for developm ent. K ham a im plem ented critical po licies 
during his tenure that aided in the long-term  transform ation  o f  resource w ealth  into 
sustainable econom ic growth. N igeria, on  the o ther hand, has w itnessed a series o f  rulers 
that were prim arily  concerned w ith aggrandizing w ealth  for their personal coffers. 
A pproxim ately decades after independence, leadership  transition  involved the usu rp ing  o f  
pow er by m ilitary generals instead o f  by dem ocratic  e lections. A gain these leaders w ere 
solely interested in ruling by their personal w him s instead  o f  by constitu tional pow ers 
entrusted to them.
Second, B otsw ana follow ed a governance m odel that countered the effects o f  the 
resource curse. The developm ental state governance m odel em phasizes a strong,
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centralized, autonom ous bureaucracy. O ne o f  the positive results o f  such a system  w as 
that B otsw ana developed a highly efficient civil service strongly based  on m eritocracy. 
This level o f  professionalism  and autonom y in B otsw ana's bureaucracy has con tribu ted  to 
an overall relatively  low er level o f  corruption in the  public sector. N igeria  in contrast has 
succum bed to the Rentier state effects. In addition  to its overdependence on oil, N igeria  
also encounters a high degree o f  political factionalism  w here disparate ethnic groups are 
em broiled in a zero-sum  skirm ish over resource revenues. It is argued here  in th is thesis 
that this is the prim ary m otivation for N igeria 's insid ious corruption.
Third, civil society in B otsw ana w hile arguably  w eak  by W estern  standards, is 
relatively stronger than N igeria. This is becausethere is a greater degree o f  co llaboration , 
organization and factionalization. A lthough, B otsw ana has few er dom estic  civil society  
organizations than N igeria, the few  that are active has less com peting in terests and ethnic 
divisions. This is not to say that all o f  B otsw ana's N G O s are w orking together tow ards a 
com m on agenda but w hat it does show  is that the rela tively  ethnic hom ogeneity  o f  the 
population has contributed to an overall h igher level o f  effectiveness in their civil society 
than in N igeria 's. Furtherm ore, because o f  the m ore dem ocratic nature o f  the B otsw ana 
governm ent itself, civil society organizations have been able to w ield m ore in fluence on 
political issues. Botsw ana's civil liberties and political righ ts are relatively  freer and thus 
the potential for societal m obilization is greater. Finally, because the governm ent has so 
effectively provided public  goods and services for the population, the p rim ary  concern  o f  
civil society groups in  B otsw ana has not been regarding the governm ent's red istribu tion  
o f  resource rents; instead,focus has been g iv ing  to o ther pressing issues such as the 
S tate’s treatm ent o f  the Basarw a people and also the prevalence o f the H1V/A1DS virus.
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Theoretical Im plications
This research suggests a num ber o f  theoretical im plications for resource endow ed 
African countries. The first im plication is that a greater em phasis needs to be p laced  on 
the study o f  leadership in analyzing the resource curse phenom enon. M any political 
science studies focus strictly on state levels o f  analysis at the expense o f  ind iv idual traits 
and behavior. This is a  m ajor draw back for the  field w hen  it com es to  intricate and 
com plex issues such as the resource curse. The role o f  B otsw ana's leadersh ip  in the 
successful m anagem ent o f  its natural resources has illustrated  the im portance o f  studying 
leadership traits and attributes.
B otsw ana’s first president, SeretseK ham a was instrum ental in shaping  the 
coun try ’s policies in a  w ay that precluded the resource curse. N ot only  did he  renego tia te  
a favorable agreem ent w ith D eB eers but he also m anaged  to  persuade the popu lation  and 
other m em bers o f  governm ent into a unified vision o f  the country . A s d iscussed  
throughout this study, K ham a w as described as a charism atic  figure that w as able to 
w ield his influence w ith in  his C abinet and also am ong  his constituents. Thus, in looking 
at the resource curse, one cannot overlook certain  individual d ispositional factors such as 
charism a.
W ith that being said, charism a does not alw ays lead to positive ou tcom es fo r a 
country. There are m any exam ples o f  sim ilarly  charism atic  leaders in A frica  w ho led 
their countries tow ards an  econom ic dow nw ard  spiral instead  o f  im prov ing  the living 
conditions o f  the country. This is w here education  and socialization becom e m ore 
im portant. K ham a spent a significant portion o f  h is adulthood years study ing  in Europe; 
this w as one o f  the reasons w hy he w as not in fluenced  by the w idespread pan-A frican ism
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and Socialism  m ovem ents during the im m ediate post-independent period. Instead, 
K ham a’s ideas w ere m ore W esternized and cosm opolitan  in scope. T h is is no t to  say  that 
W estern values are in any shape superior to Pan A frican  ideas, but w hat it does show  is 
that K ham a w as influenced m ore by dem ocratic and free m arket ideas than  the m ajority  
o f  o ther Sub-Saharan A frican leaders. Therefore, it w as a  com bination o f  K ham a’s 
personal attributes and these acquired  W esternized ideas that shaped  his unique 
perspective on leadership. The com bination o f  these attributes and values em pow ered  
him to deviate from  the prevailing ideological and political doctrines o f  that era, w hich  
turned out to be the m ost fortuitous direction for B otsw ana.
A  broader im plication o f  this analysis is that it is im portant to  look at no t ju s t  a 
country’s political system  but it is also  im portant to  observe and  understand  the 
socialization o f  its leaders. It w ould  be far m ore difficult to  in troduce ideas o f  
dem ocratization and free m arket principles in  a country  w ith  leaders that have not been  
exposed to  W estern ideas and values. Therefore, in looking  at the po ten tia l for success o f  
newly endow ed A frican countries, it is pivotal that one looks not ju s t  at the strength  o f  
the dem ocracy but also at critical d ispositional factors and  also how  their leaders w ere 
socialized.
Econom ic and political success is not solely con tingen t on leaders how ever. The 
type o f  governance is also crucial. M any have argued th a t resource-rich  coun tries tend  to 
have bad governance policies because o f  the unaccountability  tha t o il and  m ineral 
revenues generate. This has been  one o f  the m ajor argum en ts o f the R entier state thesis. 
H ow ever, not every resource-rich  country that is dependen t on the export o f  their 
resources succum bs to  the R entier state dynam ic. A gain, using  B otsw ana as the  exam ple
225
in this circum stance, this study had highlighted that it is possib le to generate  a sign ificant 
portion o f  governm ent revenues from  m ineral extraction yet avoid  succum bing  to 
characteristics o f  a R entier state such as corruption  and non-dem ocratic tendencies.
Several studies have proposed taking the resources out o f  the hands o f  the 
governm ent in order to com bat this dynam ic, such  as dom estic p rivatization . H ow ever, 
the problem  w ith  propositions such as these is tha t none o f  these strategies w ill w ork i f  a 
country has a prevailing Rentier state dynam ic w ithin the bureaucracy; how  w ill 
privatization w ork  i f  the governm ent and its band o f  elite po litical supports are 
entrenched in corruption? P rivatization  w ould sim ply resu lt in the sam e cronyism  
structure where favors are granted to  a  sm all band  o f  elites. T herefore, p riva tiza tion  
w ould not help to m itigate the m ajor facet o f  the R entier sta te , corruption.
In fact, one could argue that corruption is no t only a cause o f  the resource curse, 
but also an effect o f  the R entier state dynam ic that occurs as a result o f  the over reliance 
on natural resources for governm ent revenues. W hen a country is h igh ly  dependent on 
natural resources in order to sustain the governm ent's coffers, a h igh  degree o f  sho rt­
sightedness is engendered especially i f  the regim e is dem ocratic. In a w eak  constitu tional 
dem ocracy, the likelihood o f  siphoning oil o r m ineral revenues for p rivate  gain  increases 
if  the R entier state dynam ic is sustained. In a  w eak and corrupt dem ocracy , w hen a 
political leader sees that he/she has a lim ited am ount o f  tim e in office, it is in h is/her best 
interest to capture as m uch rent as possib le during  this tim e period. O ne cou ld  argue that 
the added elem ent o f  dem ocratic term  lim its in resource-rich countries p lagued  w ith  
corruption only m akes the rent-seeking problem  worse. Thus, w hile  corruption  is 
construed as a  cause o f  the resource curse, it can  be v iew ed as an effec t also. This is no t
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to say that there w ould be no corruption in N igeria  i f  it d id  not have oil. H ow ever, the 
presence o f  an abundant source o f  revenues com bined  w ith neopatrim onial po litics 
creates an even greater opportunity  for corruption, squandering and m ism anagem ent o f  
revenues, which all contribute to  the R entier state. Thereby, rooting ou t corrup tion  is an 
unobtainable feat if  structural governm ent patterns are not altered. A  m yriad  o f  ad hoc 
anti-corruption initiatives can be setup and im plem ented, how ever, i f  the underg ird ing  
governance m odel is unaltered, the likelihood o f  these initiatives being successfu l is very 
low.
For exam ple, this study had poin ted  out th a t in the case o f  N igeria  corruption  is 
greater because o f  the neopatrim onial rela tionships w ithin the governm ent. Furtherm ore, 
due to the heterogeneous nature o f  the population , this creates a zero-sum  com petition  
environm ent w here politicians see the scram ble over oil resources on  a  ‘first com e first 
serve basis’. It is possible that a sim ilar scram ble fo r revenues would have ex isted  even in 
the absence o f  oil. O nce there is a source o f  ex ternal revenue, that is revenues acquired  
from  sources other than dom estic production (e.g . foreign aid), there w ill be a scram ble 
over resources.
Social m ovem ents in sub-Saharan A frica have been particularly instrum ental in 
ending civil conflicts, encouraging governm ent accountability  and transparency  and 
im proving civil and political rights. T hey  have  been especially helpful in p lay ing  an 
active role in the dem ocratization process in sub-Saharan Africa. H ow ever, how  relevant 
is the civil society in com bating the resource curse?
I have argued in this study that the activ ities o f  local and  in ternational civil 
society organizations have been and continue to be instrum ental in shedd ing  ligh t on the
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resource curse. Especially since the recent d iscoveries o f  o il and natural gas reserves in 
East A frica, international CSO s such as O xfam  have  been even  m ore vocal abou t using  
this new found resource w ealth  to transform  these  developing states into em erg ing  
econom ies w ith  sustainable econom ic growth.
H ow ever, as we can see in the tw o cases observed in this study, the scope and 
influence o f  the civil society is contingent upon how  m uch the  governm ent allow s these 
organizations to m obilize and engage in the po litics associated  w ith natural resources. 
Shedding light on a problem  is one th ing but actually  com ing up w ith  solutions to  the 
lack o f  transparency and accountability  is far m ore d ifficult. In the case o f  N igeria , w e 
saw  that the EITI while a useful m ulti-stakeholder in itiative in itse lf  has no t m arked ly  
changed the level o f  corruption in the country. A n  im plication  o f th is is that there  needs 
to be a greater degree o f  in ter-relation and in ter-com m unication  betw een the governm ent 
and civil society. In o ther w ords, civil society groups w orking independen t o f  the 
governm ent in order to im prove transparency in o il revenues m ay p resen t som e m odicum  
o f  progress how ever it is insufficient. In order for v iab le , effective, an ti-corruption  
strategies to work, there needs to be closer collaboration  betw een  civil society 
organizations and governm ent agencies.
Furtherm ore, in countries such as B otsw ana w here the governm ent has already  
instituted effective m easures to preclude particu lar aspects o f  the resource curse such as 
corruption, how  influential can the civil society be  in cases such as these? T his is no t to 
say that the role o f  the civil society is unnecessary  in these types o f  coun tries, bu t rather 
how  can they be included in the d iscourse? A gain, c lose  collaboration is critical. 
H ow ever, in strong states such as B otsw ana, this is a  less v iab le path. A n im plication  o f
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this is that W estern notions o f  dem ocracy w ith strong dem ocratic institu tions and an 
active and vibrant civil society m ay not apply to  all non-W estem  countries. The case o f  
Botsw ana presents an excellent exam ple o f  a country  that has been a  stable dem ocracy  
since independence yet not does not dep ict the characteristics o f  an active and influential 
civil society as seen in the W est. D oes th is m ean that B otsw ana’s dem ocracy  is no t as 
effective or institutionalized as W estern  societies such as the U.S.? O r could  it m ean  that 
the m easure o f  dem ocracy varies and it adaptab le based on critical contex tual elem ents 
such as region, culture, and colonial history?
Finally, does an active civil society equate to an influential civ il society? Is it 
possible for a country to have far less com peting  yet m ore effective and influential civil 
society groups? In a m ultifarious country  such as N igeria, it is inevitable that m ultip le 
civil society groups w ill have com peting  agendas. In a country  with a h istory  o f  in ternal 
strife and ethnic conflict, having m ultip le groups w ith  d ivergent interests m ay underm ine 
dem ocracy instead o f  im proving it. H ow ever, in  a country such as B otsw ana w here the 
population is relatively less heterogeneous and  civil society  is re la tive ly  w eak  and 
passive, it is possible that on critical issues such as those rela ted  to the resource curse , the 
few but organized voices o f  the people are  far m ore effective.
Lim itations
There are four m ajor lim itations to  this study. The first potential lim ita tion  rela tes 
to the d issim ilar resources in the tw o case studies. As m entioned earlie r in this study, 
both countries possess poin t-source type resources how ever while the source o f  the 
natural resources are the sam e, the countries vary  in term s o f their com m odities. It is
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strongly plausible that oil presents a greater p roblem  o f  m ism anagem ent than  diam onds. 
The fact that oil possesses the largest share o f  the  global trade signifies that there are far 
m ore actors involved in the production and d istribution o f  this resource. Furtherm ore, 
because o f  the significance o f  oil in the global trade this also m eans that the political 
stakes and potential revenues are  substantially  h igher than  that o f  d iam onds. T herefore, 
another potential direction for future research  is to  conduct an in-depth study  o f  tw o  oil- 
rich countries such as N igeria and A ngola in o rder to test the falsifiability  o f  the s tu d y ’s 
theory controlling for sim ilar com m odities.
Second, the countries also d iffer in geographical size, region and  population. 
N igeria is W est A frica’s m am m oth w ith a large heterogeneous population ; w hereas 
Botsw ana is a Southern A frican country w ith a  significantly  sm aller popu lation  w ith  a 
strong regional trading relationship w ith the regional hegem on, South  A frica. The 
possibility exists that N igeria’s geographical size, large population and  m ultifarious 
ethnicities present greater challenges for the m anagem ent and distribution o f  its resource 
revenues. In com paring it to a relatively  sm aller country  such as B otsw ana, it is possib ly  
at an unfair disadvantage. A possible approach that could  be taken for fu ture research  is 
to com pare resource-rich countries o f  relatively  sim ilar geographical size, location and 
population. H ow ever, again one w ould run into the problem  o f  com paring coun tries w ith  
sim ilar resources. The A frican continent is so d iverse and divided into m any  countries 
with varying geographical sizes, languages and ethnicities that it w ould  be  particu larly  
difficult to find two countries w ith  sim ilarities in size, population and com m odity  type.
Third, this dissertation only focused on  tw o case studies. W hile, sign ifican t 
differences w ere observed am ong the tw o countries, it is still unclear w hether these
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observations can be generalized to the larger population  o r w hether B otsw ana is sim ply 
an aberration am ong the resource-rich A frican countries. T he inclusion o f  o ther cases into 
the study w ould  allow  us to test if  these patterns in leadership, governm ent and civ il 
society are present in other countries as well, and  if  so, would sim ilar effects o f  the 
resource curse be observed.
Fourth, the study could have also taken  advantage o f p rim ary  data  such as 
interview s, surveys, o r direct observation. O ne o f  the m ajor advantages o f  using  p rim ary  
sources is that the research has com plete control over how  the data is collected . H ow ever, 
th is control also has several disadvantages; one o f  w hich is the  significant cost associa ted  
w ith conducting field research; also, collection o f  prim ary data (especially  in term s o f  
field  research) can take up a considerable am ount o f  tim e and  due to  the exped ien t nature 
o f  this particular dissertation, it w ould not have been feasible to engage in extensive 
prim ary data collection in the lim ited tim e fram e o f  this project.
Future R esearch
This project has several potential avenues for fu ture research. For one, despite  the 
fact that the resource curse has been studied ex tensively  since the 1990s, there has been 
no decisive quantitative index that m easures the  degree o f  the resource curse w ith in  
countries. The closest an index has com e to m easuring  the resource curse is R evenue 
W atch Institu te’s Resource G overnance Index. H ow ever, while th is index  focuses on 
resource-rich countries it does not m easure the extent o f  the resource curse, instead  it 
m easures the quality o f  these countries governance based  on  specific criteria. T here  are 
also other indices that relates som ew hat to certa in  aspects o f  the resource curse (such  as
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corruption and conflict), but again  there has not been an  index designed specifically  to 
m easure all critical aspects o f  the curse. Thus, a good segue into future research  w ould  be 
to develop an index that m easures the degree o f  the resource curse based  on the factors 
m entioned in this study and any other factors that are central to  the resource  curse.
Two, a m ore focused in-depth study o f  the resource curse in these tw o countries 
could be achieved through the use o f  prim ary  research  m ethods. T herefore, one o f  the  
possible paths for future research could be through the interview ing o f  rela ted  offic ia ls in 
the oil and diam ond industries in N igeria  and B otsw ana respectively. T hese expert 
interview s w ould provide us w ith vital inform ation about how  the respective coun tries 
governm ents address issues related to the  resource curse.
A  third avenue that could be taken  is by expanding the research to  a m ulti-case  
study. Introducing other cases to the study w ould  help us to identify  i f  there  is a 
consistent observable pattern based on  the th ree levels o f  analysis w e described  
throughout th is discourse. Possible cases that could  be studied include N am ib ia  and 
A ngola w hich are diam ond and oil p roducing countries respectively. A no ther approach  
that could be taken is to restrict the analysis so lely  to e ither oil o r d iam ond  p roducing  
countries. Thus, the study could  potentially  include four o f  A frica’s top p roducing  
diam ond countries such as Botsw ana, N am ibia, Sierra L eone and L iberia  o r four oil- 
producers such as N igeria, A ngola, G hana and Cam eroon.
Fourth, another potential area for research relates to the increase in  illic it capital 
flows since the globalization era. In countries w ith  high corruption rates, pub lic  sector 
officials tend to stockpile these illicit funds into offshore bank  accounts. T he 
im provem ent in m obile technology and other form s o f  qu ick  or easy pay m ethods have
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m ade these transactions m uch easier. Therefore, a  plausible research p roblem  cou ld  be to 
exam ine the relationship betw een technological advancem ent and the resource curse. H as 
there been an increase in corruption w ith in  these countries since the era  o f  g lobalization  
because o f  these technological im provem ents? O r has it m ore or less rem ained  the sam e? 
These w ould  be interesting questions to exam ine in a future project.
A nd lastly, another strong point fo r research w ould be to exam ine the tax  system s 
w ithin selected cases. For exam ple, w ould the tax structure w ithin a coun try  w ith  a low  
extent o f  the resource curse be m ore firm ly institu tionalized than in a coun try  w ith  a high 
degree o f  the curse? N o research done to  the best o f  m y know ledge on the association  
betw een a  resource-rich coun try ’s tax system  and the resource curse. W hile the literature 
shows that in general resource-rich countries do not need to  tax their popu lation , these 
studies do  not provide in-depth descriptions on these coun tries’ tax regim es. T herefore, 
we cannot tell conclusively  w hether the population  is not taxed because o f  the influx o f  
resources or if  it is because the tax system  is inchoately established. For exam ple, how  
strongly institutionalized was N igeria’s tax system  before the  oil boom ? T his leads us to 
exam ine w hether the tim ing o f  tax institu tions m atter. Is it possible to im plem ent an 
efficient tax system  even after d iscovery o f  natural resources? Again, these are questions 
that are insufficiently  addressed in the literature and w ould be worth exam ining.
Policy R ecom m endations
In order to am eliorate the critical aspects o f  the resource curse it is im portan t to 
address both the econom ic and political aspects o f  the curse. Several suggestions for 
m itigating the resource curse have been  provided  in the literature. Som e o f  these
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solutions have been m entioned briefly th roughout this discourse such as econom ic 
diversification. H ow ever, the problem  w ith  all the  proffered  solutions fo r the resource 
curse is that they autom atically  assum e that these countries already  have strong 
dem ocratic institutions.
Therefore, the first and forem ost task  is to strengthen dem ocratic  institu tions. 
Through dem ocracy, transparency and accountability  w ill be  im proved and th is w ould  
decrease the instances o f  corrupt behavior. This is no t to say that dem ocracy  is a  panacea 
for the resource curse, how ever based on the strength  o f  B otsw ana’s institu tions and  also  
the success that o ther resource-rich dem ocracies such  as N orw ay and the U .S. has had 
there is definitely  a positive correlation betw een dem ocracy  and a low  exten t o f  the 
resource curse. W hat this calls for then is an active agenda for dem ocratization. M any 
resource-rich countries in A frica  continue to  rely  on foreign aid from  W estern  
international financial institutions despite their resource w ealth . One o f  the w ays in w hich  
the internationally com m unity could assis t in th is  dem ocratization process is to setup 
m ore stringent policies regarding the d isbursem ent o f  aid to  non-dem ocratic countries or 
dem ocratic countries that have not lived up to all the criteria  in becom ing a fu ll-fledged  
consolidated and institutionalized dem ocracy.
A nother m ethod in w hich the in ternational com m unity  cou ld  a id  in the fight 
against the resource curse is to encourage resource-rich  countries to jo in  m ultistakeho lder 
initiatives such as the EIT1. G ranted, it is im possible to  com pel a country  to  jo in  an 
international organization how ever they can  be persuaded. A nd  a critical w ay  to  do th is is 
by creating incentives w hen a  country accedes to  particu lar m ultistakeholder in itiatives. 
O ne o f  the reasons the K im berley Process C ertification Schem e w as so successfu l w as
234
because o f  the global consensus against conflict diam onds. M any countries refused  to
trade w ith diam ond exporters w ho w ere con tribu ted  to rebel conflicts and civil w ars. T his
provided an incentive (or rather disincentive) for countries such as B otsw ana to jo in  the
KPCS. B y having the K PCS ‘stam p o f  app rova l’ on its diam ond trade, th is ensured
*
im porting countries that B otsw ana’s d iam onds w ere conflict-free and likew ise guaran teed  
and boosted B otsw ana’s position as a  d iam ond exporter that w as no t em bro iled  in 
conflict and corruption.
Lastly , it w illbeim portant for the governm ents o f  resource-rich coun tries to 
exercise far-sightedness. O ne o f  the m ajor w ays countries cou ld  ensure tha t their resource 
w ealth is transform ed into econom ic grow th for th e ir coun try  is by securing  a  favorable 
deal w ith the m ining com panies. A s John G hazvin ianpoin ts out, unlike m onopoly  oil 
producers such as Saudi A rabia, m any sub-Saharan A frican oil p roducers p resen t 
lucrative opportunities for oil com panies. M ost SSA  oil producers are poor develop ing  
countries that lack the technical expertise and/or the capital to drill and exp lore  for oil. 
Therefore, they sign PSA s w ith  the oil com panies; this allows the oil com panies to 
explore for oil and then split the profits w ith the host governm ent based  on  their 
agreem ent after the initial costs are deducted.77This lack o f  far sig thedness p resen ts 
problem s in the long-term  for the host governm ent because the com bination  o f  poverty  
and the low technical skills and experience p laces foreign m ining com panies a t an 
advantage during the negotiation process. Thus, it is im portan t to exercise far-sightedness 
at the initial signing o f  the deal or in w orse case  scenario, renegotiate term s at a later 
stage if  the conditions prove unfavorable for the co u n try ’s econom y.
77Ghazvinian, Untapped: The Scramble fo r  Africa's Oil.
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This is prim arily  w hy B otsw ana w as able to  use its d iam ond resources for 
generating econom ic wealth. The governm ent negotiated  a favorable m ining  deal w ith  
DeBeers from  the outset. N ew ly endow ed resource-rich  countries cou ld  learn a  lot from  
this far-sighted approach. It is best to leave the m inerals in  the ground  until favorable 
term s can be agreed upon by both parties instead o f  hastily  signing a long-term  agreem ent 
that places the host country a t a disadvantage. A n im portant po licy  im plication  is 
therefore that econom ic diversification needs to  be em phasized in new  and ex isting  
endow ed A frican countries. I f  a country has o ther viable econom ic op tions besides its 
m ining industry, this will decrease the incessant scram ble over resource revenues and 
prom ote far-sightedness during the negotiation process.
Furtherm ore, it is well know n that m in ing  agreem ents are often  no t setup  in favor 
o f  the resource endow ed countries. A side from  the fact that m ining com panies typ ically  
have m uch m ore experience in resource extracting than the host governm ents, ano ther 
m ajor reason for these unfavorable agreem ents can be attributed to the eagerness o f  host 
governm ents to close the m ining deal. H ow ever, if  the country 's econom y is d iversified  
into other industries such as m anufacturing, agricu ltu re  etc., the likelihood o f  the 
governm ent m aking a  rash decision that usually  results in an unfavorable agreem ent w ith 
foreign m ining  firms w ould dram atically  decrease.
The prospect o f  resource w ealth  ought to  bring increased econom ic grow th  and 
stability to  A frican countries. H ow ever, the reality  is i f  these resources are  m anaged  by 
corrupt politicians w ho are further buttressed by  sim ilarly  unscrupulous elite in terest 
groups, the probability  o f  this w ealth  p rovid ing  a  vast im provem ent to the popu lation  is 
low. This study had show n that w hat sets countries such  as B otsw ana apart in th is
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resource curse phenom enon is the fact that it had a  cohesive leadership, a rela tively  non ­
corrupt bureaucracy and albeit having a rela tively  w eak  civil society; it is far less 
characterized by factions as observed in N igeria. This study by no m eans p resen ts 
Botsw ana as a perfect society neither does it decry  the efforts that N igeria  has em barked  
on in m itigating the effects o f  the resource curse. H ow ever, what it does tell us is that 
overcom ing the resource curse cannot be approached  solely from  one level. M ost 
strategies to am eliorate the resource curse solely  focuses on what the governm ent can do 
or should be doing. How ever, the case o f  B otsw ana show s that it is a com bination  o f  
m ultiple levels that contribute to an overall low er level o f  the resource curse. G ranted , 
governm ent plays a significant role; how ever, it w as and continues to  be the cohesiveness 
o f  B otsw ana’s leadership that drives the critical efficien t policym aking w ith in  the 
governm ent. Furtherm ore, while adm ittedly B o tsw ana’s civ il society is no t as strong  as it 
could be by W estern  standards, the relative hom ogeneity  o f  the population , and the 
relatively low level o f  conflict and corruption  have all contributed to  a  m ore united  
strategy in im proving the livelihood o f  the overall population. In  short, before  the  
econom ic aspects o f  the resource curse can b e  addressed  (i.e. D utch  d isease, p rice  
volatility etc.), it is im portant to first address the  inefficiencies w ith in  the three p ivo tal 
aspects o f  a state: its leadership, governm ent and  civil society; on ly  then  can natural 
resources be beneficial to the entire population and  not ju s t a small band  o f  elites.
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